{
  "id": 3416715,
  "name": "KRISTINE H. RYAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD W. RYAN, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Ryan v. Ryan",
  "decision_date": "1978-01-03",
  "docket_number": "Nos. 76-1066, 76-1454 cons.",
  "first_page": "483",
  "last_page": "485",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 483"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "327 N.E.2d 396",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1954,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 594",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2868832
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/27/0594-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "90 N.E. 238",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "242 Ill. 584",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5654151
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "597"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/242/0584-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 331,
    "char_count": 4966,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.917,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 5.2505908255194435e-08,
      "percentile": 0.3302698342644687
    },
    "sha256": "59e115b4404ea551bc5b95510076203b33bf53dd109b42b45e6133247f99f67d",
    "simhash": "1:8fab1dab0e038646",
    "word_count": 786
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:47.132655+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "KRISTINE H. RYAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD W. RYAN, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Kristine H. Ryan, sued defendant, Donald W. Ryan, for divorce. In addition, plaintiff sought temporary alimony and support orders from the circuit court. Subsequently, the trial court ordered the defendant to turn over to plaintiff two automobiles and to pay a certain charge account bill. After defendant failed to transfer possession of the two automobiles to the plaintiff and pay the bill, plaintiff sought the appointment of a sequestrator over the defendant\u2019s assets. The trial court ordered the appointment of a sequestrator of defendant\u2019s assets and defendant appeals, arguing that the circuit court abused its discretion by appointing a sequestrator.\nThe record reveals that on June 14, 1976, the circuit court ordered defendant to turn over a 1975 Mercury automobile to the leasing company for repairs and to give plaintiff notice of the location of the repairs. On June 30,1976, defendant was ordered to allow plaintiff to use a 1974 Ford. Another order required defendant to pay a certain charge account bill.\nOn July 9, 1976, plaintiff filed a verified emergency petition alleging that the defendant had not made either automobile available to her and had not paid the charge account bill. Plaintiff prayed for the payment of the charge account bill and for a body attachment against the defendant until he turned over the Mercury. Defendant\u2019s answer to the emergency petition admitted the failure to pay the bill and to make the automobile available. He denied that the failure to turn over the automobiles and to pay the bill was wilful. He also denied that he was able to pay the bill.\nPlaintiff filed a verified petition for the appointment of a sequestrator over the assets of defendant on July 15,1976, alleging that checks which defendant had sent her were returned by plaintiff\u2019s bank marked \u201cinsufficient funds\u201d and \u201cpayment stopped.\u201d Defendant answered plaintiff\u2019s petition.\nOn July 15, 1976, the trial court heard testimony and arguments and ordered an attachment of defendant and of the Mercury automobile and the appointment of a sequestrator.\nDefendant appeals, contending that the order of sequestration was unjustified, unnecessary and contrary to Illinois law.\nSequestration is an equitable remedy provided for by statute. At the time the trial court entered its order, section 42 of \u201cAn Act to regulate the practice of courts in granting equitable relief\u201d provided (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 22, par. 42):\n\u201cWhen any complaint is taken for confessed, or upon hearing, the court may make such decree thereon as may be just, and may enforce such decree, either by sequestration of real and personal estate, by attachment against the person, by fine or imprisonment, or both, by causing possession of real and personal estate to be delivered to the party entitled thereto, or by ordering the demand of the plaintiff to be paid out of the effects or estate sequestered, or which are included in such decree; and by the exercise of such other powers as pertain to courts of chancery, and which may be necessary for the attainment of justice.\u201d . .\nEffective October 1,1976, this paragraph was amended to conform to the Supreme Court Rules and the Civil Practice Act. (Pub. Act 79-1365.) No change in substance was made.\nSequestration is an in rem proceeding. Manning v. Mercantile Securities Co. (1909), 242 Ill. 584, 90 N.E. 238.\nDefendant argues that the order of sequestration was improperly granted because he had not been held in contempt previously. The sequestration statute makes no such requirement. Furthermore, our supreme court has stated that the remedies of contempt and sequestration are concurrent and alternative. (Manning, 242 Ill. 584, 597.) Clearly they are not dependent on each other.\nBoth parties cite Factor v. Factor (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 594, 327 N.E.2d 396, where this court, citing Manning, stated that in modem times the writ of sequestration is used by the chancery courts in proceeding against property of \u201ca contumacious defendant.\u201d \u201cContumacious\u201d means \u201cstubbornly disobedient.\u201d (Webster\u2019s New International Dictionary 581 (2d ed. 1954).) It does not necessarily require that a defendant also be found guilty of contempt.\nOn this record, the trial court acted properly by sequestering defendant\u2019s property. Given the conduct of defendant, the trial court reasonably concluded that sequestration was necessary to protect plaintiff\u2019s interests.\nThis court\u2019s order of September 9,1976, which stayed the order of the circuit court is vacated. The order of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Reagan, of Northbrook, for appellant.",
      "Jacobs, Camodeca & Timpone, of Chicago (William R. Jacobs, II, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "KRISTINE H. RYAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD W. RYAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNos. 76-1066, 76-1454 cons.\nOpinion filed January 3, 1978.\nJames J. Reagan, of Northbrook, for appellant.\nJacobs, Camodeca & Timpone, of Chicago (William R. Jacobs, II, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0483-01",
  "first_page_order": 505,
  "last_page_order": 507
}