{ "id": 3410432, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES M. SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sanders", "decision_date": "1977-12-07", "docket_number": "Nos. 77-282, 77-311 cons.", "first_page": "178", "last_page": "185", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 178" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809512 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5359658 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5350642 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2960564 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5403960 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897662 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404599 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966897 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5311600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 F.2d 96", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 714925 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/465/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12124816 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5810739 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444-45" }, { "page": "707, 723" }, { "page": "1628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 816, "char_count": 18821, "ocr_confidence": 0.892, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1510646972629764e-07, "percentile": 0.7685102490531301 }, "sha256": "fd664a26ae707993a10e88f1a3140ff9641915b76fbac827e469f6ffa89f8196", "simhash": "1:cb43f6e4f57e04f1", "word_count": 3133 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:02.730807+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES M. SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was convicted of armed robbery of Smith T. Randol. He was also convicted of armed robbery of James Collins. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of four to 12 years imprisonment. The defendant was also charged with attempted armed robbery of Frank Barbero, but this charge, as well as an aggravated battery charge involving Collins, was dismissed on the motion of the State. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting statements which the defendant made to law enforcement officers while in custody, after asking to see an attorney. The charges against the defendant were the result of three separate incidents which occurred in Winnebago and Boone Counties on the evening of January 12-13, 1977.\nIt appears from the docket entries of the circuit court of Winnebago County that a preliminary hearing was held on January 20, 1977, at the conclusion of which the court held that there was probable cause. No transcript of the preliminary hearing has been included in the record on appeal, however.\nOn March 16, 1977, a hearing was held on the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress certain statements which he had made while in custody, following his arrest. At the hearing, Officer Charles Bishop of the Rockford Police Department testified that at 1 a.m., January 13,1977, he observed three men struggling near the comer of State and Madison Streets in Rockford. As Bishop approached, two of the men fled and the third man fell to the ground. Officer Bishop recognized one of the pair as the defendant, whom Bishop knew from prior investigations. Bishop began a foot pursuit of the two subjects. He saw the two men get into a green Buick and begin driving away, but continued his pursuit. Moments later he encountered Rockford Officers Frew and Lindstrom, who were sitting in a patrol car, and told them that the persons in the Buick had been involved in a fight. Frew and Lindstrom then pursued the Buick, while Bishop returned to help the man whom he had left lying on the ground. That man, Frank Barbero, told Bishop that the incident had not been a mere fight, but that the other two men had attempted to rob him. Barbero advised Bishop that the men were armed with a chrome-plated revolver.\nOfficer Frew testified that he saw a green Buick speed past them and that immediately thereafter, Officer Bishop ran up to the squad car and told Frew and Lindstrom to pursue the Buick. During the subsequent pursuit, the Buick weaved in and out of traffic at 70 miles per hour. Finally, the officers were able to pull the Buick over. There were three men in the car: The defendant, James M. Sanders, Mark Manley and Boyce Smelser. The officers searched the car and found a .32-caliber revolver with what appeared to be dried blood on it. A \u201cclub-type\u201d instrument was also found on the back floor of the car. Other testimony established that the defendant and his companions were advised of their rights at the scene of the arrest, and then taken to the police station. At the station, the defendant was again advised of his rights, signed a \u201cwaiver of rights\u201d form, and gave a statement denying any participation in the offense. He was then taken to jail, where he slept.\nSix hours later, at approximately 9 a.m., the defendant was interrogated by Rockford Police Detectives Bland and Fegan. The officers again read the defendant his rights, and asked him if he understood them. The defendant replied that he did, but according to the testimony of Detective Fegan, the defendant stated that he \u201cdidn\u2019t want to talk to us, that he wanted to talk to his attorney first.