{ "id": 3387017, "name": "DANIEL E. LEACH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAUHOFF GRAIN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co.", "decision_date": "1977-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 13873", "first_page": "1022", "last_page": "1026", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 1022" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "245 N.W.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Mich. App. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2145037 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/69/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 Ind. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1798980 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/260/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 1141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3387149 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/1016-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.W.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10154563 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/347/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.W.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10161834, 1903821 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/295/0122-01", "/mo/365/1187-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Mo. 1187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 1903821 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/365/1187-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 S.C. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "case_ids": [ 12131712 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/216/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Colum. L. Rev.", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 A.L.R.3d 271", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Cal. Rptr. 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Cal. App. 2d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2332047 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/192/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 P.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Cal. App. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4387121 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/174/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 P.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2139047 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/272/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "380 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2553753 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/380/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2597200 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/361/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5790299 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/78/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ill. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 12124706 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/130/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.E. 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4739209 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/261/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.E. 1009", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4854331 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/276/0556-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 674, "char_count": 11171, "ocr_confidence": 0.9, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1263752082945016e-07, "percentile": 0.8609857177001439 }, "sha256": "24c9d6cd119a79f4d6af75fd108de85b153ac9f5f7305ce19370ba5257557441", "simhash": "1:5338d5428bbf2fb7", "word_count": 1853 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:38:54.645684+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DANIEL E. LEACH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAUHOFF GRAIN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CRAVEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDoes an employee discharged solely because he files a workmen\u2019s compensation claim have a cause of action for such retaliatory discharge?\nWe hold that he does.\nRetaliatory discharge by an employer is contrary to the expressly stated public policy of this State and gives rise to a cause of action in tort for compensatory and punitive damages. The ruling of the circuit court dismissing a complaint and holding there to be no such cause of action is reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court with directions to deny the motion and for further proceedings.\nThe first Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act was enacted in Illinois in 1911, and reenacted in 1913. It was taken substantially from a like enactment of Great Britain. (See Chicago Dry Kiln Co. v. Industrial Board (1916), 276 Ill. 556, 114 N.E. 1009.) The object and purpose of the enactment of the workmen\u2019s compensation law in this and other States was to eliminate the common law of liability for personal injuries based upon the negligence of the employer with its attendant and complex defenses of contributory negligence, fellow servant negligence and assumption of the risk. The difficulty of proof and delay in the courts often provided no remedy, subjected the injured employee to deprivation of livelihood, reduced him to proverty, and produced antagonisms between employers and employees to the point that under the police power, something had to be done. That which was done we now refer to as workmen\u2019s compensation. That legislation amounted to a tradeoff, liability became absolute, the various defenses disappeared, and the employee could receive compensation for his injuries without reference to fault. The employer had to pay, but the amount he had to pay was not left to the vagary of delayed jury verdicts but for the most part was dependent upon a statutory scheme, and the amount recovered would be less, but recovery would be certain. (See 81 Am. Jur. 2d Workmens Compensation \u00a71 et seq. (1976).) As we have indicated, the enactment of workmen\u2019s compensation legislation was pursuant to the police power and was done in furtherance of sound public policy. (Deibeikis v. Link-Belt Co. (1914), 261 Ill. 454, 104 N.E. 211.) We turn now to the specifics of this case.\nOn December 2, 1975, plaintiff Daniel E. Leach filed a complaint against defendant Lauhoff Grain Company, his former employer, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The complaint alleged that plaintiff, an employee at will, was discharged by defendant on November 1, 1975, in retaliation for having filed a workmen\u2019s compensation claim against the defendant on October 14,1975. Plaintiff alleged his firing was due to no reason other than his filing of the claim. Also, he alleged that defendant\u2019s conduct in firing him was in violation of section 4(h) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h)) which makes it \u201cunlawful for any employer 8 8 8 to discharge or threaten to discharge * 0 * an employee because of the exercise of his rights or remedies granted to him by this Act.\u201d The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.\nOrdinarily, an employee at will may be terminated by the employer for any cause or no cause at all. However, this principle is not absolute.\nBroadly stated, \u201cPublic policy is that principle of the law which holds, that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good.\u201d (People ex rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co. (1889), 130 Ill. 268, 294.) It \u201crelates to good morals, natural justice and matters affecting the citizens of the State generally.\u201d (Chicago & E.I.R.R. Co. v. Rouse (1898), 78 Ill. App. 286, 290.) \u201cThe public policy of a State is to be found embodied in its constitution and its statutes. When these are silent upon the subject, then in the decisions of its courts.