{ "id": 3387180, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND LESTER BOSTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Boston", "decision_date": "1977-08-25", "docket_number": "No. 76-275", "first_page": "18", "last_page": "21", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 18" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 1011", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2523917 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1014" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/1011-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3313055 ], "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/213/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 A.L.R.3d 526", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578940 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/124/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2624381 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2683156 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0343-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 433, "char_count": 7276, "ocr_confidence": 0.889, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.515182368702924e-08, "percentile": 0.4003521054702417 }, "sha256": "5baaf418d3c5b43b17195d05d718867a31ae5aa78a9cc3dfda38027b5633fab1", "simhash": "1:943938101f18e3b1", "word_count": 1303 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:29:20.985264+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND LESTER BOSTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was convicted of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 11\u20145(a)(4)) and sentenced to a term of seven days in the Du Page County jail. He appeals, contending that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nHe first argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by substantial evidence, that he was \u201c14 years and upwards\u201d as provided in the statute. It is conceded that the record does not contain any specific reference to defendant\u2019s age. Defendant contends that by the terms of the statute the crime charged can be committed only by a person who is 14 or over and thus that the proof of age becomes a material element of the offense to be proved by the State. People v. Rogers, 415 Ill. 343, 348 (1953); People v. D\u2019Angelo, 30 Ill. App. 3d 86, 90-91 (1975); People v. Roy, 124 Ill. App. 2d 52, 61 (1970).\nWhile both the Roy and D\u2019Angelo cases refer to proof by \u201csubstantial\u201d evidence, we agree with the defendant that the proof required is that beyond a reasonable doubt as with any other material element of the crime. (See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 526, 528 (1973).) And we further agree that proof of age cannot be supplied by inspection of the defendant\u2019s person by the trier of the facts. Wistrand v. People, 213 Ill. 72, 80 (1904); People v. Rogers, 415 Ill. 343, 348 (1953).\nThere are, however, numerous references in the record from which it clearly appears that the defendant must have been over the prescribed minimum age. There are repeated characterizations in the record, for example, that Dennis Boston was the stepson of the defendant. This raises a fair inference that defendant was legally old enough to be married to the mother of Dennis. There is also evidence that defendant was employed by a construction company as a painter from which it can be presumed that he was over the minimum employment age of 14. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 31.1) There are also repeated references in the record to \u201ctwo men\u201d who came to the house. We, therefore, conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant was of the age of 14 and upward. Further, it appears from the record that the question of defendant\u2019s age was not raised in the trial of the case nor in the motion for a new trial by any specific reference and the defendant does not state on appeal that he was below the age of 14.\nDefendant further contends that the record does not prove defendant\u2019s guilt of all other elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. The complaining witness testified that on the morning of December 18, 1975 \u201c[t]wo men\u201d from the Parrish Construction Company came to do some painting. She identified one of the persons as the defendant. After being in the house for a short time both men left but shortly came back. When defendant returned he asked where he could wash his paint brush. The witness testified that she told him he could do this in the basement. At this time she went up the six stairs to her bedroom in the bilevel home. She told her two-year-old daughter who was lying on the bed to sit on the stairs and talk to the men. The two-year-old sat on the second or third stair from the bottom. The mother then went back into her bedroom to make the bed. The bedroom door was \u201ccompletely closed but wasn\u2019t shut.\u201d The witness said she then heard defendant say \u201cI am a bad boy.\u201d She said she heard him say it twice. She then came out of the bedroom and saw the defendant and her daughter. She testified that the defendant was at the floor level below the last stair and that her daughter was sitting on the second stair. She said the defendant was approximately three feet from her daughter facing the child. The witness testified that she observed that the defendant\u2019s penis was \u201cout of his pants.\u201d She stated that there was sufficient light in the area and that she observed the scene for 5 or 6 seconds from a distance of approximately 10 feet. The witness then testified that she \u201cslammed in\u201d her bedroom door and called the police.\nOn cross-examination the witness admitted that she had not told the police that defendant had exposed himself both to her and to her daughter. She also testified that she did not see the second man come back into the house.\nThe defendant\u2019s stepson, Dennis Boston, also an employee of the Parrish Construction Company testified that he and his stepfather brought a can of paint into the home to attempt to touch up a part of the living room ceiling. He said the paint did not match so he went out to the truck to get additional paint while his stepfather went to the basement to wash the paint brush. He saw the mother go upstairs. He said that both he and his stepfather returned to the entrance at the same time. He observed the little girl sitting on the steps. He did not observe defendant exposing himself. He heard defendant say to the little girl \u201cI guess we are bad boys,\u201d and turning to him, \u201cDennis, we woke them up. I guess we are bad boys; huh?\u201d\nDefendant testified substantially to the same effect as had his stepson. He also said that Dennis came into the house just as he had emerged from the basement. He testified that he saw the little girl then for the first time. He said he asked her what her name was and that she was bashful and didn\u2019t answer. He said \u201cDid we wake you up\u201d and that the girl answered \u201cYes.\u201d He testified that he then said to her \u201cI guess we are bad boys for waking you up\u201d and repeated the same thing to Dennis who was at his side. He said he did not expose himself and he did not see the girl\u2019s mother after that time.\nOn cross-examination the defendant said that his son was touching up the ceiling in the living room but that the hallway enters into and is part of the living room.\nIn announcing his finding of defendant\u2019s guilt the court expressly noted that he believed that the stepson was painting the ceiling and did not have a view of the defendant at all times. He also found that the testimony of the complaining witness was clear and convincing and that there was no reason to believe that she was either hallucinating or had an ulterior motive to prosecute the defendant.\nSince the record shows that the mother testified that she observed the defendant at a distance of approximately 10 feet for a period of time of five or six seconds the court\u2019s findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The conflict between the mother\u2019s testimony and that of the defendant and his stepson created an issue of credibility to be decided by the trier of the facts. The judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. (See People v. Padfield, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1014 (1974).) We therefore affirm the judgment.\nAffirmed.\nRECHENMACHER, P. J., and NASH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Frank Wesolowski, Jr., Public Defender, of Wheaton (Robert Heise, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "John J. Bowman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Malcolm F. Smith, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND LESTER BOSTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 76-275\nOpinion filed August 25, 1977.\nFrank Wesolowski, Jr., Public Defender, of Wheaton (Robert Heise, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohn J. Bowman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Malcolm F. Smith, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0018-01", "first_page_order": 40, "last_page_order": 43 }