\u201d However, the detectives did not cease their interrogation. Instead, Detective Bland responded that \u201cthat was his perogative,\u201d but he \u201cwanted to point out a few facts in the case to him.\u201d Bland then told the defendant that the police had obtained an oral statement from Smelser and a written statement from Manley. When the defendant asked to see the statement, which the officers had obtained from Manley, they told him that they \u201cwere not allowed to do that,\u201d but folded the statement so that only the signature was visible, and showed Manley\u2019s signature to the defendant. Detective Fegan then advised the defendant that the police \u201chad a strong case,\u201d and \u201cdiscussed\u201d the penalties for the offense of armed robbery with the defendant. The defendant testified that Detectives Bland and Fegan told him that they \u201chad enough evidence for a conviction,\u201d and that they would see to it that he would receive the maximum penalty, unless he cooperated, but that if he cooperated, the detectives would see that the defendant would receive a \u201cvery very light sentence.\u201d Detective Fegan, however, stated that after their discussion of the evidence and penalties applicable in the case, the defendant said that he \u201cwanted to think about it some more.\u201d A few minutes later the defendant said that he \u201cmight as well take care of it\u201d and gave the detectives oral and written statements, generally admitting his role in the attempted robbery of Frank Barbero, but claiming that he had changed his mind about robbing Barbero, after Manley grabbed Barbero, and only fought Barbero and pointed his gun at him in an effort to disengage from the melee between Barbero and Manley.\nThe defendant subsequently gave statements to law officers from the Winnebago and Boone County sheriff\u2019s departments. In a statement which he gave to the Winnebago County officers at approximately 6 p.m., the defendant admitted his involvement in the armed robbery of Smith T. Randol. At 9:22 p.m. he gave a statement admitting the attack upon, and robbery of James Collins to officers from Boone County.\nThe defendant\u2019s testimony at the suppression hearing was, in significant respects, at variance with that of the various law enforcement officers who testified for the State. He claimed, among other things, that he confessed to the Barbero robbery because the police had told him that he would not get the benefit of counsel until he made a statement, and that his requests for counsel during the subsequent interrogations were ignored. The officers denied making such statements to the defendant and the trial judge resolved the conflicting testimony in the State\u2019s favor when it denied the defendant\u2019s suppression motion.\nOn March 21,1977, the defendant\u2019s case came before the court for trial, and the defendant\u2019s counsel informed the court that the defendant had entered into plea negotiations with the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and that he believed that the defendant was prepared to tender a plea to the court. Defense counsel further informed the court that under the terms of the plea arrangement, the defendant would plead guilty to the two armed robbery charges, and the State would move to dismiss the attempt armed robbery charge and the aggravated battery charge, and recommend a penalty of terms of four to 12 years imprisonment, to run concurrently on both charges. The judge requested that the State\u2019s Attorney inform the court of the factual basis for the plea, and the prosecutor summarized, in narrative fashion, the State\u2019s version of the events leading to the defendant\u2019s arrest. The court then informed the defendant of his rights and determined that the plea was voluntary, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 402. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 402.) To this point, the hearing on March 21 was in the procedural form which is customary where a defendant tenders a guilty plea, pursuant to a plea arrangement with the State.\nHowever, at the conclusion of the trial court\u2019s admonitions, the defendant upset this procedure by asking whether his entry of a guilty plea would terminate his right to appeal from the trial court\u2019s denial of his suppression motion. The trial court called a recess in order to explore this problem, and the defendant and his counsel had further discussion with the prosecutor. When the court reconvened, it asked defense counsel whether he had \u201csomething that will preserve [the defendant\u2019s] right to appeal.\u201d Defense counsel responded in the affirmative, indicating that he and the defendant had discussed the matter, and agreed that the prosecutor could \u201ctender an offer of proof to the court.\u201d The prosecutor then stated that he \u201cwould offer, and [he] understood that the defense will stipulate [to] the evidence presented at the defendant\u2019s preliminary hearing, also the evidence presented at the motion to suppress that we had last week,\u201d and also the statement of facts which the prosecutor had recited a few minutes before. At this point, defense counsel volunteered that the prosecutor was correct, and that the defense \u201cwould stipulate that would be the State\u2019s proof in this case,\u201d waive trial by jury, and allow the court to accept the stipulation and testimony at the earlier proceedings \u201cas evidence.