{ "id": 3351204, "name": "NORMAN SCHALL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTRY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Schall v. Country Mutual Insurance", "decision_date": "1978-06-15", "docket_number": "No. 14696", "first_page": "738", "last_page": "741", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 738" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "325 N.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2789545 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 N.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 835", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2782991 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0835-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5787730 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/27/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 N.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4950546 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/325/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426645 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 P.2d 966", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Wash. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1127940 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/83/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5456353 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3383204 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0613-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 461, "char_count": 8473, "ocr_confidence": 0.888, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4371996205184163 }, "sha256": "11e6f48610fddcfae236231b14fb88686ad292e8b286cc94b77dfd5fabe136ad", "simhash": "1:e223f1d3b78eff44", "word_count": 1390 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:17:48.742090+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NORMAN SCHALL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTRY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe several plaintiffs obtained judgments approximating *198,000 against Stanley Tipsord for injuries received in a multivehicle collision. Stanley was driving a truck owned and insured in the name of his father, Emory. The issue of liability was reviewed in Schall v. Forrest (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 613, 366 N.E.2d 1Ill. Defendant has paid the maximum liability ($100,000) upon the policy issued to cover the truck owned and insured by Emory.\nPlaintiffs appeal from the judgment of the trial court entered in their garnishment proceeding, which alleged that defendant had two additional policies in which plaintiffs had an interest.\nIt is stipulated that Della is the wife of Emory and that Stanley is the son of Emory, all of whom resided in the same household upon the day of the collision. It does not specifically appear whether Della is the mother of Stanley.\nDefendant issued the following policies: Policy \u201cA\u201d issued to Emory Tipsord insuring a pickup truck owned by him in which Stanley was not a named insured; Policy \u201cB\u201d issued to Della Tipsord insuring a 1967 Ford automobile in which Stanley was not a named insured; and Policy \u201cC\u201d issued to Stanley Tipsord insuring a 1968 Dodge automobile.\nThe parties stipulated that the automobile of Stanley Tipsord described in Policy \u201cC\u201d was not withdrawn from service, that is, that the truck was not being used as a substitute vehicle. There is no contention that the truck was not available for the regular use of the son, Stanley. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Differding (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 103, 370 N.E.2d 543.\nThe trial court found under the evidence that Policy \u201cB\u201d and \u201cC\u201d did not provide insurance coverage in addition to that which was provided by Policy \u201cA\u201d, and entered judgment in favor of the garnishee-defendant.\nPlaintiffs argue that there is an ambiguity arising by reason of the term \u201cNon-Owned Vehicle\u201d appearing in the policy. In the portion of the policy headed \u201cPersons Insured,\u201d the policy provides that with respect to a vehicle the named insured and a resident of his household is deemed a named insured. The section further provides:\n\u201c(2) with respect to a Non-Owned Vehicle,\n(a) the Named Insured, when operating such vehicle or when such vehicle is operated by an agent or servant of the Named Insured;\n(b) Relatives as hereinafter defined, provided the actual use of such vehicle is with the permission of the owner and the use is within the scope of such permission.\u201d\nWe note that the language with respect to a \u201cNon-Owned Vehicle\u201d in its paragraph (b) specifically refers to the definition of \u201cRelative\u201d as thereafter defined.\nA portion of the policy entitled \u201cDEFINITIONS UNDER SECTION I\u201d in enlarged and heavier type, immediately follows the portion referring to persons insured and defines 11 words or terms employed in the preceding portions of the policy, including the following:\n\u201c \u2018Named Insured\u2019 means the individual or entity named in the Declarations and if an individual includes his or her spouse, if a resident of the same household.\n\u2018Relative\u2019 means a resident of the Named Insured\u2019s household who is related to the Named Insured by blood, marriage, or adoption, or a person to whom the Named Insured stands in loco parentis.\n\u2018Non-Owned Vehicle\u2019 means a private passenger automobile or a motor vehicle not owned by, registered in the name of, or furnished or available for the regular use of persons described in paragraph (2) of Persons Insured.