{ "id": 3403865, "name": "BLUE ARROW DOUGLAS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL J. HOWLETT, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Blue Arrow Douglas, Inc. v. Howlett", "decision_date": "1977-10-24", "docket_number": "No. 76-312", "first_page": "230", "last_page": "235", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 230" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 944", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2963292 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "948" }, { "page": "945, 948" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0944-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2716315 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" }, { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 L. Ed. 567", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 U.S. 583", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11300746 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/344/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2663521 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958256 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0140-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 553, "char_count": 11439, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0802361123033605e-07, "percentile": 0.5623142507536154 }, "sha256": "c2fe446983713bff3f53e564d849754b150a450dca7d3edb4385f48419a95f86", "simhash": "1:4fbd3af0afe23c57", "word_count": 1856 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:34.806209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BLUE ARROW DOUGLAS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL J. HOWLETT, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nBlue Arrow Douglas, Inc. (plaintiff) brought an action under the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.), to review a decision by the Illinois Secretary of State, Michael J. Howlett (defendant). Defendant had ruled that a vehicle belonging to plaintiff had made an intrastate movement in Illinois and therefore was required to be registered in Illinois under the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 402A). The trial court reversed this decision and defendant has appealed.\nDefendant contends that his administrative decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence but was in accordance with law; and the tax imposed on plaintiff is not invalid as a burden on interstate commerce.\nAn investigator from the Secretary of State\u2019s office testified that he stopped a tractor-trailer vehicle belonging to plaintiff at 9:30 a.m. on August 5, 1974, in Chicago. The vehicle displayed a valid Michigan license plate, a valid Illinois reciprocity plate (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 402B), but no Illinois prorate decal (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95/2, pars. 3 \u2014 413, 3 \u2014 701). The driver produced three bills of lading for the cargo in the trailer, No. 4607. Two of the bills of lading were for shipments originating in Flint, Michigan, and destined ultimately for Grand Forks, North Dakota. The third bill of lading was for the shipment here involved. It had been picked up in Grand Rapids, Michigan, brought into Chicago on a different trailer, No. 2605, and then loaded onto this trailer, No. 4607, at the plaintiff\u2019s Chicago terminal.\nWhen accosted by the officer, the truck driver was proceeding to the facility of Chippewa Freight Lines, Bedford Park, Illinois. The shipment in question was to have been delivered to Chippewa to be forwarded to Cumberland, Wisconsin, its ultimate destination. The shipments represented by the other two bills of lading would be transferred to another carrier (interlined) for the trip to their ultimate destination in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Agents for defendant required plaintiff to pay a flat weight tax of $842 for use of the public highways under the Class N designation. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 815(a), truck weight of 36,001 lbs. to 41,000 lbs.\nPlaintiff\u2019s director of safety and personnel testified that the billing of the carrier\u2019s charges for these shipments was all done in Michigan. There was never any rebilling for the shipments. He also stated that none of plaintiff\u2019s vehicles had Illinois prorate plates. He verified that the shipment here involved, destined ultimately to Cumberland, Wisconsin, did not enter Illinois on trailer No. 4607, but was put on this trailer at plaintiff\u2019s Chicago terminal.\nDefendant found, as a fact, that the shipment here involved, destined for Wisconsin, was picked up at the plaintiff\u2019s Chicago terminal and moved intrastate to Bedford Park, Illinois, for further transport out of the State. Defendant defined an \u201cintrastate\u201d movement as \u201c[transportation wherein cargo or freight is loaded with [sic] Illinois for an Illinois destination\u201d and as such, any motor vehicle operating \u201cintrastate\u201d upon the highways of Illinois was required to be properly registered. Defendant concluded that the required registration was proper and refund of the amount paid was denied.\nIn approaching the problem of administrative review, our duty is to determine whether the administrative findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Kerr v. Police Board (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 140, 141-42, 319 N.E.2d 478.) However, in our opinion, in the case before us, the issue here is one of law. We find no factual dispute.\nThe first problem is determination of whether plaintiffs vehicle was engaged in an intrastate or interstate movement regarding this shipment. The pertinent statutes identically define \u201cintrastate\u201d or intrastate commerce as (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 1 \u2014 134, 3 \u2014 402A):\n\u201cTransportation originating at any point or place within this State and destined to any other point or place within this State, irrespective of the route, highway or highways traversed, and including transportation which passes into or through another State before delivery is made within this State, and including any act of transportation which includes or completes a pickup within Illinois for delivery within Illinois.\u201d\nDefendant is vested with the power and duty of administering the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 2 \u2014 101). This includes power to promulgate rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the law in the public interest (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 2 \u2014 104(b)).\nRule 3 \u2014 402C adopted by defendant sets out a number of definitions for intrastate movements of commercial vehicles. This rule provides as follows:\n\u201cA. Transportation of property, cargo or freight from any Illinois point of origin to any Illinois destination.