{ "id": 5621479, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EVELIN PAWLICKE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Pawlicke", "decision_date": "1978-08-01", "docket_number": "No. 77-429", "first_page": "791", "last_page": "797", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 791" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2791130 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5391906 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765474 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307-09" }, { "page": "782-84" }, { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2889784 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505383 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 F.2d 424", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1062286 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/535/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 F. Supp. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3348189 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/387/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2817136 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404417 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2915051 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77" }, { "page": "725" }, { "page": "1629" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "1629" }, { "page": "467-68" }, { "page": "719-20" }, { "page": "1624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 644, "char_count": 13032, "ocr_confidence": 0.856, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.624638876251236e-08, "percentile": 0.4506899823117101 }, "sha256": "ef27ecd7c7f11a80994795713e71a247eaa5535725a6251f4da543ce6f32ff69", "simhash": "1:a4e81481e663ee5b", "word_count": 2185 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:30.695364+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EVELIN PAWLICKE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSeveral inculpatory statements made by defendant while in custody on the day of her arrest on a charge of murder were suppressed. The People appeal from the adverse portions of the suppression order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 604(a)(1)). In issue is whether defendant was advised that she had a right to have an attorney present at questioning, whether she was capable of understanding and intelligently waiving her constitutional rights and whether statements made after defendant said she did not want to answer any more questions are admissible.\nAt about 8:20 a.m. on January 19,1977, a woman called the Wood Dale police stating that she had just shot a man and gave an address. When an officer appeared at the described residence defendant handed him a revolver. The officer took her into custody and advised her \u201cnot to give any information.\u201d Defendant responded, \u201cWhat more can I say? I shot him.\u201d Defendant was then taken to the Wood Dale police station where a Bensenville police officer came, told defendant she was under arrest for murder and advised her of her Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629 (1966)) including her right to remain silent and to have an attorney present when questioned. Defendant was taken to the Bensenville police station immediately. At about 9:52 a.m., J. Michael Fitzsimmons, the State\u2019s Attorney of Du Page County, arrived. He testified that he advised defendant of her Miranda rights including her \u201cright to an attorney.\u201d While he did not at first testify that he told defendant that she had the right to have an attorney present at questioning the state\u2019s attorney answered a further inquiry that it was his \u201cmemory\u201d that he told her that she had a right to have a lawyer consult with her when she was questioned.\nFitzsimmons testified that he asked the defendant if she would answer some questions; she said, \u201cYes; but I want to ask a question first. May I do that?\u201d The state\u2019s attorney replied affirmatively and the defendant asked, \u201cIs my Irv dead?\u201d When the police officer present said that he was dead, the defendant inquired as to the \u201ctime.\u201d She was told that the shooting had taken place about 7:20 a.m. After several preliminary questions as to her identity, address and her family, defendant answered \u201cI don\u2019t think I want to answer any more questions. Can I do that?\u201d The state\u2019s attorney told her that she could do that and ceased his interrogation, telling her that she would be transported to the county jail and would have to appear before a judge.\nFitzsimmons then testified as follows:\n\u201cAnd I asked her whether she had been charged. I asked Officer \u2014 Detective Long whether or not she had been charged.\nShe said \u2014 The question was not directed to her. The police officer said, \u2018No, not yet,\u2019 and she said, \u2018Why not?\u2019\nAnd I said, \u2018We have to make sure that you are the one who committed the crime,\u2019 or words to that effect, \u2018before we can proceed.\u2019\nAnd she said \u2014 there may have been some preliminary conversations of other people in between, and she said, \u2018Well, I shot him; didn\u2019t I,\u2019 or something like that.