{
  "id": 3356151,
  "name": "ANTHONY M. SPAULDING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL J. HOWLETT, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Spaulding v. Howlett",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "ANTHONY M. SPAULDING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL J. HOWLETT, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE BROWN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Anthony M. Spaulding, brought this action pursuant to the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.) seeking to review the decision of the defendant, Secretary of State, temporarily suspending his driver\u2019s license, driving privileges, motor vehicle plates, and motor vehicle registration. The circuit court reversed that decision on the ground that the Secretary\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and it is from this order that the defendant Secretary appeals. We affirm.\nThe plaintiff-appellee, Anthony M. Spaulding, a licensed motor vehicle operator, was involved in an automobile accident on November 22,1974. The plaintiff and the owner of the other car, John Williams, filed motor vehicle accident reports with the Department of Transportation. These reports are required to be filed when damage to the property of any one person involved in a traffic accident is in excess of 2100. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95/2, par. 11 \u2014 406.) Spaulding did not answer the question on his report regarding the status of his insurance coverage.\nPursuant to the safety responsibility law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95/2, par. 7 \u2014 201), the Department of Transportation made an initial determination, based on these reports, that a deposit of security in the amount of *450 or evidence of insurance was required from Spaulding. After notifying Spaulding and receiving no response, the Department certified the matter to the defendant Secretary of State. The Secretary then made a preliminary finding that there was a \u201creasonable possibility\u201d of a civil judgment being entered against Spaulding as a result of the accident, and ordered that a formal hearing be held to determine whether an order of suspension of his driving and registration privileges should be entered. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95/2, par. 7 \u2014 205.\nThe hearing was held on October 8, 1975. All interested parties received written notice. Anthony Spaulding appeared and was represented by counsel, but neither John Williams nor his wife, the actual driver of the other vehicle, appeared.\nAt the hearing, the hearing officer could not go forward with the hearing until it was determined whether or not Spaulding had insurance on the date of the accident. Spaulding\u2019s attorney admitted that he did not. The accident report of John Williams was then admitted into evidence over Spaulding\u2019s objection that the report was hearsay. Spaulding\u2019s accident report was not offered. The hearing officer treated the facts reflected in Williams\u2019 report as establishing a prima facie case. Spaulding did not attempt to rebut the document by testifying or by offering any evidence in his own behalf.\nThereafter, the hearing officer, after finding that there existed a reasonable possibility that a judgment in money damages, may be entered against Spaulding as a result of the accident, suspended Spaulding\u2019s driving and automobile registration privileges. Spaulding then deposited the required security of *450, in order to retain his license.\nOn November 12, 1975, the plaintiff filed his complaint for administrative review. On September 16,1976, the circuit court reversed the decision of the Secretary of State on the ground that the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, the court held that Williams\u2019 accident report was admissible as evidence, but was inadequate to support the Secretary\u2019s prima facie case. The sole issue on appeal is whether the motor vehicle accident report of an absent third party, standing alone, is sufficient evidence in a safety responsibility hearing to support a prima facie case that there exists a \u201creasonable possibility\u201d of a civil judgment for damages being entered against an uninsured motorist.\nOpinion\nWhere an administrative order is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, it is the duty of the reviewing court to affirm the action of the trial court in setting it aside. (Russell v. License Appeal Com. (1st Dist. 1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 594, 273 N.E.2d 650.) The entire record must be considered in order to determine whether the trial court correctly found that the administrative order was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Gasparas v. Leack (1st Dist. 1968), 93 Ill. App. 2d 99, 235 N.E.2d 359.\nThe only evidence presented at the hearing which could give rise to a prima facie case against Spaulding, was Williams\u2019 accident report. Defendant concedes that the report was hearsay. The report indicated that an automobile owned and operated by Spaulding made a right turn against the light and struck an automobile owned by Williams, but operated by his wife, which was proceeding through the intersection on a green light. The report also indicated that the approximate cost to repair Williams\u2019 automobile, a 1965 Ford, was $450.\nThe general rule is that hearsay is inadmissible in an administrative hearing. (Novicki v. Department of Finance (1940), 373 Ill. 342, 26 N.E.2d 130; Russell v. License Appeal Com. (1st Dist. 1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 594, 273 N.E.2d 650.) Defendant argues that a hearing under the safety responsibility law is distinct from other administrative hearings in Illinois. The scope of the hearing, both in terms of the factual determination made and the action taken on this determination, is very limited. The factual inquiry is confined to the question of whether there is a \u201creasonable possibility\u201d of a civil judgment being entered. No ultimate determination of liability is made and the finding of a \u201creasonable possibility\u201d cannot be used as evidence in any other proceeding. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95M, par. 7 \u2014 215.) Defendant maintains that enough evidence was presented at the hearing to establish a prima facie case against Spaulding.\nAlthough the rules and regulations of the safety responsibility law specifically provide that the Secretary may introduce accident reports into evidence at the hearing (Rule 7 \u2014 101 (4)(c)), the legislature did not intend by this section to allow hearsay evidence to be the sole basis for the Secretary of State\u2019s determination that there was a reasonable possibility of a judgment being entered. The rule against hearsay is basic and fundamental and not merely a technical rule of evidence. Russell v. License Appeal Com. (1st Dist. 1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 594, 273 N.E.2d 650.