{
  "id": 5626907,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL R. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Phillips",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL R. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STENGEL\ndelivered the opinion of the\ncourt:\nFollowing a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, defendant Paul Phillips was convicted of murder and sentenced to a term of 70 to 95 years in prison. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9\u20141(a)(1).) The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the sentence imposed is excessive.\nThe facts of this brutal crime are as follows. On August 18, 1976, defendant called Brenda Roberts, with whom he had become acquainted through various church functions, and asked her to meet him later that evening at Illinois Central College. Brenda agreed and met defendant in the hallway of one of the college\u2019s classroom buildings. As they conversed defendant became \u201cvery much angry\u201d because Brenda did not seem sufficiently interested in his problems. Defendant attacked the young woman throwing her onto the floor of a ladies restroom and strangling her with his hands. He removed one of her nylon stockings, tied it around her neck and continued to strangle her until she lost consciousness. While the victim was unconscious defendant removed her clothing and attempted to have sexual intercourse with her. He then placed her body in a restroom cubicle and used her sweater in an attempt to wipe any fingerprints from the area.\nAt trial defendant raised a defense of insanity calling an expert witness who testified that defendant, at the time of the crime, was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The State countered with its own expert who stated that defendant could both appreciate the criminality of his acts and conform those acts to the requirements of law. The jury found defendant guilty of murder. No formal evidence in. aggravation or mitigation was offered at the sentencing hearing, but a presentence report was introduced indicating that defendant had a lengthy history of mental difficulties for which he had undergone psychiatric care. His juvenile record consisted of indecent exposure, obscene phone calls and other sexually related conduct. As an adult, he was twice convicted of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor and committed to the Department of Corrections as a sexually dangerous person based on charges of attempted murder, kidnapping, and aggravated battery. The presentence investigation officer recommended a sentence of 300 to 600 years. The trial judge, noting that defendant was a \u201cmenace to society\u201d who \u201cought not to be out on the streets,\u201d sentenced defendant to a term of 70 to 95 years in prison.\nDefendant contends the sentence imposed upon him is excessive and he asks this court to employ its power under Supreme Court Rule 615 to reduce it. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 615(b)(4).) We refuse to do so.\nThis court\u2019s power to reduce sentences is narrowly limited to those cases where the record clearly reveals that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sentence. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882). The reasons supporting the narrow construction of our power under Rule 615 are obvious and have been frequently enunciated. A proper sentence must be based upon the particular circumstances of each case. (People v. Bolyard (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 583, 338 N.E.2d 168.) Included among the factors to be considered in imposing sentence are the defendant\u2019s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits and age. (People v. Dukett (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 432, 308 N.E.2d 590). Also to be taken into consideration are the \u201cnature and circumstances of the offense\u201d for which defendant is being sentenced. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(c)(1).) The trial judge, who has the opportunity to hear the evidence presented and to observe the defendant, is in a far superior position to evaluate these factors than a court of review which is limited to the facts contained in a cold record. People v. Morgan (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 276, 319 N.E.2d 764.\nThe circumstances of the present case portray a vicious, senseless and unprovoked murder by the defendant of a young woman who tried to befriend him. The defendant\u2019s attempt to sexually abuse the victim\u2019s corpse adds to the heinous nature of the offense. Furthermore, this was not defendant\u2019s first crime. His previous record indicates his propensity toward violent sexual crimes as he progressed from indecent exposure to contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor to attempted murder and finally to murder itself. Defendant claims the trial judge failed to consider his potential for rehabilitation. Attempts have been made to rehabilitate defendant since he was 14 years old. The attempts were obviously futile; the seriousness of his crimes has steadily increased. As the presentence report states, \u201cIn the past, psychiatrists have felt that he could function in society, but it was only a matter of time until another offense occurred.\u201d Defendant murdered Brenda Roberts slightly more than one month after psychiatrists determined he was no longer a sexually dangerous person and recommended his discharge from the Department of Corrections. These then were the facts regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant that were before the trial judge when he made his sentence determination. Based on these facts, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in concluding that defendant is a \u201cmenace to society\u201d who should not be allowed out on the streets.\nIn support of his request for sentence reduction defendant lists 28 murder cases decided between 1975 and 1977 and claims that the sentence imposed in the present case is \u201cgrossly out of line when compared to typical sentences\u201d imposed in those cases. We find this data to be irrelevant. As stated previously, a proper sentence determination must be based on the particular circumstances of each individual case. (People v. Bolyard (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 583, 338 N.E.2d 168.) The question to be decided is not whether the sentence imposed is \u201ctypical,\u201d but whether the sentence imposed is so inappropriate that it evinces an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The sentence in the present case does not constitute a substantial departure from the fundamental law and its spirit, nor is it disproportionate to the nature of the offense. People v. McDole (3d Dist. 1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 663, 359 N.E.2d 226.\nFinally, defendant claims the trial judge did not limit himself to consideration of relevant factors in determining the appropriate sentence to impose. Under the present Unified Code of Corrections every person confined to a penal institution is eligible for parole when he has served 20 years less time credit for good behavior. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1003\u20143-3.) This means that despite the stated minimum sentence of 70 years, this defendant will be 0eligible for parole after serving 11 years and 3 months, assuming good behavior. Defendant notes that the trial judge, in his comments before passing sentence, expressed dissatisfaction and frustration with that sentencing law and this court has itself expressed some frustration as a result of that very same statute. (People v. Doom (3d Dist. 1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 959, 363 N.E.2d 457.) We have noted that the effect of the pertinent provision is to make a court\u2019s carefully considered decision to impose a lengthy sentence \u201ca classic exercise in futility.\u201d (48 Ill. App. 3d 959, 962, 363 N.E.2d 457, 460.) Other courts have cited the statute as a factor weighing against reduction of lengthy minimum sentences. (People v. Henderson (1st Dist. 1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 164, 351 N.E.2d 225.) A defendant who stands convicted of a heinous and atrocious crime had nothing to complain about when the sentencing judge notes with frustration that whether he imposes a minimum term of 50 or 500 years, it will be treated for purposes of parole as if it were a 20-year sentence. In any event, we do not believe the trial judge based his sentence decision on his feelings of frustration or dissatisfaction. Rather, we believe the trial judge properly based his sentence determination on the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, all of which amply support the judge\u2019s sentence of 70 to 95 years.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Tazewell County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER and SCOTT, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STENGEL"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "Bruce Black, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (James E. Hinterlong and Gerry R. Arnold, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL R. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 77-154\nOpinion filed March 17, 1978.\nRobert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nBruce Black, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (James E. Hinterlong and Gerry R. Arnold, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0109-01",
  "first_page_order": 131,
  "last_page_order": 134
}