\nAnd then again apprised her, or started to apprise her she had a right to an attorney. I asked her if she had an attorney. She said she did not and did not want an attorney.\nI told her that she would be brought before the Court to post bond. She said she didn\u2019t want to post bond and that she didn\u2019t want an attorney appointed for her, and she said she wanted to talk to her son.\nI said, \u2018Perhaps your son will hire an attorney for you.\u2019\nShe said, \u2018No; I did this by myself. I don\u2019t want any help from my son. I don\u2019t want an attorney,\u2019 and there was probably some more conversation about cigarettes and the location of her son and daughter, and whether or not she could talk to them and that concluded the interview.\u201d\nThe state\u2019s attorney testified that defendant then stated:\n\u201c \u2018I will just say one thing,\u2019 and then she said, \u2018Hell hath no\u2019 \u2014 She said, \u2018I love him, and I will just say one thing, Hell hath no fury as a woman scorned.\u2019 \u201d\nAt this point the state\u2019s attorney said he left the conference room.\nA policematron testified that when she brought the defendant into the Bensenville police station, defendant seemed to be in a daze, \u201cLike she didn\u2019t realize what was going on around her.\u201d The matron testified that in her view the defendant remained somewhat oblivious to the events around her throughout the remainder of the day.\nRichard Pawlicke, the defendant\u2019s son, testified that he arrived at his mother\u2019s house about 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the murder; found his mother drinking some wine; thought his mother was in a \u201cstate of shock\u201d at this time, and was \u201ctoo incoherent to carry on a telephone conversation.\u201d He testified that his mother showed symptoms of shock, her lips were a little discolored on the blue side, her breathing fast and shallow and she was dazed. He described his mother\u2019s intelligence as \u201cdull.\u201d\nThe defendant testified that she drank two bottles of strawberry wine that morning; had taken four Librium tablets, felt very depressed and was contemplating suicide. She couldn\u2019t recall if anyone advised her of her right to have an attorney present during questioning. She stated that she was not aware that she could request the assistance of counsel during her interrogation that morning and afternoon.\nFollowing the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements the court held that the noninterrogation statements made by the defendant on the morning and afternoon of January 19, 1977, were admissible but suppressed \u201call statements of defendant made in the presence of the State\u2019s Attorney in an interrogation situation in the conference room at the Bensenville Police Department.\u201d The People appeal from that portion of the order which suppressed all statements made in the conference room of the Bensenville Police Department on January 19, 1977.\nThe trial judge also found that no one \u201cexplicitly testified\u201d that the defendant had been advised of her right to have an attorney \u201cpresent with her while being questioned.\u201d This finding is erroneous since a police officer testified that he informed the defendant of her right to have a lawyer present while undergoing interrogation about an hour before the interrogation in the conference room. Hence it does appear, contrary to the trial court\u2019s finding, that the full Miranda warnings were recited to the defendant before her interrogation began. (In this context, see People v. Rosario, 4 Ill. App. 3d 642, 646 (1972).)\nIt is, of course, true that even proper warnings are of little consequence if an accused is not in fact capable of understanding the warnings and thus of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. (People v. Turner, 56 Ill. 2d 201, 205 (1973).) A person\u2019s use of drugs can lessen his ability to understand the Miranda warnings and to \u201cknowingly and intelligently\u201d waive his right to remain silent. (People v. Koesterer, 44 Ill. App. 3d 468, 478-79 (1976).) However, the use of drugs or the ingestion of alcoholic beverages does not in and of itself render a subsequent admission inadmissible. \u201cThere is no per se rule mandating that statements made under the influence of narcotics are involuntary. Nor are they presumptively involuntary or likely to be so [citations]. Nevertheless, the Court must carefully sift the evidence in spite of the fact that the defendant\u2019s waiver may have blown his case because of \u2018internally generated guilt, fear, stupidity or drunkenness\u2019 or drug lethargy.\u201d United States v. Hollis, 387 F. Supp. 213, 220 (D. Del. 1975). See also United States v. Brown, 535 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1976).\nWhile the focus must be upon a defendant\u2019s \u201cdemeanor, coherence, articulateness, his capacity to make full use of his faculties, his memory, and his overall intelligence\u201d (United States v. Hollis, at 220), the fact that an accused may have been \u201cemotionally upset\u201d does not in and of itself create a situation which prevents questioning after the accused has been given the proper warnings. People v. Merkel, 23 Ill. App. 3d 298, 304 (1974).