{ "id": 3383688, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UDEL BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Beltran", "decision_date": "1977-08-17", "docket_number": "No. 76-262", "first_page": "810", "last_page": "815", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 810" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404599 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953999 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 U.S. 923", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6358887, 6359213, 6359408, 6358548, 6358709, 6359038 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/364/0923-04", "/us/364/0923-06", "/us/364/0923-07", "/us/364/0923-02", "/us/364/0923-03", "/us/364/0923-05" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2738737 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5397461 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0301-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 11544, "ocr_confidence": 0.895, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.231081683874406e-08, "percentile": 0.3853284496509256 }, "sha256": "46508f93a07981260e45567220dc2a6e2055c603d2eac32a14c1df6247ae4406", "simhash": "1:7207d9209319c7cf", "word_count": 1961 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:54.645684+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UDEL BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of burglary and theft of property valued at less than *150, and sentenced to 1 to 3 years in the penitentiary. He appeals, contending that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined him regarding a prior felony conviction, and that a reversal of the trial court\u2019s judgment and sentence is therefore mandated.\nImmediately prior to trial, the defendant moved in limine for an order prohibiting the State from introducing certified copies of the defendant\u2019s prior convictions. This motion was granted in part, the trial court holding that the State would be limited to introducing only one of the defendant\u2019s four prior robbery convictions, in the event that the defendant took the stand. However, although the prosecutor then had a certified copy of one of the convictions marked for identification, through apparent inadvertence, it was never offered into evidence at trial.\nInstead, the defendant\u2019s prior conviction was presented to the jury during the prosecutor\u2019s cross-examination of the defendant, as follows:\n\u201cQ. Okay. Have you ever been convicted of a felony?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. What have you been convicted of?\nMR. MORELLI [defense counsel]: Your Honor, I\u2019m going to object to going into the circumstances of the previous conviction.\nTHE COURT: He admitted he\u2019s been convicted. That\u2019s sufficient. Objection sustained.\u201d\nThe State, implicitly conceding that the question was improper, contends that any error was waived by defense counsel\u2019s failure to make an immediate objection after the question was asked, prior to the defendant\u2019s answer. However, in view of our holding in People v. Cassman (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 301, this contention must be rejected. In Cassman, we held that it is improper to cross-examine a defendant as to his prior conviction of a crime, and that the error is of such magnitude that it constitutes plain error which may be considered by a court of review even where no objection to the offending question has been made at trial.\nNonetheless, it does not follow that a reversal of the defendant\u2019s conviction is mandated in this case. \u201cWhere the competent evidence shows, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty in a case where the jury are not the judge of the penalty to be inflicted upon the defendant, error will not ordinarily require reversal of the judgment of conviction.\u201d (People v. Tranowski (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 11, 17, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 923.) It has been stated that it is not the policy of courts of review in Illinois to reverse a judgment of conviction merely because error has been committed, unless it appears that real justice has been denied or that the verdict of the jury resulted from the error. (E.g., People v. Dudley (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 57, 61.) Thus, where the evidence against the defendant is such that the jury could scarcely have arrived at any other verdict, a conviction will be affirmed, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was subjected to improper cross-examination regarding a prior conviction. (People v. Madison (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 476, 488-89.) A review of the evidence adduced at trial is therefore necessary to the disposition of this appeal.\nThe complaining witness, David Michaels, testified that on May 12, 1975, he arrived at a tavern called the Romania Club, parked his car in the parking lot, leaving his keys in the ignition, and went inside. Michaels observed six patrons in the tavern, one of whom was the defendant, Beltran. In order to gain entrance to the tavern, it is necessary for a patron to operate a \u201cbuzzer\u201d at the door; whenever Michaels was in the tavern and the buzzer sounded, he would look up and observe the person who was entering. While in the tavern on this occasion, he observed an individual enter, purchase a six-pack of beer, and immediately leave. The only other person to leave the tavern while Michaels was there was the defendant, who left by himself and then returned and went into the men\u2019s room. Michaels remained in the tavern for what was apparently another 15 minutes to one-half hour, and then went outside, where he discovered that his car was gone. He returned to the tavern, and the police were called. On direct examination, Michaels testified that while he was waiting for the police to arrive, the defendant emerged from the men\u2019s room, holding Michaels\u2019 car keys in his hands, and asked Michaels \u201cif these were what [he] was looking for.\u201d Michaels replied that they certainly were, since they were his car keys. On cross-examination, Michaels evidently became confused on this point, since he seemed to indicate that the defendant gave Michaels the keys before Michaels went outside. However, on redirect, Michaels reiterated that defendant had given him the keys after Michaels had returned to the tavern in order to call the police. In any event, the defendant told Michaels that he had found the keys in the urinal in the men\u2019s room; however, Michaels observed that the keys were not wet. The defendant then asked Michaels if Michaels wanted him \u201cto stay around in case the police asked any question.