{ "id": 5628278, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY RODGERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rodgers", "decision_date": "1978-03-01", "docket_number": "No. 76-843", "first_page": "719", "last_page": "726", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 719" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2872794 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 N.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2912294 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 N.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5307241 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399-400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937164 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 N.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5333925 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2731326 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 N.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427199 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5406131 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3415074 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2925937 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125-126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2733489 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5407459 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 N.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857055 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0482-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 814, "char_count": 16588, "ocr_confidence": 0.906, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7560825622721402e-07, "percentile": 0.7092139348664729 }, "sha256": "afb51bb124347cb7dd8d2e999c0ce8eda4b55607cf39da6914ae32b5bd77d08e", "simhash": "1:8339bcf055db263d", "word_count": 2723 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:22:59.686785+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY RODGERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 4 to 12 years. Defendant admits he was present when the robbery was committed. He contends, however, that the evidence adduced at trial proves him to be neither a principal nor accountable for the acts of the actual perpetrator of the robbery.\nThe State relied on the testimony of the two victims, Peter Loughran and James Fryzyna. Both testified that one night at 12:15 a.m., they were walking in Chicago to a friend\u2019s house. Loughran testified that as they approached a corner, he noticed two men underneath the trunk of an automobile. Fryzyna stated that he observed the two men behind the car.\nLoughran and Fryzyna both testified that when they reached the corner, the two men, one of whom was carrying a rifle, approached them and demanded several times that they \u201cget down\u201d behind the bushes. When the victims hesitated, both were struck in the head with the rifle.\nLoughran testified that defendant then made repeated demands for Loughran\u2019s money. When Loughran gave defendant a dollar bill and some change, defendant began searching Loughran\u2019s pockets to see if he had more money. At the same time, the assailant with the rifle was going through Fryzyna\u2019s pockets, looking for money. The victims testified that during the search both assailants threatened to shoot the victims.\nFollowing the search, defendant instructed Loughran to remove the leather jacket Loughran was wearing. As Loughran began to unbutton the jacket, defendant ripped it from his back and pushed Loughran down. Defendant then kicked Loughran in the eye, and the defendant drove away with the other assailant.\nLoughran was asked by the defense counsel whether Loughran gave the following answer to a question asked before the grand jury:\n\u201cQuestion: Were they inside the car?\nAnswer: They were inside the car laying on the back so we couldn\u2019t see their faces. One had a shotgun, or a regular rifle, I can\u2019t tell the difference really and he told us to get down.\u201d\nAlthough Loughran could not recall whether this statement was made before the grand jury, the defense counsel and the State\u2019s Attorney stipulated that the above exchange took place.\nDefendant\u2019s explanation was that on the night in question he was riding in the front passenger seat of a car with Greg Owens, the driver, and Larry Cross. Three or four cars approached the one in which defendant was riding, and their occupants began cursing and shouting at the three men in Owens\u2019 car. Owens turned onto a side street and stopped the car. Cross got out and opened the trunk. When defendant heard Cross shouting and saw Cross holding a gun on two men standing on the comer, defendant stepped out of the car and asked Cross, \u201cHey man, what is on your mind?\u201d After telling defendant to \u201cshut up,\u201d Cross proceeded to rob the victims of their money. Cross then ordered Loughran to remove the jacket Loughran was wearing. When Loughran hesitated, Cross struck him on the head. Loughran removed the jacket and threw it at defendant, whereupon Cross grabbed the jacket and put it across his arm.\nDefendant further testified that he did not take money or a jacket from either victim. He stated that he did not know Cross well, was not aware of Cross\u2019s intentions to commit robbery, and did not know the weapon was in the car. Defendant also testified on cross-examination that after the incident Owens drove him to his own neighborhood and parked the car there. Defendant then walked home, but did not tell his parents or the police about the incident.\nDefendant raises the following issues: (1) whether he was proved guilty of armed robbery; (2) whether the trial court properly denied his motion for a directed verdict on the armed robbery charge; (3) whether the discrepancy between the victim\u2019s name in the indictment and in the report of proceedings denied him a fair trial; (4) whether defendant was deprived of a fair trial by his retained trial counsel\u2019s incompetence; and (5) whether the trial court committed errors which subject defendant to the possibility of double jeopardy.\nAs to defendant\u2019s first contention, a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:\n\u201cEither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense \u201d \u00b0 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 5\u20142(c).)