\nB. Transportation of property, cargo, or freight from any Illinois point of origin to an Illinois dock, terminal, or warehouse for subsequent reloading or further transport.\nC. Transportation wherein cargo or freight is loaded within Illinois for an Illinois destination.\u201d\nIn our opinion, rules A and B above quoted are not applicable to define plaintiff\u2019s handling of the shipment in question as intrastate. It is undisputed that this shipment did not originate in Illinois but originated in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The shipment may have been destined to an Illinois point but its ultimate destination was not within Illinois.\nIn our opinion, paragraph C is the rule applicable to the case before us. It is undisputed that this shipment was loaded \u201cwithin Illinois\u201d at plaintiff\u2019s Chicago terminal. In addition the shipment was loaded at the terminal for an Illinois destination. It is undisputed that plaintiff was to carry the shipment to the facilities of Chippewa Freight in Bedford Park, Illinois, and that there it was to be reloaded and transhipped by Chippewa to its ultimate destination in Cumberland, Wisconsin.\nAlthough the Chicago to Bedford Park trip was but a segment of an itinerary which originated in Michigan and was to come to a final destination in Cumberland, Wisconsin, the shipment entered Illinois on a vehicle and was destined to leave Illinois on another vehicle. Thus, so far as the trip on trailer No. 4607, the unit here involved, is concerned, the shipment originated in Chicago and terminated in Bedford Park and was wholly within Illinois.\nPlaintiff nevertheless contends that, even if the movement was intrastate, it qualifies under an exception set forth elsewhere in Rule 3\u2014 402C, which allows an \u201cintrastate\u201d movement to be made on foreign plates with a valid Illinois prorate decal under certain circumstances. However, in the case before us, plaintiff\u2019s own evidence established that the vehicle did not have a current and valid Illinois prorate decal. This contention, therefore, is without merit.\nWe conclude that this movement by plaintiff\"s vehicle regarding this shipment was intrastate under the applicable statutes and regulations. Therefore it was necessary for the vehicle in question to display a current and valid Illinois prorate decal. Plaintiff was required to pay the flat rate tax under Illinois category N for this operation of the vehicle. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 815(a) at Class N.\nPlaintiff\u2019s final contention is that the tax here involved is an unlawful burden upon interstate commerce which is the exclusive and proper province of the Federal government. This contention is refuted by Bode v. Barrett (1952), 412 Ill. 204, 106 N.E.2d 521, affd (1953), 344 U.S. 583, 97 L. Ed. 567, 73 S. Ct. 468. The license fee which plaintiff seeks to recover in the case before us is not a tax upon the value of the goods. It is an authorized tax, based on vehicle weight, for the privilege of using the highways of Illinois. (412 Ill. 204, 216-28.) This court has recently pointed out that, \u201cA State can impose a tax on interstate commerce in order to exact compensation for the use and maintenance of facilities provided by the State. [Citations.]\u201d (National Transportation, Inc. v. Howlett (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 249, 258, 345 N.E.2d 767.) The only issue here would be whether the total tax \u201clevied for the privilege of using roads produces an amount which is shown to be in excess of fair or reasonable compensation to the State for the privilege. [Citations.]\u201d (37 Ill. App. 3d 249, 258.) In the case before us, plaintiff did not introduce evidence to show that the fee in question was excessive, arbitrary, unfair, or was applied in a discriminatory manner.\nIt remains to comment briefly upon People v. Barker (1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 944, 340 N.E.2d 633, cited by plaintiff. That decision is useful for the information it imparts but it has no precedential value in the case before us. In Barker, a truck trailer was shipped by rail from Winter Garden, Florida, to Chicago. There, the entire trailer was transported by a diesel tractor driven by the defendant Barker from Chicago to Plainfield, Illinois. As the court pointed out in Barker, the only issue there was \u201cthe individual criminal responsibility of defendant * * *.\u201d (34 Ill. App. 3d 944, 948.) The court expressly stated that the opinion was not designed to control the issue regarding payment of a license fee by the owner of the truck. 34 Ill. App. 3d 944, 945, 948.\nEven more important is the fact that in Barker the entire trailer was transported by the defendant without loading or unloading and thus without breaking the bulk of the cargo. The statute contains an exception to the effect that an inbound or outbound movement within Illinois may be completed by a vehicle not based within the State, but registered under an Illinois reciprocity agreement, without the need to comply with the registration and licensing laws of Illinois \u201conly if the operator thereof did not break bulk of the cargo laden in such inbound or outbound trailer or semitrailer.\u201d The statute continues that, \u201cAdding or unloading intrastate cargo on such inbound or outbound trailer or semitrailer shall be deemed as breaking bulk.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 3\u2014 402B(3)(d).\nQuite to the contrary, in the case before us it is undisputed that the cargo in question was brought by plaintiff to its Chicago terminal on plaintiff\u2019s trailer No. 2605 and was unloaded there. Then the freight was reloaded onto trailer No. 4607, which was stopped by the officer, for delivery to Bedford Park, Illinois for interlining to Chippewa Freight for transfer to Cumberland, Wisconsin, the ultimate destination. In our opinion, Barker, and the statutory exception cited above, serve only to convince that the movement in question before us was intrastate movement subject to the licensing laws of Illinois as above pointed out.\nThe judgment appealed from is accordingly reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nMcGLOON and O\u2019CONNOR, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Robert G. Epsteen, Assistant Attorney- General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Harold I. Levine, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BLUE ARROW DOUGLAS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL J. HOWLETT, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 76-312\nOpinion filed October 24, 1977.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Robert G. Epsteen, Assistant Attorney- General, of counsel), for appellant.\nHarold I. Levine, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0230-01", "first_page_order": 252, "last_page_order": 257 }