{
  "id": 3336843,
  "name": "EDWARD R. FERN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BAYANI PAHATI, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Fern v. Pahati",
  "decision_date": "1978-08-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 77-1561",
  "first_page": "78",
  "last_page": "82",
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      "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 78"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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        2866138
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:25.660634+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "EDWARD R. FERN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BAYANI PAHATI, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs Edward and Jacqueline Fern filed suit against defendant Bayani Pahati for personal injuries and damages arising out of an automobile accident. Defendant and his passenger subsequently filed a separate suit against plaintiffs for personal injuries. Plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys in Pahati\u2019s suit moved that the two cases be consolidated. The motion was granted. However, plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys in the suit against Pahati appeared and subsequently moved to sever the two cases. They were joined in the motion by the attorney for Pahati as plaintiff. This motion was also granted.\nThe case was heard before a jury, but at the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in plaintiffs\u2019 favor on the issue of liability. The jury subsequently awarded plaintiffs *12,500 in damages. The suit against plaintiffs by defendant and his passenger was later settled out of court.\nOn appeal defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion for severance; (2) granting a directed verdict in plaintiffs\u2019 favor on the issue of liability; (3) allowing Edward Fern to testify as to the fair market value and damages to his automobile; and (4) finding that the jury\u2019s verdict was unanimous.\nWe reverse and remand.\nPlaintiffs Edward and Jacqueline Fern filed suit against defendant Bayani Pahati for personal injuries and property damage arising out of an automobile accident that occurred on January 30, 1973. Defendant counterclaimed for property damage to his auto.\nSubsequently, defendant and his passenger filed their own lawsuit against Edward Fern for personal injuries arising out of the accident. In defendant\u2019s suit against plaintiffs, both defendant and plaintiffs were represented by attorneys different from those who represented them in plaintiffs\u2019 suit against defendant.\nIn defendant\u2019s suit against plaintiffs, plaintiffs\u2019 defense attorney moved that defendant\u2019s suit be consolidated into their case. The motion was granted. However, the attorneys in plaintiffs\u2019 suit against defendant later appeared and moved that the two cases be severed. Plaintiffs were joined in this motion by the attorney for Pahati as plaintiff. This motion was also granted.\nThereafter, plaintiffs\u2019 suit proceeded to a jury trial. Remaining in that suit, however, was defendant\u2019s counterclaim for property damage. The suit for personal injuries by Pahati and his passenger against plaintiff Fern was later settled out of court.\nThe evidence at trial indicated that the accident occurred at the unregulated intersection of Byron and Hoyne streets in Chicago. Defendant was driving south on Hoyne while plaintiff Edward Fern was driving east on Byron.\nPlaintiff Edward Fern testified that he was thoroughly familiar with the intersection of Byron and Hoyne streets. He was aware of the large apartment building on the northwest comer that partially obstructed the northward vision of a driver traveling east on Byron. Knowing of the obstruction presented by the building, he stated that he reduced his speed as he approached the intersection to 15-20 miles per hour. When he was still 30-40 feet west of the intersection, which presented his first opportunity to see any appreciable distance around the apartment building, he looked north. There he saw defendant\u2019s vehicle coming south on Hoyne and approaching the intersection. Mr. Fern stated that he reduced his speed to 5-10 miles per hour as both vehicles entered the intersection. Seeing that a collision was inevitable, he slammed on his brakes and managed to stop his vehicle just prior to impact. He then stated that defendant\u2019s right front fender collided into his left front fender. This latter statement was subsequently challenged by the testimony of Officer George Loftus.\nDefendant testified that when he was approximately 50 feet from the intersection, he decreased his speed from 15-20 miles per hour to 10 miles per hour. His right foot was off the gas pedal and poised somewhere next to the brake pedal. He testified that he did not see plaintiffs\u2019 car until it was approximately one foot or a \u201cfinger snap\u201d away from the point of impact.