{ "id": 3360403, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WOODROW BEAMER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Beamer", "decision_date": "1978-05-08", "docket_number": "No. 77-129", "first_page": "855", "last_page": "859", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 855" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2729600 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5641909 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2858633 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 1060", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2459922 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/1060-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491807 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0741-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 11651, "ocr_confidence": 0.854, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1926565449161236e-07, "percentile": 0.5917316028849559 }, "sha256": "177d5e28f8203cf01b051dc14c532890aa15320b446984491a2f04a92b84843a", "simhash": "1:b340e32be45a9869", "word_count": 1937 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:17:36.138296+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WOODROW BEAMER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr, JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was convicted of armed robbery, following a bench trial, and was sentenced to a term of four to 12 years in prison. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress two statements which he gave police, since, (1) the State failed to prove that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the assistance of counsel, and (2) the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the statements were voluntary, since it failed to produce all witnesses material to the issue of voluntariness. We affirm.\nOn September 2, 1975, Will Todd robbed a 7-Eleven store in Loves Park, Illinois, at gunpoint. Two boys saw the robber leave in a \u201clate model, light-colored T-bird.\u201d Immediately thereafter, defendant and Will Todd were stopped while riding in a 1969 or 72 Ford Thunderbird. The defendant was driving the car. Merchandise taken from the 7-Eleven store and a .22-caliber pistol were found in the car. The defendant and his companion were advised of their \u201crights\u201d and then transported to the Sheriff\u2019s office.\nAt 2 a.m. on September 3, 1975, shortly after the defendant was arrested, he was interviewed by Detective Rodney Roop of the Winnebago County sheriff\u2019s police. Roop first read the defendant a \u201cwaiver of rights\u201d form. The defendant was asked if he understood his rights and responded that he did, and signed the form. In response to questioning by Roop, the defendant made some inconclusive remarks, and then stated that he would like to \u201cthink about it awhile\u201d before making a statement, and \u201cpossibly contact a lawyer.\u201d Questioning was immediately terminated and later that day the defendant was taken before a judge who \u201cfully explained\u201d his rights and appointed the public defender to represent the defendant. The defendant\u2019s preliminary hearing was set for September 10, 1975, at 2:45 p.m.\nOn September 9, 1975, Detective Meyers of the sheriff\u2019s department interviewed the defendant. He began by orally advising the defendant of his \u201cconstitutional rights.\u201d He then advised the defendant that law enforcement agencies in Tennessee and other States were making inquiries regarding the defendant, and that \u201cthey would possibly have charges coming up against him for armed robbery in those other states.\u201d The defendant was asked if he wanted to say anything about the robbery of the 7-Eleven, and responded that he \u201cwas involved in this armed robbery\u201d and that he \u201cdid it with Willie Todd.\u201d Meyers asked him to reduce his statement to writing, but the defendant declined, stating that he would \u201clike to spend the night in jail and think about it.\u201d The defendant asked Meyers to contact him the next day and stated that he would let Meyers know then whether or not he would give a written statement.\nThe next day, prior to the scheduled preliminary hearing, the defendant was brought to the detective bureau of the sheriff\u2019s office. He first talked to two \u201ccity officers\u201d for approximately an hour. The State did not call the \u201ccity officers\u201d as witnesses, and there is no testimony as to what occurred during the interview. After the \u201ccity officers\u201d had finished talking to the defendant, at approximately 1 p.m., Detective Meyers brought the defendant to his office and advised him of his constitutional rights by reading a \u201cwaiver of rights\u201d form to him. Meyers read the defendant his rights \u201cone at a time,\u201d pausing after each \u201cright\u201d to ask the defendant if he understood. After Meyers finished giving the defendant his \u201crights\u201d he explained them again in \u201claymen\u2019s\u201d terms, telling the defendant that if he said anything, it could be taken into court and used \u201cto convict him of the crime of armed robbery.\u201d At the conclusion of these admonitions, the defendant stated that he understood his rights and desired to make a statement \u201csince he thought about it all night and wanted to tell the truth.\u201d\nHe then signed a waiver of rights form and shortly thereafter signed a written statement, admitting that he was \u201cin on the robbery with Will Todd\u201d and that \u201cwhen we went to the store our intentions were to rob it.\u201d\nThe defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that he knowingly waived his right to counsel prior to making the oral statement on September 9, and that the written statement on September 10 was the product of the \u201ctainted\u201d statement made on the 9th. The defendant argues that even though Detective Meyers testified that he orally advised the defendant of his \u201cconstitutional rights\u201d, prior to questioning him on September 9, this testimony was not sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant was informed of his right to counsel.\nWe begin by noting that although the police knew, or should have known, that defendant was represented by an attorney on September 9, they arranged for and conducted the interview without notice to the defendant\u2019s attorney. While this court has refused to hold that statements obtained in the absence of counsel, even though counsel has been retained or appointed, are per se inadmissible, we observe that the State has a higher burden to show waiver of the presence of counsel, once counsel has been appointed, than in cases wherein interrogation takes place, prior to the appointment of counsel People v. Sandoval (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 741.