\nIt is apparent that the legislature contemplated that this hearing would encompass more than a threshold inquiry into whether or not a respondent was financially responsible. Rule 7 \u2014 101(5) enumerates the issues to be considered at a safety responsibility hearing:\n\u201c(a) The identity of the driver(s) involved in the accident;\n(b) The identity of the owner(s) of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident;\n(c) The nature and extent of the property damage or bodily injury sustained in the accident upon which the amount of the security deposit is based;\n(d) The determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment in excess of the statutory minimum being rendered against the respondent. Should it be so determined a prima facie case shall be deemed established. * *\nIn addition, the rules also provide that the uninsured driver has the right \u201cto the issuance of subpoenas,\u201d \u201cto call and examine witnesses,\u201d \u201cto introduce exhibits,\u201d \u201cto cross-examine witnesses,\u201d and \u201cto obtain in advance * * * all copies of police reports not designated confidential by state law.\u201d (Rule 7 \u2014 101(3).) Clearly, the legislature intended to provide respondent with a meaningful hearing and a valid inquiry into the issues. This cannot be accomplished when the sole evidence consists of an unsworn report prepared by a person who is not present and cannot be cross-examined or impeached.\nDefendant argues that although Williams\u2019 report is hearsay, it is enough to establish a prima facie case since this particular form of hearsay would be included as an exception to the rule excluding hearsay. Defendant cites Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 93 S. Ct. 1038, for the proposition that hearsay statements \u201cmade under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-examination,\u201d are often admitted into evidence. Accident reports have been legislatively promulgated to insure their reliability. Section 11 \u2014 409 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 409) provides:\n\u201cAny person who provides information in an oral or written report required by this Article with knowledge or reason to believe that such information is false shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.\u201d\nThus, defendant argues, it can readily be seen that the report in issue here has support for its reliability because a specific penalty is provided for falsifying the report.\nDespite the fact that the legislature has imposed a penalty for providing false information, this sanction fails to assure the reliability of the accident report since the relevant questions call for opinion and conjecture as to how the accident occurred and the extent of damages. Furthermore, the \u201ccircumstances that tend to assure reliability\u201d in Chambers are not present in this case. Specifically, that court held that those hearsay statements fell within the spontaneous utterance exception, whereas Williams apparently filled out his accident report 14 days after the accident. Additionally, the statements in Chambers were found to be admissions against interest, also not a condition found here. Finally, the sheer number of independent statements in Chambers provided additional corroboration for each individual statement. In the instant case, there is absolutely nothing else in the record to corroborate the representations contained in the accident report prepared by Williams.\nDefendant also argues that the procedures employed at a safety responsibility hearing are analogous to those used under the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act. There, a corrected tax return is admissible against a taxpayer at a hearing, and is presumed to be prima facie evidence of the amount of tax due. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, par. 443.) The taxpayer may overcome the Department\u2019s case by introducing his books and records, supported by his own testimony. (Quincy Trading Post, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (4th Dist. 1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 725, 298 N.E.2d 789.) Defendant argues that the same procedures should apply here.\nThis argument is also not persuasive. The difference between the procedures under the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax Act and those under the safety responsibility law is that under the former, there is a statutory presumption that corrected tax returns are prima facie correct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, par. 443.) The only time a prima facie case arises under the safety responsibility law is when the hearing officer, after considering the evidence, makes a determination there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment in excess of the statutory minimum ($250) being rendered against the respondent. Should it be so determined, a prima facie case shall be deemed established. (Rule 7 \u2014 101(5)(d).) Nowhere does it provide that the accident reports themselves constitute a prima facie case.\nIn conclusion, it is our opinion that there was insufficient evidence produced by the Secretary at the safety responsibility hearing to sustain a prima facie case. Accordingly, the order of the circuit court of Cook County reversing the decision of the Secretary is affirmed.\nIn passing we should also note that the rules and procedures of the safety responsibility law are adequate and sufficient to protect the rights of the uninsured motorists. The record discloses that plaintiff was adequately informed as to the time, place and nature of the hearing, and was given an opportunity to present evidence in his own behalf. It is clear that he was afforded due process of law. Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90, 91 S. Ct. 1586; Rentra Liquor Dealers, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1st Dist. 1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 293 N.E.2d 388.\nAffirmed.\nSTAMOS, P. J, and PERLIN, J., concur.\nSpaulding\u2019s accident report, which was not introduced at the hearing, would have provided some corroboration for Williams\u2019 version of how the accident occurred.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE BROWN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Stephen R. Swofford, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Robert P. Bums, Alan M. Freedman, and Allen L. Ray, all of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ANTHONY M. SPAULDING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL J. HOWLETT, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 76-1662\nOpinion filed April 11, 1978.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Stephen R. Swofford, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nRobert P. Bums, Alan M. Freedman, and Allen L. Ray, all of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0249-01",
  "first_page_order": 271,
  "last_page_order": 276
}