{ "id": 2468744, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Dennis Pisarski, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Pisarski", "decision_date": "1972-06-09", "docket_number": "No. 52923", "first_page": "235", "last_page": "242", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "6 Ill. App. 3d 235" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "14 N.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill.App. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3193894 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/295/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill.App.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594853 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/109/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.E. 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4830084 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/272/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 U.S. 541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169814 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/369/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744-745" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2838755 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12089416, 12089640, 12089544, 12089323, 12089588, 12089366, 12089689, 12089468, 12089437, 12089503 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0975-03", "/us/397/0975-09", "/us/397/0975-07", "/us/397/0975-01", "/us/397/0975-08", "/us/397/0975-02", "/us/397/0975-10", "/us/397/0975-05", "/us/397/0975-04", "/us/397/0975-06" ] }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2890012 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 U.S. 717", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1285471 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722-723" }, { "page": "1642-1643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/366/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 N.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592-593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866065 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0329-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 813, "char_count": 15431, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4381588717190627e-07, "percentile": 0.6526112140128633 }, "sha256": "f19b0f1700ea0b3880b1ab5ac5a66281de1c1bebdca2e7e17416414b40784aaa", "simhash": "1:894426a1f7b7286f", "word_count": 2666 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:18.777064+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Dennis Pisarski, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE ENGLISH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOFFENSES CHARGED\nMurder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1 (a-1) and (a-2).) Three counts of aggravated battery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4, par. 12 \u2014 4 (b-1), and par. 12 \u2014 4 (b-3).) Attempt (to commit murder). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 4.\nJUDGMENT\nAfter a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of murder and one count of aggravated battery. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 35 to 60 years for murder, and 4 to 5 years for aggravated battery. CONTENTIONS RAISED ON APPEAL\n1. Defendant was denied a fair trial because two jurors had read newspaper articles concerning defendant and the trial which had appeared in two Chicago daily papers on the evening the trial began and on the morning after the first witnesses were called.\n2. Defendant was denied a fair trial because a State\u2019s witness, while demonstrating her version of defendant\u2019s handling of the gun at the time of the shooting, broke down sobbing in the presence of the jury.\n3. Defendant\u2019s sentence was excessive.\nEVIDENCE\nIn the summer of 1966, defendant and the decedent were very close to one another and considered themselves engaged. In December, 1966, defendant gave decedent a diamond ring which she wore on the third finger of her left hand. On April 8, 1967, when defendant went to visit decedent in her home, he was met by decedent\u2019s brother, who handed him the diamond ring and other items he had given decedent. The decedent was not present, but her mother told defendant that he could not see or speak to the decedent at all.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s testimony, decedent called him on April 16, 1967, to tell him that it was not her idea, but her mother\u2019s and brother\u2019s, that they were not to see each other again. She told him that she still loved him, they arranged to meet on April 24, 1967.\nOn April 24, 1967, defendant went to the high school to pick up decedent, and they went for a ride.\nDecedent\u2019s mother testified that on April 27, 1967, when defendant again came to her home, she told him that he was not to see her daughter again as she did not want to see or talk with him. Decedent was present in the room, but said nothing.\nOn May 3, 1967, at around 8:00 A.M., defendant went to speak with decedent at the high school which she attended. A teacher, Mr. Gerenstein, asked defendant to leave the building as he was no longer a student, but allowed defendant to leave by a particular exit so that he could say one thing more to decedent.\nA girl student who was standing across the corridor from decedent\u2019s locker testified that defendant walked up to the decedent and said, \u201cIf you\u2019re smart, you\u2019ll do it,\u201d to which decedent replied, \u201cNo.\u201d Defendant then said, \u201cSee this.\u201d At this point, the witness had her back to defendant and decedent, but was looking over her shoulder at them and heard decedent say, \u201cMichael.\u201d She saw defendant holding a gun straight ahead of him, and when the gun was closer to decedent\u2019s head or shoulders, defendant pushed the decedent so that she was leaning against the locker. The witness saw defendant raise the gun, and as the witness turned completely around to face the pair, she heard a shot. She saw decedent fall, and saw that defendant was \u201csmiling and going hmm, like a pleased look.