\u201d The trial court ascertained that the defendant understood that he was giving up his rights to a jury trial, and to confront the witnesses against him. The court then stated that if it accepted the offer of proof as evidence, it would have no choice but to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of the armed robbery of James Collins and Smith T. Randol. The court asked the defendant if he understood that he was now giving up the right to testify on his own behalf, and the defendant responded that he did. The trial court told the defendant that when he sentenced him, he \u201cwould still consider the agreed plea as to the sentence,\u201d and again ascertained that the defendant understood the terms of the original plea agreement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court rendered a judgment which followed the terms of the earlier plea agreement. Therefore, the end result of the defendant\u2019s concern regarding the preservation of any error in the court\u2019s denial of his suppression motion was that the defendant avoided the specific procedural limitations which are imposed upon the scope of an appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty (see Supreme Court Rule 604(d)), yet stipulated to the State\u2019s proofs on each of the charges against him.\nOn appeal, the defendant\u2019s counsel has argued ably that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence of the statement which he gave to Detectives Bland and Fegan, admitting a role in the attempted robbery of Frank Barbero. We agree. In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, the Supreme Court clearly stated that although a suspect in police custody may waive his right to remain silent, and to the presence of an attorney, where he \u201cindicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning,\u201d but 9 \u201d the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.\u201d (384 U.S. 436, 444-45; 474; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 707, 723, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1628,_; see also, People v. Washington (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 186.) Since the defendant told Detectives Bland and Fegan that he desired to see an attorney before signing a \u201cwaiver of rights\u201d form, it is clear that all interrogation should have ceased at that point.\nThe State has argued that the record merely shows that the officers had conversation with the defendant after he requested counsel, in an effort to \u201cmake certain that the defendant had before him all the information to make a truly informed decision about waiving his rights and making a statement,\u201d \u201cpossibly even with the thought in mind that the defendant could relay the information to the lawyer whom he wished to call,\u201d and that such conversation did not constitute \u201cquestioning\u201d or \u201cinterrogation\u201d within the meaning of Miranda. The scenario which the State has attempted to construct on appeal, of two officers whose only fault was excessive zeal in attempting to act in the defendant\u2019s best interest, lacks objective support in the record. Further, police remarks to a defendant, after he has requested counsel, need not be purely interrogative in character in order to constitute impermissible \u201cinterrogation\u201d or \u201cquestioning\u201d within the meaning of Miranda; where the objective of such remarks to the defendant is to gain a response or admission, the remarks will constitute \u201cinterrogation,\u201d regardless of the form that they take. (See Brewer v. Williams (1977), 430 U.S. 387, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 97 S. Ct. 1232; Combs v. Wingo (6th Cir. 1972), 465 F.2d 96; People v. Pendleton (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 385.) Our review of the record convinces us that the remarks that Detectives Bland and Fegan made to the defendant, after the defendant requested counsel, were designed to elicit a response from him and, therefore, constituted impermissible interrogation under Miranda. Thus, the defendant\u2019s statement concerning the attempted robbery of Frank Barbero should have been suppressed.\nNonetheless, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to suppress the defendant\u2019s subsequent statements concerning the robberies of Smith T. Randol and James Collins. These statements were obtained some nine to 12 hours after the interrogation by Bland and Fegan, and concerned different offenses from that which was involved in the earlier interrogation. Furthermore, in each of the latter instances, the interrogating law officers obtained a \u201cwaiver of rights\u201d from the defendant, prior to commencing their interrogation. Under these circumstances, the effect of the earlier procedural violation of the Miranda standards was \u201csufficiently dissipated\u201d by lapse of time, repeated admonitions, and other factors, so that the statements to the officers from the Winnebago and Boone County sheriff\u2019s departments were properly admitted. See People v. White (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 288, 297.