\nMiss Arellano, a passenger in defendant\u2019s auto testified that she first saw plaintiffs\u2019 auto when it was six to seven feet away from the point of collision. She testified further that defendant\u2019s auto was in the middle of the intersection at the moment of impact, but that she did not actually see the collision because she closed her eyes.\nPolice officer George Loftus also testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. He stated that he spoke to Edward Fern at the hospital after the accident and that Fern stated that the front of his auto struck defendant\u2019s auto.\nDuring the trial, plaintiffs introduced into evidence photographs of their auto and defendant\u2019s auto. The photographs showed extensive damage to the front end of plaintiffs\u2019 auto. The photographs also showed considerable damage to the passenger side of defendant\u2019s auto.\nAs to plaintiff Edward Fern\u2019s expenses arising from the accident, he introduced a paid doctor\u2019s bill for *105 and a paid hospital bill for *567.80. The trial court also allowed him to testify as to the cost of repair and fair market value of his auto. Mr. Fern\u2019s qualification for testifying as an expert was that he once worked in an auto body shop for a year and a half.\nAt the close of all the evidence, the trial court first directed a verdict against defendant on his counterclaim for property damage and then directed a verdict in plaintiffs\u2019 favor on the issue of liability. The only issue submitted to the jury was the amount of damages. In ruling against defendant, the trial court relied on defendant\u2019s statement that he did not see plaintiffs\u2019 auto until it was a \u201cfinger snap\u201d away and defendant\u2019s failure to yield the right-of-way to plaintiffs.\nThe jury awarded plaintiffs *12,500 in damages. When polled, one of the jurors responded both \u201cyes\u201d and \u201cno\u201d to the query whether that was her verdict. When questioned further she responded \u201cI will have to go along with them.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant raises a number of issues, one of which is that the trial court improperly directed a verdict in plaintiffs\u2019 favor on the issue of liability. Defendant argues that this question should have gone to the jury. Because we agree with defendant on this point, it will be unnecessary for us to address ourselves to the other issues raised on appeal.\nA verdict can be directed only when all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict could ever stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504.) We do not believe that the requirements of Pedrick have been met in the case at bar.\nWhen viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, the evidence indicates that defendant may have entered the intersection first and that plaintiff hit him. Supporting this view, there is the testimony of Miss Arellano that the collision did not occur until defendant was already in the middle of the intersection. While defendant did not see plaintiffs\u2019 auto until just prior to impact, Miss Arellano did not see it until it was only six or seven feet away. From these facts the jury could have concluded that defendant entered the intersection first and did not see plaintiffs because Mr. Fern was driving at an excessive speed. Further evidence that the jury could have construed as indicating that plaintiffs were at fault was the extensive damage done to the front end of their auto. The jury could have concluded from observing the photographs that plaintiffs \u201cbroad-sided\u201d defendant and were also traveling at an excessive speed. From the testimony of Officer Loftus concerning Mr. Fern\u2019s statement at the hospital, the jury could also have concluded that plaintiffs\u2019 auto struck defendant\u2019s auto.\nTherefore, we cannot say that the evidence produced at trial so overwhelmingly favored plaintiffs that a contrary verdict could not stand. At best, the evidence indicated a close case that should have gone to the jury.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nJudgment reversed; cause remanded.\nGOLDBERG, P. J. and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Taylor, Miller, Magner, Sprowl & Hutchings, of Chicago (James J. Hoffnagle, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Levatino & Levatino, of Chicago (Fred S. Posner, of counsel), for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "EDWARD R. FERN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BAYANI PAHATI, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 77-1561\nOpinion filed August 7, 1978.\nTaylor, Miller, Magner, Sprowl & Hutchings, of Chicago (James J. Hoffnagle, of counsel), for appellant.\nLevatino & Levatino, of Chicago (Fred S. Posner, of counsel), for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0078-01",
  "first_page_order": 100,
  "last_page_order": 104
}