{
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  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO KING, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. King",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO KING, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nLorenzo King (defendant) was charged with robbery in violation of section 18 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 18\u20141.) After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to two to six years imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted, he was not proved guilty of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, and he was not accountable for his companion\u2019s criminal conduct.\nThe record discloses: Martin Barrett, a Chicago police officer, testified that he and his partner, Abel Presas, were on duty at about 1 a.m. on July 9.1975, in the 800 block of North Dearborn Street, in Chicago. They saw two men run from a parking lot between two buildings. One of the men, later identified as defendant Lorenzo King, was carrying a yard-long stick. Both men turned toward the officers, stopped running and began to walk. Barrett told his partner to stop the two men. Toward the rear of the parking lot Barrett saw Samuel Montes, who, although a mute, communicated to Barrett that he had been robbed. Barrett took Montes to Dearborn Street, where Montes identified defendant as the man who had robbed him. The men were handcuffed and placed in the squad car. Montes communicated to Barrett that 40 one-dollar bills were taken from him. After defendant was removed from the squad car, 40 one-dollar bills were found stuffed in the place where defendant had been sitting. At the time Barrett and his partner stopped defendant, they had no warrant for his arrest nor had they seen him commit a crime.\nOfficer Abel Presas testified that while on duty with his partner on July 9.1975, at about 1 a.m., he was in an unmarked police car in the 800 block of North Dearborn. He saw two men run from a parking lot. One of them, later identified as the defendant, was carrying a long stick. When the two men saw the police car, they paused momentarily and then began walking. Barrett walked toward the parking lot, while Presas asked the two men to come back to him. They turned and walked toward him. He showed them his police identification, asked defendant to drop the stick, and asked them to identify themselves. After a short time, Barrett returned with Montes. Barrett said there had been a robbery. The two men Presas had asked for identification were placed .under arrest, patted down and put in the back seat of the squad car. A short time later defendant was taken from the car and they recovered 40 one-dollar bills from the back seat of the car where he had been sitting. They had no warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest and had not seen defendant commit a crime.\nSamuel Montes, who testified by written answers and by indications of his head, related that he was in the alley behind 818 North Dearborn, Chicago, at approximately 12:50 a.m. on July 9, 1975. Defendant and another man approached him. Defendant threatened him with the long stick he had and said he would kill Montes if he did anything. Then the defendant stood next to Montes and took 40 one-dollar bills from Montes\u2019 left coat pocket. The two men walked east toward Dearborn Street. A short time later a police officer met Montes in the alley. The officer led Montes to Dearborn Street, where he saw the defendant. Montes testified that although he subsequently had told an assistant State\u2019s attorney that King was not the man who robbed him, he later told the assistant State\u2019s attorney he had said this because he was confused, but that he was now certain King was the right man.\nDefendant argues that he was improperly stopped by the police officers because they could not and did not reasonably infer from the circumstances that defendant and his companion were committing, about to commit or had committed an offense.\nThe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107\u201414):\n\u201cA peace officer, after having identified himself as a peace officer, may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed an offense as defined in Section 102 \u2014 15 of this Code, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of his actions. Such detention and temporary questioning will be conducted in the vicinity of where the person was stopped.\u201d\nThe above-quoted statute codifies the decision in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868. (People v. McGowan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 73, 77, 370 N.E.2d 537.) The facts and circumstances must be specific and articulable to be reasonable. (Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883.) The McGowan court said that the facts and circumstances, viewed as a whole, must lead the officer to conclude that the situation is \u201cso far removed from the ordinary that any competent police officer would be expected to act quickly to maintain the status quo, rather than to observe the situation further.\u201d 69 Ill. 2d 73, 78.\nIn the present case, the officers were in a high crime area at approximately 1 a.m. They had recently made a robbery arrest in the same vicinity. They observed two men, one of them carrying a long stick, running from a parking lot between two buildings. When the men saw the officers in their squad car, they slowed to a walk. The officers correctly requested that defendant and his companion halt and identify themselves, given the area the officers were in, the time of the night, the running and slowing of the two men and the carrying of the long stick. We hold that there were sufficient articulable and specific facts and circumstances from which to infer that a crime had been committed. People v. McGowan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 73, 370 N.E.2d 537.\nDefendant also contends that he was arrested when Officer Presas requested that he halt and identify himself. An arrest is made when a person is informed of a violation by the police, submits to police control and the evidence clearly shows that the officers intended to effect an arrest and the person understood the officers\u2019 intent. (People v. Wipfler (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 158, 165, 368 N.E.2d 870; People v. Clark (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 400, 404, 137 N.E.2d 820.) Officer Presas did not inform defendant of a violation. In fact, he was not aware that any crime had been committed. Presas only asked defendant to identify himself. The officer did not try to restrain defendant. Nothing in the record indicates that Presas intended to effect defendant\u2019s arrest prior to Barrett\u2019s return with the victim. Clearly, defendant was not unlawfully arrested by Presas\u2019 request for him to halt and identify himself. The trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence.\nDefendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial testimony of the victim was directly contradicted by his prior statements. At trial, Montes positively identified defendant as the man who had robbed him. Defense counsel introduced Montes\u2019 prior statement to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney that King was not the man who robbed him. The State then adduced Montes\u2019 subsequent pretrial statement in which he stated that he had said King was not the man who robbed him because he was confused. He also told the assistant State\u2019s attorney that he was sure that King had robbed him. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their evidence are matters for the trier of fact. (People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 298, 347 N.E.2d 733.) This record does not disclose any reason for this court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. Montes\u2019 trial testimony that King robbed him is corroborated by the officers\u2019 testimony that King was carrying the stick used to threaten Montes and the recovery of the proceeds of the robbery from a part of the back seat of the police car to which only defendant had access.\nFinally, defendant contends that if Montes\u2019 pretrial statement that King did not rob him is taken as the correct version of the incident, there was insufficient evidence to find defendant guilty on an accountability theory. We disagree. Montes testified that defendant and another man approached him, defendant threatened him with a long stick, said he would kill Montes if he did anything, stood next to Montes and took 40 one-dollar bills from Montes\u2019 coat pocket. The two men then walked away. Clearly, even if defendant\u2019s companion took the money from Montes, there is sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty on an accountability theory. Defendant was seen fleeing from the scene of the robbery, carrying the stick that was used to threaten Montes. The stolen money was recovered from the back seat of the police car where defendant was seated. The trial court correctly found defendant guilty of robbery on an accountability theory.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Foss, Schuman & Drake, of Chicago (William J. Stevens, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger and Kenneth T. McCurry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO KING, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 77-1939\nOpinion filed July 5, 1978.\nFoss, Schuman & Drake, of Chicago (William J. Stevens, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger and Kenneth T. McCurry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0239-01",
  "first_page_order": 261,
  "last_page_order": 265
}