\u201d\nEach of the respective policies states that a \u201cPerson Insured\u201d in respect to a vehicle is the \u201cNamed Insured,\u201d and a resident of his household. Defendant\u2019s liability under Policy \u201cA\u201d is not disputed since Stanley was a resident of Emory\u2019s household and the maximum on this policy has been paid.\nPlaintiffs contend that Policies \u201cB\u201d and \u201cC\u201d are ambiguous as to the use of the term \u201cNon-Owned Vehicle\u201d and since ambiguities in insurance policies are construed in favor of the insured the court should find coverage under all of the policies. It is contended by plaintiffs that the policy is misleading because it speaks of a person insured with respect to a \u201cNon-Owned Vehicle,\u201d but subsequently in a definition a \u201cNon-Owned Vehicle\u201d is defined to mean something less than all vehicles that are not owned by the insured. It seems to be the contention that nonowned vehicles must be listed as an exclusion to alert the reader that it did not have the same meaning.\nInitially, we note that plaintiffs are not the insured and would not ordinarily be expected to be confused by the terms of the policy. Here, plaintiffs contend that the issue turns upon the expectations of different individual purchaser\u2019s insurance policies for the operation of different and identified motor vehicles. We find no reason to conclude that such restricted purchases contemplated an increase of liability coverage of each person by reason of accumulating liability coverage provided by the several policies purchased.\nPlaintiffs argue that an insuring agreement is ambiguous when it requires multiple readings to ascertain its meaning. It is apparent that an insurance policy is necessarily a complex instrument dealing with permutations and combinations of persons insured, vehicles insured, and the uses both covered and excluded. It is doubtful that the policy could be simplified by defining each term necessarily employed with regard to each person insured in each provision stated.\nPlaintiffs urge that this court should find ambiguity as was done in Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Ward (1974), 83 Wash. 2d 353, 517 P.2d 966. The issue was stated to be one of first impression in that the court and its members strongly disagreed as to whether the decision was contrary to the great weight of authority as developed in other jurisdictions.\nWe note that the Supreme Court has examined policies of comparable structure in the definition of a nonowned vehicle, and have not found such construction or form of statement to be ambiguous. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Differding (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 103, 370 N.E.2d 543; c.f., Econo Lease, Inc. v. N off singer (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 390, 349 N.E.2d 1; Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1945), 325 Ill. App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269; Schoenknecht v. Prairie State Farmers Insurance Association (1960), 27 Ill. App. 2d 83, 169 N.E.2d 148.\nThe purpose of the clause has been recognized as acceptable as stated:\n\u201cThe purpose of the \u2018drive other cars\u2019 provision in an automobile liability policy is to cover occasional or incidental use of other cars without the payment of an additional premium, but to exclude the habitual use of other cars, which would increase the risk on the insurer without a corresponding increase in the premium \u00b0 \u00b0 \u00b0. More specifically, the evident intention of the limitation with respect to other automobiles is to prevent a situation in which the members of one family or household may have two or more automobiles actually or potentially used interchangeably but with only one particular automobile insured.\u201d\nThis purpose was recognized in Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1945), 325 Ill. App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269; Continental National American Group v. Vaicunas (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 835, 325 N.E.2d 747; MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Harden (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 360, 325 N.E.2d 102.\nIn the light of such authorities we must conclude that Policy \u201cB\u201d issued upon Della\u2019s Ford does not provide liability coverage because Stanley was driving his father\u2019s truck, rather than the described vehicle. Policy \u201cC\u201d issued to Stanley upon a 1968 Dodge covers his use of a \u201cNon-Owned Vehicle\u201d but that truck was not a \u201cNon-Owned Vehicle\u201d as specifically defined in the policy obtained by the father, Emory. Thus, there is no coverage under Policy \u201cC.\u201d The sum of the provisions of the purchase of Policy \u201cA\u201d was to cover the truck. The plaintiffs have failed to meet the burden of showing other coverage.\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nREARDON, P. J., and CRAVEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP" } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Brandt, W. Loren Thomson, Jerome Mirza, and Robert W. Neirynck, all of Bloomington, for appellants.", "Phillips, Phebus, Tummelson & Bryan, of Urbana (Hurshal C. Tummelson, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NORMAN SCHALL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTRY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 14696\nOpinion filed June 15, 1978.\nWilliam R. Brandt, W. Loren Thomson, Jerome Mirza, and Robert W. Neirynck, all of Bloomington, for appellants.\nPhillips, Phebus, Tummelson & Bryan, of Urbana (Hurshal C. Tummelson, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0738-01", "first_page_order": 760, "last_page_order": 763 }