{ "id": 3421570, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. CHARLES SANFORD, Petitioner-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sanford", "decision_date": "1978-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 76-695", "first_page": "599", "last_page": "603", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 599" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "280 N.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390769 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 N.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2842720 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 N.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2932788 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 103", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11642843 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2939834 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464304 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3401955 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927490 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958321 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454796 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2704396 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 N.E.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2821284 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/100/0101-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 497, "char_count": 8238, "ocr_confidence": 0.909, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.350729799585044e-08, "percentile": 0.336297791878986 }, "sha256": "073e515bc0fc7a3bfd5f8719cbc3a718ec08eefe58f02b53aad8b11b47b15508", "simhash": "1:2e1db09871f3a3fa", "word_count": 1315 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:43.340261+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. CHARLES SANFORD, Petitioner-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Charles Sanford, appeals from dismissal of his post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner argues that the allegations set forth in his pro se petition require that an evidentiary hearing be conducted, and he maintains his counsel at prior proceedings afforded him inadequate representation.\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County in 1966, petitioner was convicted of the murder of John Davenport and arson; he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 50 to 75 years. These judgments were affirmed on direct appeal. (People v. Sanford (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 101, 241 N.E.2d 485.) In 1968 petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 1 et seq.) Counsel was appointed to represent petitioner but subsequently was granted leave to withdraw after apparently concluding the matter was without merit. The pro se petition was then dismissed and no appeal was taken.\nSeveral years later a second post-conviction petition was filed alleging the impropriety of multiple convictions under the facts presented. The State\u2019s brief in this appeal suggests the public defender was appointed to represent petitioner in the matter, although the present record is not clear in this respect. In any regard the petition was dismissed. On appeal of the second petition, this court directed that the judgment pertaining to the arson conviction be vacated because it arose from the same course of conduct as the murder conviction. People v. Sanford (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 763, 324 N.E.2d 12 (abstract).\nIn 1976 a third pro se post-conviction petition was filed. Petitioner maintained that he had not been indicted in conformity with the requisite statutory procedures and had not received a preliminary hearing. He also contended that the cause of the victim\u2019s death was not properly shown, that his trial counsel was incompetent, that no fingerprints were found on a gasoline can apparently used to start the fire, and that several State witnesses had lied. Petitioner claimed he had a witness, whose identity was not disclosed, to substantiate his claim of perjury.\nThe public defender was appointed to represent petitioner. Counsel did not file an amended petition. At the hearing on the State\u2019s motion to dismiss the matter, petitioner\u2019s counsel indicated he had reviewed the case and had no basis upon which to object to the motion. The trial court then dismissed the petition. This appeal follows and petitioner is represented by counsel appointed by this court, who has not participated in any of the prior proceedings.\nThe State convincingly urges that the multitude of prior attempts by petitioner to nullify his conviction render the present issues res judicata; and those issues which could have been raised at those proceedings but were not are now considered waived. (See People v. Partin (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 80, 83, 370 N.E.2d 545.) However, we will examine petitioner\u2019s contentions in light of the record presented in order to terminate the extensive litigation of this matter.\nPetitioner now contends that he was not given a preliminary hearing when he was indicted in 1966. This argument fails to present a cognizable issue within the framework of a post-conviction proceeding because, at the time petitioner was indicted, he had no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. People v. Hood (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 315, 323, 319 N.E.2d 802.\nPetitioner maintains that his counsel at trial in 1966 should have objected to a gasoline can introduced into evidence which did not show his fingerprints. Moreover, petitioner also now urges that his trial counsel was incompetent because he stipulated to the results of Davenport\u2019s postmorten examination which he claims was not in fact performed; and counsel failed to seek out an unidentified witness who would have discredited the testimony of two State\u2019s witnesses.\nIt is axiomatic that the burden is on the petitioner in post-conviction proceedings to show a violation of his constitutional rights. (People v. Farnsley (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 537, 549, 293 N.E.2d 600.) In order to establish a constitutional claim of incompetence of counsel, the representation afforded petitioner must be of such low calibre as to render the proceedings a sham or farce. People v. Virgil (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686-87, 370 N.E.2d 74.\nWhile petitioner\u2019s trial record has not been filed as part of this appeal, examination of this court\u2019s opinion in petitioner\u2019s direct appeal clearly demonstrates the relevancy of the gasoline can as the container apparently used to bring a combustible fluid into the building in order to start the fire. Moreover, with the exception of petitioner\u2019s bare allegation concerning the cause of Davenport\u2019s death and reference to an unidentified witness, who petitioner claims would have shown that two State\u2019s witnesses committed perjury, petitioner did not submit documentation to establish such assertions. Under the circumstances, dismissal of the post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing was proper. (People v. Jones (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 152, 157, 361 N.E.2d 1104; People v. Newberry (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 74, 76-77, 302 N.E.2d 34; Farnsley, at 549.) The record presented herein does not establish that petitioner\u2019s trial counsel was incompetent.\nPetitioner also maintains that he was arraigned after eight jurors had been selected for his trial. He maintains that the indictment was not signed by the grand jury foreman or the State\u2019s Attorney. The thrust of the contention seems to be that a grand jury proceeding may not have occurred, and petitioner may not have been afforded a prompt determination of probable cause. The copy of the indictment contained in this record shows that it was filed on June 21, 1966, and it bears the typewritten names of the grand jury foreman and State\u2019s Attorney. The record also shows petitioner had two copies of the indictment when he was arraigned, and such procedure occurred after a partial selection of a jury had been accomplished.\nWe initially note that failure to promptly ascertain probable cause to charge petitioner would not vitiate a subsequent conviction (Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103, 119, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854; cf. People v. Hendrix (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 165, 169, 295 N.E.2d 724), thus precluding any claim of constitutional magnitude in this case. Moreover, in People v. Hangsleben (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 236, 252 N.E.2d 545, an analogous contention was raised because the indictment did not bear a date and was not endorsed by the grand jury foreman. The defendant contended this lack of a signature deprived him of due process of law. The supreme court held that the lack of the foreman\u2019s signature was not of constitutional dimension. In the present case petitioner was represented by counsel; he was given a copy of the indictment; the court explained the nature of the charges; and petitioner pleaded not guilty. The record does not in any manner support petitioner\u2019s conjectural assertion that the indictment was not returned by the grand jury.\nWhile petitioner has claimed that the other attorneys who represented him in proceedings subsequent to his convictions were incompetent for not having raised the aforesaid issues, we need not discuss this issue. We specifically note that the failure of petitioner\u2019s trial counsel to amend the third post-conviction petition is not indicative of improper representation, because counsel is under no obligation to present frivolous constitutional claims. People v. Phelps (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 35, 38, 280 N.E.2d 203.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nDIERINGER and ROMITI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sidney A. Jones, III, of Mitchell, Hall & Jones, P. C., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Michael E. Shabat, and John J. Rayman Lieberman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. CHARLES SANFORD, Petitioner-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 76-695\nOpinion filed February 16, 1978.\nSidney A. Jones, III, of Mitchell, Hall & Jones, P. C., of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Michael E. Shabat, and John J. Rayman Lieberman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0599-01", "first_page_order": 621, "last_page_order": 625 }