\nThe responses to custodial interrogation by the state\u2019s attorney prior to defendant\u2019s expression of her desire not to answer further questions pose no substantial issue. The answers were made to preliminary questioning and do not involve inculpatory admissions. The substance of this appeal lies in the admissions which defendant made, apart from custodial interrogation, which the People seek to except from the Miranda rule. Volunteered or spontaneous statements, as opposed to admissions elicited by custodial interrogation, are \u201cexpressly excepted\u201d from the requirements of Miranda. (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629. See also People v. Hicks, 44 Ill. 2d 550, 553-54 (1970).) Thus, a volunteered statement is admissible even if preceded by inadequate Miranda warnings or even without Miranda warnings. The test as to the admissibility of such statements is whether they are voluntary and the product of a rational mind. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-09, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770, 782-84, 83 S. Ct. 745, 754 (1963).\nIn this case although the trial court found that defendant did not understand her right to have an attorney present during the questioning, it also found that all of the defendant\u2019s statements had been made voluntarily. It should also be noted that as to noninterrogation situations the court expressly found that the defendant\u2019s will \u201cwas not overborne and that defendant was not so influenced by drugs or alcohol as to render her volunteered statements\u201d involuntary. And the evidence amply supports this conclusion. The fact that the defendant may have consumed two bottles of strawberry wine on the morning of the murder, that she had taken four Librium tablets, that she felt depressed and was contemplating suicide; that her intelligence was \u201cdull\u201d; and that her attention was focused on the deceased and her emotional relationship with the deceased does not require a conclusion that her subsequent statements were involuntary. Compare People v. Kelley, 10 Ill. App. 3d 193, 195 (1973); People v. Johnson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 36, 44 (1975).\nThe trial court in its order concluded that the State had failed to prove that the remarks made by the state\u2019s attorney after defendant had sought to terminate the questioning were not the \u201cprod\u201d that elicited the further remarks of the defendant. In view of the trial court\u2019s finding in the suppression order that the \u201cState\u2019s Attorney was dealing honestly with defendant, had no improper motive, and was not seeking to trick her,\u201d it is clear that there was no intentional \u201cprod\u201d of the defendant with the improper motive of seeking further answers of an inculpatory nature. Further, it is difficult to see how the particular remarks of the state\u2019s attorney could be considered any inducement to the defendant to inculpate herself. Telling the defendant that she would be taken to the county jail and be processed, asking in the defendant\u2019s presence whether she had been formally charged, explaining to her, when it appeared that she had not yet been charged, that the authorities wanted to make sure that she was the one who committed the crime before they proceeded, asking whether she had an attorney or suggesting that her son could hire one for her, in the context of this record do not amount to custodial interrogation in the Miranda sense. These comments by the state\u2019s attorney do not carry with them the \u201cinherent compulsions of the interrogation process\u201d nor the \u201cinherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere\u201d (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 719-20, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1624) sought to be neutralized by prior police warnings.\nThus, the trial judge was entitled to believe defendant\u2019s testimony that at no time on January 19, 1977, was she aware of the fact that she could have a lawyer present during interrogation and could on this basis properly suppress her responses to custodial interrogation prior to the time when she expressed her right to be silent. But we also conclude that the other statements made by defendant in the Bensenville station were volunteered and spontaneous and are therefore admissible. The portion of the trial court\u2019s order which suppressed those statements is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nWOODWARD and NASH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William Linkul and Malcolm F. Smith, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Lewis W. Kreydick, of Barrington, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EVELIN PAWLICKE, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 77-429\nOpinion filed August 1, 1978.\nJ. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William Linkul and Malcolm F. Smith, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nLewis W. Kreydick, of Barrington, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0791-01", "first_page_order": 813, "last_page_order": 819 }