\nAlthough mere presence at the scene of a crime does not render a person accountable for the acts of another (People v. Nugara (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 482, 487, 236 N.E.2d 693), evidence of conduct showing a design on the part of the accused to aid in a crime renders the accused accountable for the other perpetrators\u2019 actions. People v. Kessler (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 493, 497, 315 N.E.2d 29.\nHere, sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that defendant was legally accountable for the armed robbery. The victims\u2019 testimony establishes that the defendant actively aided the other assailant rather than being an innocent bystander. Even though defendant offered an exculpatory account of the incident, this presented only an issue of credibility for the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses. Weighing the issue of credibility and determining matters of fact was within his province as trier of fact. People v. Spagnolia (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 455, 458, 173 N.E.2d 431.\nRelying on the discrepancy between Loughran\u2019s testimony that the assailants came from underneath the car and Fryzyna\u2019s statement that the assailants were behind the car, defendant argues that the testimony of Loughran and Fryzyna is not credible. Defendant also points at the difference between Loughran\u2019s grand jury testimony that the assailants were waiting inside the car lying out of sight in the back seat and his trial testimony that placed them underneath the car. These variations in testimony were for the trier of fact to weigh in his deliberations, and do not destroy the credibility of the State\u2019s two eyewitnesses. People v. Bell (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 122, 125-126, 290 N.E.2d 214; People v. Ganter (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 316, 371 N.E.2d 1072.\nDefendant further claims that the circuit court erred by failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict. After the denial of this motion, defendant testified on his own behalf, thus waiving his motion for a directed verdict by introducing evidence after the motion was denied. (People v. Gokey (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 433, 312 N.E.2d 637.) In addition, there was sufficient evidence of defendant\u2019s participation in the crime to justify denying this motion.\nThe defendant\u2019s next contention is that the discrepancy between the complainant\u2019s name in the indictment, James \u201cKruzyna\u201d and the name of the State\u2019s witness appearing in the transcript, James \u201cFryzyna\u201d denied him due process of law. Defendant contends that this discrepancy made it impossible for him to prepare a defense against the actual victim, Fryzyna.\nWhen attacked for the first time on appeal, an information or indictment will be upheld as sufficient if it informed the accused with sufficient specificity to prepare his trial defense, and allows him to plead a resulting conviction as a bar to a future prosecution arising out of the same conduct. (People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29, 344 N.E.2d 456.) A variation in the name of a victim is immaterial unless it substantially injures the accused. People v. Nesbitt (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 487, 488, 173 N.E.2d 447; People v. Nelson (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 509, 162 N.E.2d 390.\nDefendant has not shown that the variance caused him any substantial injury. The record indicates that on the day of the crime, the State filed a preliminary complaint charging defendant with armed robbery. The complainant\u2019s name and signature appeared on the document as James \u201cFruzyna.\u201d This is very similar to the spelling of the witness\u2019s name in the transcript \u2014 James \u201cFryzyna.\u201d When the defendant was indicted, the victim\u2019s last name appeared in the indictment as \u201cKruzyna,\u201d a misspelling. In the State\u2019s answer to defendant\u2019s motion for discovery, the names \u201cJames Frizyka\u201d appeared on the list of witnesses with the address 922 North LeClaire. At trial, Fryzyna gave the same address, and defense counsel made no objection to the discrepancy, though he extensively cross-examined Fryzyna.\nWhatever the precise spelling of this witness\u2019s name, defendant was advised at all times of the witness\u2019s address, and so should have been able to prepare a defense against him. Further, the identity of the address demonstrates that the victim named in the indictment and the person who testified at trial are the same, so that defendant can plead his conviction as a bar to any future prosecution on the same facts.\nDefendant next claims that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel\u2019s incompetence. Where a defendant has been prejudiced by the acts or omissions of his counsel\u2019s inadequate representation, the defendant may be entitled to a new trial. (People v. Witherspoon (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 18, 21, 302 N.E.2d 3.) However, it is well-settled that review of a retained counsel\u2019s competence does not extend to those areas involving the exercise of judgment, discretion and trial tactics (Witherspoon; People v. Baer (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 391, 399-400, 342 N.E.2d 177), and because another attorney in the better light of hindsight may have handled the trial differently is not an indication of the trial counsel\u2019s incompetence. (Baer, at 400.) The defendant must clearly establish actual incompetence of counsel and substantial resultant prejudice which would have changed the trial\u2019s outcome. Witherspoon; Baer.\nDefendant contends that five episodes in the trial demonstrated the incompetence of his trial counsel. First, he argues that his trial counsel\u2019s failure to act upon the discrepancy between the victim\u2019s name in the indictment and the witness\u2019s name in the transcript prejudiced defendant. We have already concluded, as set forth above, that no prejudice resulted to defendant because of this variance.\nThe defendant\u2019s next complaint about his counsel relates to the direct testimony of Peter Loughran, and involves the following leading question asked by the State\u2019s Attorney:\n\u201cA. * * * we noticed there was a white Ford there, with two men underneath the trunk \u2014 under the chassis of the car.\nQ. In front, or the rear of the car?