{ "id": 3399729, "name": "THE CITY OF MT. CARMEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLIFTON M. PARTEE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "City of Mt. Carmel v. Partee", "decision_date": "1977-10-31", "docket_number": "No. 76-465", "first_page": "449", "last_page": "453", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 449" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "133 N.E. 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 Ill. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2424551 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/300/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 N.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742628 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 N.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5329325 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5354791 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2894791 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2934045 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0217-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 515, "char_count": 11426, "ocr_confidence": 0.889, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33303196441182475 }, "sha256": "cea99b36fbdcbff08c194d4b468d844fd44302542a29e32fb449b73c2cf3b143", "simhash": "1:b800a8a62fb80d47", "word_count": 1864 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:34.806209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE CITY OF MT. CARMEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLIFTON M. PARTEE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner City of Mount Carmel (hereinafter City) appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Lawrence County dismissing its petition to condemn land in Wabash County for a street and highway right-of-way. Defendant landowners filed a traverse and motion to dismiss upon which the trial court entered judgment.\nThe sole issue presented is whether a municipal corporation is authorized by statute to acquire by eminent domain a street right-of-way located in an unincorporated area which is outside of but adjacent and contiguous to the municipality. The relevant statute involved is section 11 \u2014 61\u20141 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 61\u20141) which states as follows:\n\u201cThe corporate authorities of each municipality may exercise the right of eminent domain by condemnation proceedings in conformity with the provisions of the constitution and statutes of the State of Illinois for the acquirement of property useful, advantageous or desirable for municipal purposes or public welfare including property in unincorporated areas outside of but adjacent and contiguous to the municipality where required for street or highway purposes by the municipality.\u201d\nThe proposed right-of-way lies in an unincorporated area of approximately 47 acres which borders the City on two sides for about 2200 feet. The strip sought to be condemned runs north and south, its southern edge touching the city limits for a distance of approximately 60 feet. No other portion of the strip intersects the municipal boundary.\nIn their traverse and motion to dismiss defendants contended-that the property sought to be condemned by the City must be \u201cadjacent and contiguous\u201d to the municipal boundaries and since this strip is not \u201cadjacent and contiguous\u201d to the city limits of Mount Carmel the City is without power to condemn the right-of-way.\nOn the other hand, the City argues that a proper reading of the statute reveals that it is not the property sought to be condemned, but rather the unincorporated area containing the property which must be \u201cadjacent and contiguous\u201d to the municipality. Since the right-of-way is within an \u201cadjacent and contiguous\u201d unincorporated area, the argument continues, the City may properly exercise its power of eminent domain to acquire the desired property.\nThere being no dispute as to whether the property the City seeks to condemn would be \u201cuseful, advantageous or desirable\u201d or that it will be used \u201cfor street or highway purposes\u201d as required by section 11 \u2014 61\u20141 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 61\u20141), we turn our attention to whether it is the property or the unincorporated area which must be \u201cadjacent and contiguous\u201d to the municipality.\nWhile our research has disclosed no decision of the courts of this State on this particular question, the Illinois Supreme Court discussed section 11 \u2014 61\u20141 in Village of Deerfield v. Rapka, 54 Ill. 2d 217, 296 N.E.2d 336. There the court dealt with the authority of a municipality to acquire property outside of its municipal limits for playground purposes under section 11 \u2014 95\u20141 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 95\u20141). After noting that the closing portion of section 11\u2014 61 \u2014 1 was added by amendment to the statute in 1961, the court went on to say:\n\u201cThe amendment was not designed, the argument is, to repeal or lessen the broad municipal authority to condemn. It was intended to insure a power to condemn, for street purposes, land outside but adjacent and contiguous to the municipality. The argument is persuasive.\u201d (54 Ill. 2d 217, 222.)\nWe recognize that this interpretation of the statute was merely dicta, as the question in the case was only the municipality\u2019s power to condemn outside its boundaries generally. However, the statement by the court clearly supports the defendants\u2019 contention that it is the property to be condemned and not the unincorporated area containing it which must be adjacent and contiguous to the municipality.\nAdditionally, long-standing rules of statutory construction lend support to the defendants\u2019 argument. Illinois courts have traditionally applied the \u201clast antecedent doctrine\u201d in construing statutes. This rule requires that relative or qualifying words, phrases, or clauses are to be applied to the words px phrases immediately preceding, and not as extending to or including other words, phrases or clauses more remote, unless the intent of the General Assembly disclosed by the context and reading of the entire statute, requires such extension or inclusion. (People v. Thomas, 45 Ill. 2d 68, 256 N.E.2d 794.) The City argues that by operation of this rule, the words \u201cadjacent and contiguous\u201d must apply to their closest antecedent, \u201cin an unincorporated area\u201d and not to the more remote \u201cproperty.\u201d However, this argument ignores the words \u201coutside of\u201d which also follow \u201cin unincorporated areas,\u201d and would by plaintiff\u2019s use of the last antecedent rule modify \u201cin unincorporated areas.