\u201d\nAfter the first shot, defendant went down the hall toward the exit, still with the gun in his hand. He turned and fired three more times, wounding the instructor who had first asked him to leave the building.\nDefendant testified that he went to the school to speak with decedent on May 3, 1967, at which time the decedent told him that she planned to tell her parents that she was going to marry him. He replied, \u201cYou are only going to get yourself in more trouble. * * *\" but decedent said that her mind was made up. Defendant then raised the pistol to his head to commit suicide, but decedent grabbed his hand and the gun went off. He did not remember pointing the gun at anyone after the shooting or firing more shots.\nAlthough there was testimony as to the depressed state of defendant, a possible prior suicide attempt, and suicide and love notes, there was also testimony of a co-worker of defendant that defendant had said on April 29, 1967, \u201cWell, I have been taking a lot of shit from [decedent] lately, and I\u2019ll shoot her.\u201d In any event, defendant was found guilty by a jury of both murder and aggravated battery, and since he does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt, we have set forth the above and following facts only as they relate to the three contentions raised on appeal.\nOPINION\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after it was learned that two jurors had each read one of two newspaper articles concerning defendant and the trial which appeared in Chicago daily papers on the evening the trial began and on the morning after the first witnesses testified.\nThe first article appeared in a question-and-answer column in answer to the question, \u201c* * * the shooting last May at West Leyden Twp. High School in which a girl student was killed. What ever happened to the teacher shot in the hip?\u201d The article reported that the teacher, who still has the bullet in his hip, is doing quite well, and that, as the athletic director of both East and West Leyden High Schools, he is on the job every day. The article went on to say: \u201cBy the way, the trial of the accused killer, Michael Pisarski, 18, a high school dropout, just began before Circuit Court Judge Francis T. Delaney. Eight jurors have been selected.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In addition, a brief summary of the incident followed which gave the information that decedent had ended a two-year romance with defendant, that defendant went to the high school to speak with the decedent, and that defendant \u201callegedly pulled a .22 calibre pistol and shot her in the head, then fired at [a teacher], hitting him in the hip.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe second article was a news story which began with the headline, \u201cDEATH THREAT TOLD IN GIRL\u2019S SLAYING TRIAL,\u201d and the subheadline, \u201cWill Shoot her,\u2019 Youth Testifies.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In addition to giving the date, time and place of the shooting, and various other personal information about the defendant, decedent, and wounded teacher, the article related some of the testimony of two state\u2019s witnesses and an admission reportedly made by the defendant when he was being questioned by the police subsequent to his arrest. The testimony of the witnesses, however, was not stated in the article as fact, but was always limited by the words, \u201ctestified that,\u201d and defendant\u2019s admission read that \u201cPisarski reportedly admitted the shooting and said he did it because, 1 was depressed and I loved her.\u2019\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant argues that the jurors who had read the articles were tainted as of the moment of their exposure to the articles. Such is not the rule. In People v. Berry, 37 Ill.2d 329, 331, 226 N.E.2d 591, 592-593, the court, in affirming the denial of a motion for change of venue for adverse pre-trial publicity, stated:\n\u201c[T]he rule is that an accused is entitled to a change of venue when it appears there are reasonable grounds to believe that the prejudice alleged actually exists and that by reason of the prejudice there is a reasonable apprehension that the accused cannot receive a fair and impartial trial.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe situation in the instant case, where the motion for a mistrial was based on the alleged prejudicial effect of publicity upon jurors already selected, is essentially the same as in a case where a motion for change of venue is based on adverse pre-trial publicity. In neither instance will prejudice be assumed merely because of the exposure of potential or selected jurors to the publicity; it must be shown that it actually exists.\nIn the instant case, both articles were factual in character, but when matters in issue were described, the report carefully used such terms as \u201ctestified that\u201d and \u201creportedly.\u201d Such objectivity may reasonably be expected to preclude any prejudicial effect on the jurors so long as the reports were accurate, as these were. However, to protect defendant\u2019s rights, the court examined each of the two jurors (and an alternate juror) who had read the news stories to discover if they were prejudiced against defendant as a result of their exposure to the publicity. Each of the jurors answered that the articles would in no way affect his judgment in the case or change the answers he had given during the voir dire. They declared that they would be fair and impartial and that they would keep an open mind until the case was closed. Both maintained that they still understood the prior warning given them by the court that defendant was entitled to a presumption of innocence, and that the State had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe court in Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 722-723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-1643, stated that with today\u2019s widespread methods of communication, an important criminal case can be expected to arouse the public\u2019s interest so that most of those best qualified to be jurors will have some opinion as to the merits of the case. But the court continued and said:\n\u201cTo hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror\u2019s impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.