\nA. The rear of the car, laying on the ground by the curb, as they were trying to fix it, or trying to conceal themselves, you know.\nMr. Levy [defense counsel]: Objection, to that, your Honor.\nThe Court: The last portion will be stricken.\u201d\nPursuant to defense counsel\u2019s general objection, the part of the answer damaging to defendant \u2014 \u201ctrying to conceal themselves\u201d \u2014 was stricken. Defendant contends that his trial counsel should have moved to strike the entire answer because the original question was leading. Although this was a leading question, defendant\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s failure to move to strike the entire answer did not prejudice defendant.\nThe third error defendant attributes to his counsel was his failure to \u201cfollow through on an objection\u201d to Loughran\u2019s testimony concerning photographs he viewed at a police station. Loughran testified that the police showed him several photographs and asked him to determine if any of them was a photograph of the person who had taken his money. The following exchange then occurred:\n\u201cQ. Did you pick out any?\nA. Yes.\nMr. Levy [defense counsel]: I object to that. He showed him the photographs and he was asked, if he picked out any.\nThe Court: Subject to being connected up, I will let it stand.\u201d Defendant contends that the testimony was not \u201cconnected up\u201d and that he was prejudiced by his counsel\u2019s failure to bring this to the attention of the trial judge.\nIllinois courts adhere to the rule that, absent some indication to the contrary in the record, a trial judge at a bench trial is presumed to have considered only competent evidence. (People v. Clarke (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 104, 277 N.E.2d 866.) This rule presumes a trial judge will decide factual issues based only on legally relevant and competent evidence introduced at trial, and will not permit irrelevent material to influence his determination. (People v. Glanton (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 124, 145, 338 N.E.2d 30.) Defendant has not pointed to anything in the record rebutting this presumption. In fact, the trial judge himself declared that he would consider the testimony only if it were later \u201cconnected up\u201d by the State\u2019s Attorney. This indicates that defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel\u2019s failure to reinstate the objection.\nDefendant also contends his defense counsel should have read into the record at trial the questions and answers given by Loughran at the grand jury proceeding which contradicted his testimony at trial with respect to where defendant was when Loughran approached the automobile. Prior inconsistent statements are used to discredit a witness, and are not affirmative evidence on the merits of a case. Thus, when the parties stipulated that the questions were asked and answers given by Loughran at the grand jury proceedings, defense counsel\u2019s impeachment of Loughran was complete and there was no need to read the questions and answers into evidence. Further, it would not have been in defendant\u2019s best interest to have this material admitted into evidence because the answers indicated that defendant was hiding with the other assailant in the back of the car. This evidence only could have implicated defendant, rather than helped absolve him of guilt.\nDefendant\u2019s final allegation of incompetence is that his defense counsel erred by not making a closing argument. It is not clear that an argument was not made here. The report of proceedings presented to this court does not contain final arguments by either party. But the memorandum of orders (\u201chalf-sheet\u201d) indicates that closing arguments were heard, and at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated in mitigation: \u201c* \u00b0 \u00b0 [Y]ou have heard my final argument in which I pointed out that at best the participation, so-called, of this young man in this incident was minimal.\u201d Even if his defense counsel did not make a closing argument, defendant has failed to demonstrate how this prejudiced him; because the trial was short and the court heard the evidence, there may have been no need for closing argument. In the absence of evidence of prejudice, the scope of our review on the issue of incompetence does not extend to the defense counsel\u2019s tactical decision to forego a closing argument, assuming he made such decision. Baer.\nDefendant\u2019s last contention is that the trial judge denied defendant his right to due process of law when he allegedly failed to enter defendant\u2019s name upon the \u201chalf-sheet\u201d in the case; allegedly failed to enter judgment against defendant on the findings; and allegedly failed to enter the names of the robbery victims as part of his findings. Defendant claims these errors subject him to the possibility of being prosecuted twice for the same offense.\nEven a casual examination of the \u201chalf-sheet\u201d indicates that defendant\u2019s name, Stanley K. Rodgers, and his indictment number are clearly written at the top of the \u201chalf-sheet.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s other contentions are equally infirm. This statement by the trial judge in the record leaves no doubt that the trial judge found defendant guilty of the robbery:\n\u201cThe Court: I have listened to the testimony very carefully and the court is of the opinion that the defendant Stanley Rodgers did participate in the robbery here, and the court finds you guilty on that charge.\u201d\nFollowing this, several pages of record contain the sentencing hearing of defendant, and the trial judge\u2019s pronouncement of a sentence. The victims\u2019 names and addresses are found throughout the record, which is replete with references to the date, time and location of the offense. The record will provide defendant with a complete bar to any future prosecution on the same facts.\nJudgment affirmed.\nJIGANTI, P. J., and McGILLICUDDY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "John Latimer Edward, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Joan S. Cherry, and Pamela L. Gray, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY RODGERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 76-843\nOpinion filed March 1, 1978.\nJohn Latimer Edward, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Joan S. Cherry, and Pamela L. Gray, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0719-01", "first_page_order": 741, "last_page_order": 748 }