{ "id": 2470670, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mary Curran, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Curran", "decision_date": "1972-07-06", "docket_number": "No. 55799", "first_page": "792", "last_page": "795", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "6 Ill. App. 3d 792" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "249 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill.App.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 F.2d 1079", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2180638 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/414/1079-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 F.Supp. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 68279 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/220/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 F.Supp. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 88740 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/210/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 F.2d 148", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 109008 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/325/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 F.Supp. 456", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 89005 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/210/0456-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 445, "char_count": 6659, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08117867103448888 }, "sha256": "70da047b04a4bed617a8c2316af5164570c3bdd69507ee424841416e17f3dfa8", "simhash": "1:8f6b269014423b28", "word_count": 1089 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:18.777064+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mary Curran, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DEMPSEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Mary Curran, was indicted for gambling in violation of paragraph 28 \u2014 1(a) (10), chapter 38, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969. She waived a jury trial, was found guilty and placed on probation for six months.\nOf the points raised on appeal we need consider but one: the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.\nArmed with a search warrant, officers of the Chicago Police Department made a forced entry into an apartment leased to the defendant. There were two people in the apartment, Mary Curran and Matt Raimondi. Recovered in a search of the premises were two one-hundred dollar bills and a sheet of paper, found in a hollowed crucifix in the bedroom, and water soluble paper, found in a piano bench.\nOfficer Corless, the State\u2019s sole witness, testified that he had been a policeman for five years and assigned to the Vice Control Division, Gambling Unit for approximately one year. Pieces of paper similar to the one found in the crucifix had been seen by him a half-dozen or more times. The specific paper contained a handwritten fist of baseball teams and pitchers but had no betting notations on it. Corless could not identify the handwriting and he did not know if the games were played on the date of the raid.\nWhile the police were in the apartment, Corless testified that the telephone rang four times. He answered the phone. Two of the callers asked for \u201cMatt\u201d; Corless answered \u201cyes,\u201d and took down the information the callers gave him: \u201cfive on Sox to win, three on Sox to win, five on Cubs to win.\u201d None of the callers identified themselves.\nThe defendant testified that there were only two phone calls. She claimed the officer was wrong when, after the first call, he announced a bet was made. When the phone rang again, the police denied her request to answer the phone with the officers listening to the conversation on an extension. Curran denied accepting bets on the telephone or having the phone installed for the purpose of transmitting information concerning wagers, betting odds, or changes in betting odds. She stated that the crucifix had been given to her as a gift; after she discovered it to be hollow, she placed the two one-hundred dollar bills within it. She said she was never known as \u201cMatt,\u201d did not know of anybody using her telephone for betting purposes and did not know the list of baseball teams was in the crucifix.\nSection 28 \u2014 1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 delineates numerous activities as gambling offenses. Section (10) under which the indictment was brought states:\n\u201c(a) A person commits gambling when he:\ne # e\n(10) Knowingly transmits information as to wagers, betting odds, or changes in betting odds by telephone, telegraph, radio, semaphore or similar means; or knowingly installs or maintains equipment for the transmission or receipt of such information; except that nothing in this subdivision (10) prohibits transmission or receipt of such information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests * * *.\u2019\u2019 Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969, ch. 38, par. 28 \u2014 1(a) (10).\nThe defendant was charged with violating only the first portion of the statute: knowingly transmitting \u201cinformation as to wagers, betting odds and changes in betting odds by telephone\u201d. The indictment did not charge her with installing or maintaining \u201cequipment for. the transmission or receipt of such information\u201d. And she was not indicted for making, offering to make, or receiving bets. Her guilt or innocence depended upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that she transmitted betting information by telephone.\nThe statute does not define the word \u201ctransmit\u201d and nothing in the legislative history of the statute indicates that the word was intended to have a meaning other than its common one: to convey to another person, to pass on from one person or place to another. (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary (1966).) The drafters of the statute state that subsection (a) (10) is:\n\u201c* * * designed to reach middlemen, agents, and other participants in the gambling racket who might not technically qualify as offenders under other subsections of the article. It also reaches into the heart of syndicate activity by outlawing the operation of telephone networks necessary to furnish betting information.\u201d Committee Comments, S.H.A., ch. 38, art. 28, p. 627 (1970).\nThis purpose has been given effect in Federal cases which have applied the statute to the transmission of information pertaining to wagers, racing odds and results. See, Angelini v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company (7th Cir. 1969, 418 F.2d Ill; Kelly v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company (N.D. Ill. 1962), 210 F.Supp. 456 aff'd 325 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1963); Telephone News System, Inc., v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company (N.D. Ill. 1962), 210 F.Supp. 471, 220 F.Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1963); United States v. Ruthstein (7th Cir. 1969), 414 F.2d 1079.\nWhile we are not aware of an Illinois decision which has interpreted subsection (10), aU of the Federal cases we have read involved the furnishing of gambling information. There is no evidence that Curran sent out or transmitted information. The evidence shows that she possessed a Ust of basebaU teams and pitchers, and some water souble paper; that four telephone calls were received on her phone from unknown persons who asked for \u201cMatt\u201d and that two of them placed bets. She did not pass the information on to anyone else and there was no evidence from which an inference could be drawn that she intended to lay-off the bets with some third person. While it appears that she might qualify as an offender under other subsections of paragraph 28 \u2014 1(a), or under the latter portion of subsection (10) in that she knowingly installed or maintained \u201cequipment for the transmission or receipt of such information,\u201d she was not indicted for these offenses.\nAs this court observed in People v. Galan (1969), 101 Ill.App.2d 98, 249 N.E.2d 118, suspicious circumstances, although of probative value, cannot substitute for proof, and suspicions or probabilities are not enough to convict. Nor can making a bet or being a bookmaker, without supporting evidence, be equated with transmitting gambling information.\nThe defendant\u2019s conviction is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nMcGLOON, P. J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DEMPSEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Caplin & Golding, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and Larry S. Boress, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mary Curran, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 55799;\nFirst District\nJuly 6, 1972.\nCaplin & Golding, of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and Larry S. Boress, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0792-02", "first_page_order": 814, "last_page_order": 817 }