\u201d\nAfter two police officers arrived, Michaels rode with them, looking for his car. They found it one block from the Romania Club. When Michaels and the officers returned to the tavern, they observed the defendant standing by his car with the hood up, working on the engine. Michaels returned to his car and discovered that two spare tires, a set of golf clubs, a pair of golf shoes, a motorcycle rack and a bumper jack were missing from the trunk, although the trunk opened normally after Michaels inserted the key, and there was no sign of a forced entry. Michaels then returned to the tavern parking lot, where he and the two officers observed a spare tire in the back seat of the defendant\u2019s car. Michaels identified the tire as the one which had been taken from his trunk, and the officers then checked the trunk of the defendant\u2019s car where they found the balance of the items which had been taken from Michaels\u2019 car trunk.\nBoth of the officers also testified at trial. One of the officers testified that the defendant told him that the golf clubs, shoes, spare tires and other items belonged to the defendant. The other officer stated that when he asked the defendant how the items in the defendant\u2019s car came to be found there, the defendant replied that he didn\u2019t know. The defendant also told the officers that he was working on his car because it wouldn\u2019t start.\nThe only witness presented by the defense, was the defendant himself. He testified that a man came up to him in the Romania Club on the evening in question, and offered to sell him some tires. The defendant said that he had never seen the man before, that the man was an inch taller than the defendant, with \u201cnot too long hair\u201d which was \u201cmore curley\u201d than the defendant\u2019s. He stated that the man was \u201cnot skinny\u201d but when asked for clarification, the defendant replied that the man \u201cwas skinny.\u201d The defendant said that he and the man went outside together, and walked to the man\u2019s car. The man opened the trunk and showed the defendant the tires, telling the defendant that he wanted *15 for them. The defendant gave the man *15, and the man then offered to sell the golf clubs, shoes and other items to the defendant for an additional *10. The defendant gave the man the amount he requested, took the items he had purchased, put them in his car, and went back into the tavern. He stated that he subsequently found Michaels\u2019 keys in the urinal in the tavern, gave them to Michaels, and told Michaels that he intended to remain at the tavern drinking in case Michaels needed him. He had a number of drinks, and then went out to his car, which wouldn\u2019t start. He was working on his car when the police approached him. He testified that he had told the officers that he didn\u2019t know anything about the items in his car, because he was afraid, since he didn\u2019t have a driver\u2019s license.\nUnder cross-examination, the defendant stated that he couldn\u2019t remember what kind of car the man who sold him the items in question had had, or whether the man\u2019s car was \u201cbig\u201d or \u201csmall,\u201d or whether it was a light or a dark colored car.\nOn this record, the jury could not have entertained a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt, regardless of whether or not there was any mention or evidence of his prior convictions. It is undisputed that Michaels\u2019 car was burglarized while he was inside the Romania Club drinking, that the car was subsequently found a mere block from the tavern, and that the defendant left and returned after 15 minutes or more, during the period of time that Michaels was inside. Since there were no signs of a forced entry, it is apparent that the offender used the keys which Michaels left in the ignition to open the trunk, and there was no question but that the defendant had had those keys in his possession, and that the items which were taken from Michaels\u2019 car trunk were found shortly thereafter in the defendant\u2019s car. Michaels\u2019 testimony established that the defendant was the only person to leave the tavern while Michaels was there, prior to the time that Michaels discovered that his car was missing, who had also been in the men\u2019s room where the car keys were purportedly found. It is true that this testimony was in conflict with the defendant\u2019s statement that he left the tavern in the company of the unidentified stranger who sold him Michaels\u2019 property, but the defendant\u2019s version of the event was rendered wholly implausible by the combination of his vague description of the unknown \u201cseller,\u201d his complete inability to recall even such basic details about the seller\u2019s car, as whether it was \u201cbig\u201d or \u201csmall,\u201d \u201clight\u201d or \u201cdark,\u201d and his subsequent statement that he didn\u2019t know how the stolen items came to be in his car. Similarly, the defendant\u2019s claim that he found Michaels\u2019 car keys in the urinal of the tavern restroom was rendered questionable by Michaels\u2019 uncontradicted testimony that the keys were dry when the defendant gave them to him. By contrast, though there was a degree of confusion in Michaels\u2019 testimony as to the exact time, and, in one instance, sequence of the events in question, his testimony was clear and convincing on every point relevant to the prosecution\u2019s case. The defendant\u2019s apparent willingness, as expressed to Michaels, to stay at the tavern and cooperate in any investigation was belied, to a degree, by his subsequent attempt to start his car, and readily explained by the fact that the inoperative condition of his car, which was filled with bulky, stolen items and parked in front of the tavern, left him with no other options.\nSince the jury could not have reasonably found that the defendant was not guilty, even absent any testimony or evidence of the defendant\u2019s prior convictions, the trial court\u2019s error in permitting the defendant to be cross-examined regarding a prior conviction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is therefore affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD and GUILD, JJ, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Gerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UDEL BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 76-262\nOpinion filed August 17, 1977.\nRalph Ruebner, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nGerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0810-01", "first_page_order": 832, "last_page_order": 837 }