\u201d Such a reading of the statute would obviously render the words \u201coutside of\u201d mere surplusage, as unincorporated areas are necessarily \u201coutside of\u201d the municipal boundaries. Proper use of the last antecedent rule requires a different reading. The word \u201cproperty\u201d is, in our opinion, the last antecedent which is modified by the qualifying words and phrases following it \u2014 \u201cin an unincorporated area\u201d, \u201coutside of\u201d but \u201cadjacent and contiguous [to the municipal boundary].\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 61\u20141.) All of these words and phrases serve to describe the property which may properly be condemned by the municipalities. The prepositional phrase \u201cin unincorporated,\u201d if deleted, would allow municipalities to condemn incorporated property outside of but adjacent and contiguous to the municipality. While such authority has been granted in cases involving condemnation for airport purposes (Village of Schiller Park v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 278, 186 N.E.2d 343), the intent of the legislature as shown by section 11 \u2014 61\u20141 was to deny this power to municipalities for street and highway purposes. In Village of Schiller Park v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 278, 186 N.E.2d 343, the court stated:\n\u201cWhen the General Assembly intends to limit an extra-territorial power to unincorporated territory it says so by the use of appropriate language.\u201d (26 Ill. 2d 278, 281.)\nAccordingly, we hold that the words \u201cadjacent and contiguous\u201d as used in section 11 \u2014 61\u20141 of the Illinois Municipal Code apply to \u201cproperty\u201d and not to \u201cunincorporated areas.\u201d\nAs the trial court pointed out in its order, it is difficult to imagine what limitations would exist on a municipality\u2019s power to condemn outside its borders if a different interpretation were adopted. If only the unincorporated area containing the property to be condemned was required to be adjacent and contiguous to the municipality, a city could condemn property several miles from its border if such property was part of an adjacent and contiguous unincorporated area. In addition, perplexing and far-reaching questions would be raised by the interpretation which the City recommends. For example, what are an \u201cunincorporated area\u2019s\u201d boundaries? Does an \u201cunincorporated area\u201d end only when it intersects incorporated land? In focusing on the property to be condemned, rather than the area of which it is a part, it may be determined by the court whether it is or is not adjacent and contiguous to the municipality and hence subject to the power of eminent domain as exercised by the corporate authorities. This limitation of the municipality\u2019s power to condemn is consistent with the intention of the legislature in enacting section 11 \u2014 61\u20141 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 61\u20141).\nThe City does not seriously contend that the property which it seeks to condemn is adjacent and contiguous to the municipality. The only portion of the right-of-way which touches the municipal boundaries is a 60-foot strip. In order for property to be contiguous to city limits there must be a substantial common boundary (Spaulding School District No. 58 v. City of Waukegan, 18 Ill. 2d 526, 165 N.E.2d 283), or it must touch or adjoin the corporate limits in a reasonable and substantial physical sense. (Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d 342, 167 N.E.2d 169.) The property involved in this case is therefore not contiguous to the municipality. While both Spaulding and Western National Bank involved annexations, we fail to see how the nature of the action would alter the legal definition of contiguity.\nWe therefore believe that section 11 \u2014 61\u20141 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 11 \u2014 61\u20141) requires that the property which \u00e1 municipality seeks to condemn for street or highway purposes be adjacent and contiguous to the municipality. This reading of the statute comports with our duty to strictly construe statutes delegating the State\u2019s sovereign power of eminent domain. \u201cThe authority to take private property against the owner\u2019s consent must be for a public use, and the statute conferring power to take property for a public highway must be strictly construed.\u201d Town of Kingston v. Anderson, 300 Ill. 577, 580-81, 133 N.E. 347.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lawrence County dismissing the City of Mount Carmel\u2019s petition for condemnation is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCARTER, P. J., concurs.\nThe cause was transferred to Lawrence County upon defendant\u2019s motion for a change of venue.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN" }, { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER,\ndissenting:\nAs I understand the factual situation in this case, the City of Mt. Carmel sought to take property which lay outside the city limits in an area that was adjacent and contiguous to the city for the purpose of constructing a street or highway that would connect on both its ends with its streets or highways connecting with its streets. The strip sought, at its southern end touches the city limits for a distance of approximately 60 feet, connecting to a city street at that end, and on the north end being 110 feet in width connecting to a county highway that leads to a public country road which connects to an existing street in the immediate vicinity.\nIt is my opinion that the purpose of the 1961 amendment to section 11\u2014 61 \u2014 1 of the Illinois Municipal Code was to provide a municipality a means of connecting its streets by the use of a street or highway across property that was outside its limits in an area contiguous and adjacent to its limits. With such limited purpose in mind there need be no apprehension as to a city having an unlimited power or the extent of boundaries of the unincorporated area lying adjacent or contiguous.\nI do not agree with the majority\u2019s application of the \u201clast antecedent doctrine\u201d and am of the opinion that if that doctrine is to be applied it should be applied as petitioner has suggested.\nI would therefore reverse and remand.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert M. Keenan, Jr., of Mt. Carmel, for appellant.", "Crain, Hall & Cooksey, of Centralia (Robert M. Crain, of counsel), for appellees Clifton M. Partee and Clarence E. Partee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE CITY OF MT. CARMEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLIFTON M. PARTEE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 76-465\nOpinion filed October 31, 1977.\nEBERSPACHER, J., dissenting.\nRobert M. Keenan, Jr., of Mt. Carmel, for appellant.\nCrain, Hall & Cooksey, of Centralia (Robert M. Crain, of counsel), for appellees Clifton M. Partee and Clarence E. Partee." }, "file_name": "0449-01", "first_page_order": 471, "last_page_order": 475 }