{ "id": 3358804, "name": "YOLANDA HIGGENBOTTOM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT VAN VEIGA, SR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Higgenbottom v. Van Veiga", "decision_date": "1978-04-11", "docket_number": "No. 77-1280", "first_page": "189", "last_page": "191", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 189" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "231 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2548183 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/87/0213-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 342, "char_count": 6274, "ocr_confidence": 0.844, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.331642805619591e-08, "percentile": 0.44009264632802914 }, "sha256": "a833b5ba6dc3eea20dddf0c16a84076727cf470ddb7cb29aa359228d70ff7c04", "simhash": "1:7cabdfdbaae89614", "word_count": 1019 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:17:36.138296+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "YOLANDA HIGGENBOTTOM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT VAN VEIGA, SR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal arises from an order entered by the circuit court of Cook County, reinstating a paternity action filed by plaintiff, Yolanda Higgenbottom, against defendant, Robert Van Veiga, Sr. This action had previously been dismissed on defendant\u2019s special appearance and motion to dismiss which alleged that plaintiff\u2019s action was not commenced prior to the expiration of the applicable period of limitation. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 106 3/4, par. 54.\nOn November 23, 1976, plaintiff filed a paternity action against defendant. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff gave birth to a male child on April 3, 1973; that defendant, who was unmarried and a resident of Washington, D.C., was the father of said child bom out of wedlock; and that defendant had acknowledged the paternity of said child to plaintiff and others, and agreed to support and maintain plaintiff during her pregnancy and thereafter, but has failed to do so. Plaintiff prayed for a reasonable amount of money to be paid by defendant for the support, maintenance, education and welfare of said child and further requested reimbursement for expenses incurred during pregnancy and compensation for weekly support and maintenance.\nDefendant responded to plaintiff\u2019s action on March 8,1977, by filing a special appearance and a motion to dismiss the lawsuit. Through these devices defendant contended that plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit had not been commenced within two years of the birth of the child and was, therefore, barred by the applicable statute of limitation. Defendant submitted a memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss and on April 14,1977, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the action.\nPlaintiff, thereafter, filed a motion for rehearing. On July 8, 1977, a hearing was held and the circuit court vacated its order of April 14,1977, and reinstated plaintiff\u2019s action. Defendant then filed a motion to have the reinstatement order certified for immediate appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 308.) On August 18, 1977, the order was certified for immediate appeal. On November 3, 1977, this court granted defendant permission to file the instant appeal.\nThis appeal presents, for our resolution, a question concerning the relationship between section 4 of the Illinois Paternity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 106 3/4, par. 54), and section 18 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 19). The relevant portions of these statutory provisions read, respectively, as follows:\n\u201c54. Institution of the action.\nA proceeding to establish the paternity of a child bom out of wedlock and to establish and enforce liability for its support, maintenance, education and welfare shall be instituted in the circuit court. 0 0 0 No such action may be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the birth of the child. \u00b0 \u00b0 The time any person so accused is absent from the State shall not be computed.\u201d\n\u201c19. Absence from state deducted \u2014 Exceptions.\nIf, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the times herein limited, after his coming into or return to the state; and if, after the cause of action accrues, he departs from and resides out of the state, the time of his absence is no part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. * * * For purposes of the first sentence of this Section, no person shall be considered to be out of the State or to have departed from the State or to reside outside of the State during any period when he is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State with respect to that cause of action pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of the \u2018Civil Practice Act\u2019, * *\nDefendant contends that these statutory provisions must be conjoined and construed such that defendant\u2019s absence from Illinois would not toll the two-year limitations period contained in section 4 of the Paternity Act. If we are to accept this contention we must be persuaded by the following logic: (1) plaintiff was entitled to file a paternity action against defendant within two years after the birth of the child and plaintiff failed to do so, (2) defendant absented himself from Illinois within this two-year period, (3) although pursuant to the language of section 4 of the Paternity Act said absence would appear to have tolled the two-year limitations period, defendant was amenable to process pursuant to the Illinois long arm statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, pars. 16, 17), in that defendant (for jurisdictional purposes only) committed a tortious act within Illinois from which plaintiff\u2019s cause of action arose (Poindexter v. Willis (1967), 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1), and (4) pursuant to section 18 of the Limitations Act, defendant cannot be deemed to have \u201cdeparted\u201d from Illinois. Therefore, plaintiff\u2019s paternity action was filed in an untimely fashion.\nDefendant\u2019s position is persuasive. Plaintiff was able to bring defendant within the jurisdiction of the courts of this State pursuant to the long arm statute. (Poindexter v. Willis (1967), 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1.) We, therefore, should not bar defendant the equal opportunity of utilizing the long arm statute, through section 18 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 19), in a fashion favorable to defendant. Consequently, we hold that under these circumstances, section 18 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 19), is applicable to the Paternity Act (DI. Rev. Stat. (1975), ch. 106 3/4, par. 54). Defendant, therefore, had not \u201cdeparted\u201d from the State of Illinois, and plaintiff\u2019s paternity action was not commenced in a timely fashion.\nAccordingly, the judgment entered by the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nPERLIN and BROWN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "P. Scott Neville, Jr., of Howard, Mann & Slaughter, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Matthew F. Kennedy, Jr., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "YOLANDA HIGGENBOTTOM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT VAN VEIGA, SR., Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 77-1280\nOpinion filed April 11, 1978.\nP. Scott Neville, Jr., of Howard, Mann & Slaughter, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMatthew F. Kennedy, Jr., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0189-01", "first_page_order": 211, "last_page_order": 213 }