\nFurther, it is clear that the trial court\u2019s error in denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statement regarding the attempted armed robbery of Frank Barbero does not require a reversal of either of the defendant\u2019s other convictions. It is not the policy of courts of review in this State to reverse a judgment of conviction merely because error has been committed, unless it appears that real justice has been denied, or that the finding of the court or jury resulted from the error. See, e.g., People v. Madison (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 476; People v. Morehead (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 326, 333.\nHere, the statement which the defendant gave Detectives Bland and Fegan directly related only to the charge regarding the attempted robbery of Frank Barbero, which was dismissed by the State, and lent only inferential support to the charges upon which the defendant was convicted. In addition, under the procedure which the State and the defense devised to enable the defendant to gain the benefit of the previously negotiated plea arrangement without the detriment of being in a position of appealing from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty, the trial court could not reasonably have found that the defendant was innocent. The defendant stipulated, not only to the evidence which was admitted at the preliminary and suppression hearings, but also to the statement of facts presented by the prosecutor in response to the court\u2019s request for the factual basis of the defendant\u2019s plea. At the same time, the defendant failed to offer any evidence on his behalf. Under these circumstances, the trial court could not, on this record, have entertained a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt, even had it wholly ignored the statement which the defendant gave to Officers Bland and Fegan.\nThere can be no doubt that the procedural device used by the defense and prosecution in this case, to meet their perception of the needs of moment, did not constitute an example of good practice by either side. The Supreme Court of Illinois expressed dissatisfaction with the use of such a \u201cstipulated bench trial\u201d in the cases of People v. Stepheny (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 237, and People v. Smith (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 236. In those cases, the court held that where a bench trial on stipulated evidence is \u201ctantamount to a guilty plea,\u201d and the accused is not afforded the protections set forth in Supreme Court Rule 402 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 402), the conviction cannot stand.\nHowever, in the instant case, the trial court admonished the defendant substantially in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 402(a)), determined that the defendant had entered into the arrangement voluntarily, and determined the factual basis for the arrangement. The terms of the arrangement were stated in open court, and the court, by questioning the defendant, confirmed the terms of the arrangement, and the fact that it was not the result of threats, or of promises that were not a part of the agreement between the prosecution and defense. Thus, although the defendant did not tender a guilty plea, it appears that he was nonetheless afforded the protections of Supreme Court Rule 402; this case is therefore distinguishable from Stepheny and Smith.\nThe general rule is that an accused \u201cmay by stipulation waive the necessity of proof of all or any part of the case which the People have alleged against him and that having done so, he cannot complaint * * * of evidence which he has stipulated into the record.\u201d (People v. Hare (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 321, 324; accord People v. Hawkins (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 339.) To allow the defendant to escape the application of this rule on the record herein would enable him to avoid the effect of the stipulation which he agreed to make on two of the charges against him, while accepting the benefit of the State\u2019s agreement to dismiss the other two charges. This would be an incongruous and unacceptable result. (Cf. People v. Stacey (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 261, 267.) We therefore apply the rule that the defendant is bound on appeal by the stipulation which he freely and knowingly entered into at trial, and hold that any error by the trial court in failing to suppress the statement which the defendant gave the detectives, Bland and Fegan, could not have affected the outcome of the case as presented and was, therefore, harmless error beyond any reasonable doubt.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD and GUILD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Robinson, Daniel Cummings, and Allen L. Wiederer, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Daniel Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko and Barbara A. Preiner, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES M. SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNos. 77-282, 77-311 cons.\nOpinion filed December 7, 1977.\nMary Robinson, Daniel Cummings, and Allen L. Wiederer, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDaniel Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko and Barbara A. Preiner, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0178-01", "first_page_order": 200, "last_page_order": 207 }