{ "id": 3402582, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANK IRONS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Irons", "decision_date": "1977-10-21", "docket_number": "No. 76-545", "first_page": "50", "last_page": "52", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 50" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959171 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2696709, 2690319 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0357-01", "/ill-app-3d/19/0357-02" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5308029 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 N.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911572 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952306 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 N.E.2d 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966716 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 F.2d 185", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 980306 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/551/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 F.2d 180", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 980175 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/551/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 N.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911346 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 238", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771759 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 F.2d 180", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 980175 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/551/0180-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 399, "char_count": 6804, "ocr_confidence": 0.898, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.822043060910941e-08, "percentile": 0.5333193170721536 }, "sha256": "f42efeee94f44e8e2e19582e5f47470b99536ff111345c3d48d38fdd726075ba", "simhash": "1:2b30b9fcdd10ec3f", "word_count": 1143 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:34.806209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANK IRONS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE JONES\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition in which he alleged he did not knowingly and understandingly enter a plea of guilty to aggravated battery because he was not advised by the court during the plea proceeding that there would be a mandatory parole period of 3 years following his release from incarceration.\nDefendant entered his plea of guilty on February 4, 1975 following negotiations and received the agreed sentence of one to three years. It is not disputed that the court failed to advise defendant that the sentence would include a mandatory parole term of 3 years as imposed by statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-8 \u2014 1(e)(2).\nDefendant\u2019s petition for leave to file late notice of appeal was denied by this court. Subsequently defendant filed the post-conviction petition we now consider. He argues that a constitutional question is presented since he did not knowingly and understandingly enter his plea of guilty as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709, and People v. Reeves, 50 Ill. 2d 28, 276 N.E.2d 318. The prayer of defendant\u2019s petition is that the mandatory parole portion of his sentence be vacated. He asserts that that disposition is required by fundamental fairness because he has already served the incarceration period of his sentence (defendant is on parole) and he should not be required to plead anew, citing United States ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1977), and United States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 185 (7th Cir., 1977).\nIn People v. Wills, 61 Ill. 2d 105, 110, 330 N.E.2d 505, our supreme court held that trial judges must advise defendants of a mandatory parole term accompanying an offense before accepting a plea of guilty to that offense. It was stated that: \u201cThe constitutional requirement for a valid plea of guilty is that it be intelligent and voluntary, and as we said in People v. Reeves, 50 Ill. 2d 28, 29, \u2018Boykin adds the requirement that if the guilty plea is to withstand appellate or post-conviction review \u201cthe record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant who pleads guilty enters his plea understandingly and voluntarily.\u201d \u2019 \u201d The Wills opinion concluded by holding that the admonition concerning the period of mandatory parole applies prospectively to guilty pleas taken subsequent to May 19,1975. It accordingly is not expressly applicable here.\nUnder the interpretation placed upon Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) in People v. Krantz, 58 Ill. 2d 187, 317 N.E.2d 559, which predated the Wills case, it was unnecessary for a trial judge to admonish a defendant entering a plea of guilty that a mandatory parole term would follow any prison sentence imposed upon conviction of a felony. That rule was changed by People v. Wills but it nonetheless was applicable at the time of defendant\u2019s negotiated plea of guilty in this case. Accordingly, the trial judge was not required to admonish defendant of the mandatory parole term that would follow his prison sentence, but it was required that defendant enter his plea knowingly and understandingly.\nThe record discloses that at the time defendant entered his plea of guilty he was expecting to serve a period of time on parole following release from his prison sentence. On January 12, 1976, he filed a pro se post-conviction petition (later supplanted) in which he alleged that his trial counsel had told him that he would be subject to a 6-month parole term. Also, at the hearing on the post-conviction petition the defendant placed in evidence a letter from himself to the Appellate Defenders Office for the Fifth District in which he related: \u201cI could complete sentence in 18 months * * * with six months parole.\u201d In this letter, as well as other letters of defendant in evidence, and by his testimony, defendant stated that he would not have entered a plea of guilty if he had known of the 3-year mandatory parole term. Defendant\u2019s argument, however, must accommodate the fact that he did expect to be placed on parole for 6 months following his prison sentence and that he had this expectation at the time he entered his plea. The defendant\u2019s argument as thus modified must be that he received a longer term of parole than he was expecting at the time he entered his guilty plea. Under this circumstance no constitutional question is raised. People v. Shaw, 49 Ill. 2d 309, 273 N.E.2d 816; People v. Gillery, 24 Ill. App. 3d 564, 321 N.E.2d 342; People v. Marsh, 19 Ill. App. 3d 357, 311 N.E.2d 416.\nThere are no other allegations that defendant was not fully admonished of the consequences and advised of his rights at the time his guilty plea was entered. Nothing suggests that defendant entered his plea other than knowingly and understandingly, except as to the extent of the term he would serve on parole. As to this, no constitutional question is raised. We consider that there was substantial compliance with the then applicable legal requirements and the judgment denying the post-conviction petition should be affirmed. People v. Ellis, 59 Ill. 2d 255, 320 N.E.2d 15; People v. Krantz.\nAffirmed.\nKARNS, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE JONES" }, { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER,\ndissenting:\nThe majority hold that defendant\u2019s argument must \u201caccommodate\u201d the fact that he did expect to be placed on parole for 6 months following his prison sentence, and that he only received a longer term of parole than he was expecting at the time he entered his guilty plea. It must have come as quite a shock for the defendant to learn that instead of a 1- to 3-year sentence for which he bargained he received in reality a 1- to 6-year sentence.\nThe court in United States ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner (7th Cir. 1977), 551 F.2d 180, stated, \u201cWe do not find the imposition of a two year parole term to be an insignificant punishment. The conditions for parole place a number of onerous burdens on the liberty of paroled individuals.\u201d\nThe record indicates to me that the defendant was under the distinct impression that he was to receive an indeterminate sentence of 1 to 3 years, and that his plea of guilty was not entered voluntarily and knowingly.\nFor the above reasons, I would order that the defendant be released from that portion of the judgment requiring the defendant to serve a 3-year parole term on completion of his indeterminate sentence.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER," } ], "attorneys": [ "James Geis and David Mejia, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Clyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Bruce D. Irish, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANK IRONS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 76-545\nOpinion filed October 21, 1977.\nCARTER, P. J., dissenting.\nJames Geis and David Mejia, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nClyde L. Kuehn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Bruce D. Irish, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0050-01", "first_page_order": 72, "last_page_order": 74 }