\u201d People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank (1935), 361 Ill. 75, 86.\nIn Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Durkin (1942), 380 Ill. 11, 42 N.E.2d 541, the supreme court held that the preamble of the Unemployment Compensation Act constitutes a declaration of the legislature of the public policy of this State. So too the public policy of Illinois is established by subsection (h) of section 4 of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. This section was added to the Act on July 1, 1975. It was clearly the public policy of this State at the time of plaintiff\u2019s discharge in November 1975. It is a fair interpretation of that subsection to say that our public policy is the prevention of discharges for an employee\u2019s filing of a workmen\u2019s compensation claim because such actions subvert the operation of the Act.\nWe recognize the employer\u2019s interest in having freedom to discharge his at will employees, yet we cannot overlook the fact that the effect of the substitution of workmen\u2019s compensation for the common law was to eliminate a cause of action by an employee against the employer for work-related injuries. The Act took away from the employee the right to sue in tort in exchange for his right under the Act. To accept defendant\u2019s argument here would be to say to the employee, \u201cAlthough you have no right to a tort action, you have a right to a workmen\u2019s compensation claim which, while it may mean less money, is a sure thing. However, if you exercise that right, we will fire you.\u201d\nThe theory of a tort action arising from a wrongful discharge is not new. In Nees v. Hocks (1975 Ore.), 536 P.2d 512, an employee\u2019s tort action was sustained where she was fired for serving on jury duty against her employer\u2019s wishes. Recovery was granted to plaintiffs in Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396 (1959), 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, where they were discharged from an employment at will for their failure to give perjured testimony in their employer\u2019s behalf. In Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc. (1961), 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769, employees at will were discharged for promoting unionism. The court gave recognition to their cause of action for wrongful discharge, holding that the public policy in favor of freedom to unionize overrode the employer\u2019s right to discharge employees at will. See cases collected at Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975); Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967).\nCourts in several States have addressed the precise issue before us here. A split of authority has developed. In Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc. (1950), 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148, plaintiff sued her employer for threatening to fire her if she did not drop a workmen\u2019s compensation claim. Allegedly plaintiff was then fired when she refused to withdraw her claim. The South arolina Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because there was no invasion of plaintiff\u2019s right to prosecute her workmen\u2019s compensation claim. Two Missouri cases have also upheld dismissal of complaints where plaintiffs were employees at will who alleged they were discharged for bringing workmen\u2019s compensation claims. (Christy v. Petrus (1956), 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122; Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc. (1961 Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 204.) While we agree with the general proposition that employers may fire employees at will without cause, we cannot ignore the fact that in the business world unscrupulous employers often intimidate employees to keep them from exercising their rights under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. An injured employee may well decide to succumb to his employer\u2019s ultimatum and drop the workmen\u2019s compensation claim if he has a family to feed or poor prospects for employment elsewhere. Thus, we disagree with Raley, Christy and Narens to the extent that they fail to recognize that the exercise of a legal right, for an ulterior purpose, which serves to frustrate the exercise of the legal right of another while at the same time frustrating the public policy of the State, may be actionable. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141, for the views of another panel.\nIn two cases directly on point, courts have recognized tort action for wrongful discharge of an employee in retaliation for his filing of a workmen\u2019s compensation claim, a reason which constituted a violation of public policy. (Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. (1973), 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425; Sventko v. Kroger Co. (1976), 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151.) In Frampton the Indiana Supreme Court stated:\n\u201cThe Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for work-related injuries (through insurance) and a right in the employee to receive such compensation. But in order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for public policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his right in an unfettered fashion without being subject to reprisal. If employers are permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen\u2019s compensation claims, a most important public policy will be undermined.\u201d 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427.\nWe agree with the reasoning in Frampton and Sventko because of the strong public policy to provide financial and medical benefits to the victims of work-related injuries. This policy clearly outweighs the employers right to discharge employees at will when the firing is for the ulterior purpose of evading liability under the Act. We do not abrogate the employer\u2019s right to discharge employees at will without cause in cases where no clear mandate of public policy is involved. Rather, our holding only recognizes an exception to that right to discharge where, as is alleged here, the firing was in retaliation for the employee\u2019s exercise of his rights under the Act.\nFor purposes of ruling on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court was bound to accept plaintiff\u2019s allegations as true. Thus, the court was bound to accept plaintiff\u2019s allegation that his discharge was motivated solely because he exercised his right to file a claim under the Act. The trial court\u2019s granting of the motion to dismiss was error and the judgment of the circuit court of Vermilion County is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with his opinion.\nTwo panels of this court consider essentially the same issue and reach different results. This opinion expresses one view, and a majority opinion in Kelsay expresses another. Members of both panels are unanimous in their views that the two cases with the conflicting views should be certified to the supreme court for the resolution of the conflict. Accordingly, in both instances, upon the court\u2019s own motion, a certificate of importance has been ordered to issue.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nMILLS and REARDON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CRAVEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Manion, Janov & Edgar, Ltd., of Hoopeston (Rick E. Janov, of counsel), for appellant.", "Acton, Acton, Meyer & Smith, of Danville (Thomas B. Meyer, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANIEL E. LEACH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAUHOFF GRAIN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 13873\nOpinion filed August 31, 1977.\nManion, Janov & Edgar, Ltd., of Hoopeston (Rick E. Janov, of counsel), for appellant.\nActon, Acton, Meyer & Smith, of Danville (Thomas B. Meyer, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1022-01", "first_page_order": 1044, "last_page_order": 1048 }