\nNonetheless, where such an issue is raised by a motion to suppress a confession, the State\u2019s burden of proof is proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (E.g., People v. Noblin (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 1060.) Here, arguably, the arresting officers\u2019 testimony that the defendant was advised of his \u201crights\u201d at the scene of the arrest, or Detective Meyers\u2019 testimony that he advised the defendant of his \u201cconstitutional rights\u201d on September 9, constituted obvious references to the customary Miranda warnings which, of course, are a familiar litany to virtually every police officer and include an admonishment of the right of counsel. However, the State\u2019s case does not rest upon this inference. The defendant could hardly have been unaware of his right to counsel on September 9, since he was present in court when counsel was appointed to represent him on September 3, 1975, and the court\u2019s docket entry indicates that the defendant \u201cwas fully advised\u201d of his rights at that time. Further, Detective Roop testified that he read the defendant a \u201cwaiver of rights\u201d form on September 3, and the defendant stated that he understood the rights set forth in the form, which was introduced into evidence, and clearly set forth the right to counsel and to have counsel present during questioning. In fact, on September 3 the defendant demonstrated a working knowledge of his rights by telling Roop that he wanted to \u201cthink about it for awhile, and possibly contact a lawyer\u201d before making any statement. As the court noted in People v. Hill (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 125,131-32, \u201conce Miranda\u2019s mandate was complied with at the threshold of the questioning it was not necessary to repeat the warnings at the beginning of each successive interview.\u201d On this record we cannot hold that the trial court\u2019s finding that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, prior to making an oral confession on September 9, 1975, was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nApart from arguing that the written confession obtained on September 10, 1975, was \u201ctainted\u201d as a product of the oral confession made the day before, the defendant has argued that the State has failed to prove that the defendant knowingly waived his right to counsel in the interrogation on September 10. Although it is clear that the defendant was given complete Miranda warnings on September 10, the defendant contends that the written form advising him of his rights, which were carefully explained to him by Detective Meyers, and which he acknowledged that he understood, served only to confuse him. While the form advised the defendant that he had a right to remain silent, that any statements he made could be used against him in court, that he had a right to talk to a lawyer, before being asked any questions, as well as a right to have the lawyer present during questioning, and that, if he decided to answer questions without a lawyer present, he had the right to stop answering questions at any time, the defendant argues that the form did not enable him to \u201cfully grasp the significance of the procedural situation in which he found himself,\u201d since it informed him that, if he could not afford to hire a lawyer, one would be appointed for him, even though he already had a lawyer. We find this argument to be meritless; the written statement of rights which the defendant received clearly and repeatedly advised him of his right to counsel, and it strains credulity to argue that the defendant did not understand his rights because he already had a lawyer when they were given to him.\nFinally, the defendant urges that the State\u2019s failure to call the two \u201ccity officers\u201d who interviewed him prior to the interview with Detective Meyers on September 10 mandates a reversal of his conviction. Where a confession is objected to as involuntary, it should not be admitted unless each material witness on the issue is either produced or his absence explained. (E.g., People v. Bell (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 82.) However, this \u201cis not a mechanical rule but a practical one, designed to assist the court in determining whether the confession was voluntary.\u201d (People v. Sims (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 425, 429.) Thus, in Sims, where the defendant claimed that his confession had been coerced by police brutality and the record showed that all of the persons (six in number) who could reasonably be considered material witnesses on the question of mistreatment were called and testified in denial of the defendant\u2019s allegations, it was not error to admit the confession into evidence, even though the defendant contended there were a total of 18 officers who were involved in interrogating him at one time or another. In this case, there was never any allegation that the \u201ccity officers\u201d had anything to do with either of the defendant\u2019s statements. Detective Meyers\u2019 interview with the defendant, on September 10, was conducted pursuant to the defendant\u2019s express request that Meyers contract him. Meyers began the interview by advising the defendant of his rights, and there is nothing that would indicate that Meyers\u2019 interrogation was somehow linked to that of the \u201ccity officers.\u201d The evidence indicates that the interview by the \u201ccity officers\u201d was not conducted in a \u201cback office,\u201d and there was never any claim that the officers participated in or witnessed any actions that could be construed as physical or mental coercion. It is apparent that the testimony of these officers, being thus unrelated to the statements at issue, would not have been material to the claim raised by the defendant\u2019s suppression motion.\nIt is therefore clear that there was no error in the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s suppression motion, and the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed accordingly.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD, P. J., and GUILD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr, JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Robinson and Michael Mulder, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Daniel D. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko and William L. Browers, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WOODROW BEAMER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 77-129\nOpinion filed May 8, 1978.\nMary Robinson and Michael Mulder, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDaniel D. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko and William L. Browers, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0855-01", "first_page_order": 877, "last_page_order": 881 }