{ "id": 3388396, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENZO CANACCINI, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Canaccini", "decision_date": "1977-09-28", "docket_number": "No. 76-376", "first_page": "811", "last_page": "814", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 811" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5437035 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2697501 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 381, "char_count": 6963, "ocr_confidence": 0.9, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.634530366490929e-07, "percentile": 0.6900958318419337 }, "sha256": "5b1ab6c478abdf8ab9c2dda23338056768f402b1f3e8af08b47efd9989c8722a", "simhash": "1:9c8bc6d7f75fdba5", "word_count": 1198 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:29:20.985264+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENZO CANACCINI, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal by the People questions the right of the trial court to vacate its judgment forfeiting bail (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 110\u20147(g)) more than 30 days after its entry.\nThe defendant has not appeared in this court nor filed a brief. However, we review pursuant to First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128 (1976).\nThe defendant posted \\0% of a $5,000 bond which was set on a burglary charge. His trial was scheduled for September 29, 1975. On that date he did not appear and the case was continued to October 1, 1975. The defendant also did not appear on the continued date and the court ordered his bond forfeited. The matter was set for hearing on November 10, 1975.\nOn October 6,1975, the clerk of the circuit court notified defendant and his counsel that the defendant\u2019s bail had been ordered forfeited, and that judgment would be entered on the forfeiture if defendant failed to appear within 30 days. Defendant was advised in the notice that the hearing would be held on November 10, 1975.\nThe defendant did not appear by November 10 and on that date the People applied for judgment on the defendant\u2019s forfeited bail. The trial court thereupon entered judgment against the defendant in the amount of $5,000 plus costs. The judge further ordered the clerk of the court to apply the cash deposit to the costs and to pay the balance ($392.60) to the State\u2019s attorney pursuant to section 110 \u2014 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 110\u20147).\nOn January 23, 1976, the defendant appeared in court and pleaded guilty to both the charge of burglary and the charge of violation of his bail bond and was sentenced to 30 months probation conditioned on his serving the first 90 days in the Kane County jail. At this time the judge also entered an order that the bail be refunded in the name of the defendant\u2019s attorney.\nOn February 10, 1976, defense counsel filed a motion to vacate the order of forfeiture. In the motion counsel stated:\n\u201cPrior Orders of this Court reflect that the parties entered into successful plea negotiations and the Court has heretofore ordered that the bail of said defendant be refunded to Robert A. Chapski, Attorney for said defendant.\u201d\nIn response to the motion the court vacated its October 1, 1975, order revoking bail and directed the clerk to refund the bail to the defendant\u2019s attorney, after deducting statutory fees and costs.\nOn March 10, 1976, the People filed its motion alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its January 23 and February 10 orders because each was entered more than 30 days after the final judgment was entered on defendant\u2019s bail forfeiture. The motion also alleged that the court had never vacated its November 10 judgment entered on the forfeiture and that more than 30 days had elapsed since that date. The court denied the motion and this appeal followed.\nThere is a further suggestion based on the argument on the People\u2019s motion that the trial court may have been led to believe that in the plea negotiations prior to the entry of the guilty pleas, the assistant state\u2019s attorney present had possibly acquiesced in the bond refund order which had previously been entered. The record does not support this conception however. It is also clear from the record that the matter of the bail forfeiture and judgment was not a part of the defendant\u2019s guilty plea and no reference to the bond of defendant appears in the transcript of that hearing. On this record we do not rule on the effect, if any, of these matters if the circumstances had been otherwise.\nWe agree with the People that the court was without authority to vacate its judgment forfeiting bail. We therefore reverse.\nThe case is governed by section 110 \u2014 7(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which states as pertinent:\n\u201cIf the accused does not comply with the conditions of the bail bond the court having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the bail to be forfeited. Notice of such order of forfeiture shall be mailed forthwith to the accused at his last known address. If the accused does not appear and surrender to the court having jurisdiction within 30 days from the date of the forfeiture or within such period satisfy the court that appearance and surrender by the accused is impossible and without his fault the court shall enter judgment \u201d 0 e the judgment may be enforced and collected in the same manner as a judgment entered in a civil action.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nNo specific procedure is estabished nor is a time specified within which a bail forfeiture under the statute may be set aside. The statute appears to clearly state and intend that if an accused forfeits bail and fails to present himself within an additional 30 days the court shall enter judgment of forfeiture. The statute further clearly provides that the judgment is to be enforced and collected in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.\nIt would therefore appear appropriate that the Civil Practice Act be applied and furnish the procedure for setting aside a final judgment of bond forfeiture which must be accomplished within 30 days after the entry of the judgment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 50(5)), except when relief is sought, as it was not here, under section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 72). See Lectro-Stik Co. v. Stepco Corp., 19 Ill. App. 3d 900, 902 (1974).\nUnder the facts before us the trial court lost authority to vacate its final judgment forfeiting bail which was entered on November 10,1975, after 30 days from that date. The orders entered by the court on January 23 and February 10, 1976, therefore were without authority and void. We therefore reverse the orders dated January 23 and February 10,1976. In so doing we do not rule on defendant\u2019s argument (based upon People v. Ratliff, 65 Ill. 2d 314 (1976)) that he did not wilfully violate bail. We remand the cause with directions to grant the People\u2019s motion to vacate the unauthorized orders and to thereafter proceed consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nRECHENMACHER, P. J., and NASH, J., concur.\nPrior to 1963 the Illinois bail forfeiture statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 38, par. 625f) provided that a court on the basis of cause set forth, could set aside a judgment forfeiting bail within 15 months from its entry. This provision has since been repealed. See Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 16, pars. 24\u201441 (Smith-Hurd 1974).", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko, Barbara A. Preiner, and Stephen W. Deitsch, all of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ENZO CANACCINI, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 76-376\nOpinion filed September 28, 1977.\nGerry L. Dondanville, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Phyllis J. Perko, Barbara A. Preiner, and Stephen W. Deitsch, all of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0811-01", "first_page_order": 833, "last_page_order": 836 }