\u201d\nThe answers given by each of the jurors during his examination by the court gave the court an adequate basis for finding that he could \u201clay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence.\u201d The court further guarded defendant\u2019s rights by repeatedly admonishing the jury to avoid reading newspapers, listening to the radio, watching television, or discussing the case with anyone. People v. Yonder, 44 Ill.2d 376, 387, 256 N.E.2d 321, 327, cert. denied in People v. Guido, 397 U.S. 975.\nWe are satisfied, from a review of the record, that defendant received a trial before a fair and impartial jury and that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial. Even if such were not the case, defendant would be estopped from so asserting, since defense counsel declined to question the jurors as to any fixed opinions they might have gained after reading the articles. During the questioning of the first juror who had read the article, when the court asked whether either the State\u2019s Attorney or defense counsel would like to ask some questions, defense counsel replied, \u201cThis is Your Honor\u2019s .province, if the Court please.\u201d Since the jurors\u2019 answers to the questions of the court revealed that the jurors were competent, it was up to defendant, if he still believed that the jurors were not impartial, to pursue the questioning further when given the opportunity to do so. People v. Ward, 32 Ill.2d 253, 259, 204 N.E.2d 741, 744-745; see also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 558, 82 S.Ct. 955, 964.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after a State\u2019s witness, while demonstrating her version of defendant\u2019s handling of the gun at the time of the shooting, did so with what defense counsel (though not the record) later classified as an \u201coutburst\u201d in the presence of the jury, citing People v. Duzan, 272 Ill. 478, 493, 112 N.E. 315, 321. Additionally, defendant cites as error the fact that the court held a hearing and denied the motion in chambers and then proceeded with the case without admonishing or advising the jury as to the outcome of the episode.\nThis witness was a schoolmate of the decedent who had witnessed the incident, including the critical moment when defendant said he had been holding the gun to his own head. She testified to hearing a conversation between defendant and decedent at decedent\u2019s locker, and to seeing defendant with a gun in his hand. After she identified the gun, the State\u2019s Attorney asked her to relate to the court where defendant\u2019s hand was when he pushed decedent. She answered, \u201cA gun was in the right hand and his left hand, I don\u2019t know, it was in this vicinity, somewhere in through here [indicating].\u201d The State\u2019s Attorney asked if she would be able to demonstrate defendant\u2019s actions to the jury, and when the witness answered affirmatively, the court asked her to do so. She stepped down, and the court said, \u201cGet the gun, young lady, and show us the way it was, if you can.\u201d\nDefense counsel objected, and he and the State\u2019s Attorney began to argue. The court asked them both to step into chambers, at which time defense counsel made a motion for mistrial on the grounds that putting a gun in the hands of a young girl is improper, and that the ensuing scene was prejudicial to the defendant.\nIn general, the trial judge has a wide degree of discretion in ruling upon the admissibility of courtroom demonstrations. (People v. Carter, 109 Ill.App.2d 15, 23, 248 N.E.2d 847, 851.) In the instant case, the court obviously felt that the greatest accuracy concerning the most critical part of the entire case would be gained through a demonstration by the witness, since it was the judge who asked the witness to take the gun in her hand and show, if she could, how defendant had held the gun prior to the shooting. Such a demonstration, which helped to clarify the matter in issue for the jury, was proper evidence, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow it.\nAs to defendant\u2019s complaint of emotionalism, the law is clear that an emotional outburst is no reason for the granting of a mistrial if the outburst is giving vent to natural feelings and not simulated or attempted for the purpose of influencing the jury. (Gourley v. Chicago & E. I. Ry. Co., 295 Ill.App. 160, 183, 14 N.E.2d 842, 851.) There is no hint from the in-chamber conversation that the emotional reaction of the witness was anything but the natural reaction of a 16-year-old girl who had to handle a gun to demonstrate how a schoolmate of hers was killed. We find that the court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial.\nDefendant lastly contends that the major sentence imposed was excessive because at the time of the sentencing, defendant was 19 years old, with no arrest record. The sentence is a serious one, but so also are the crimes committed \u2014 one face-to-face murder followed by wild shooting in a crowded school hall which, except for the most fortuitous of circumstances, might well have resulted in additional deaths. We are unable to find in this record sufficient grounds to justify the exercise of our authority to reduce defendant\u2019s sentence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, par. 615 (b) (4).\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLORENZ, P. J., and DRUCKER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE ENGLISH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Adamowski, Newey & Riley, of Chicago, (Francis X. Riley, of counsel,) for appellant.", "Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and James E. Sternik, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Dennis Pisarski, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 52923;\nFirst District\nJune 9, 1972.\nAdamowski, Newey & Riley, of Chicago, (Francis X. Riley, of counsel,) for appellant.\nEdward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and James E. Sternik, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0235-01", "first_page_order": 257, "last_page_order": 264 }