{ "id": 3338174, "name": "THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. LAWRENCE KELLER, JR., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Department of Transportation v. Keller", "decision_date": "1978-08-18", "docket_number": "No. 14749", "first_page": "237", "last_page": "240", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 237" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 3d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2941597 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/22/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 N.E.2d 1012", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 Ill. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2551325 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/379/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966520 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 N.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 Ill. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2500573 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/388/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2858145 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 N.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 3d 1074", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2466346, 2470061 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/6/1074-01", "/ill-app-3d/6/1074-02" ] }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966062 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 388, "char_count": 6091, "ocr_confidence": 0.894, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.89516513629939e-08, "percentile": 0.4193055270789919 }, "sha256": "19fcfc6d85dcac68fb754d846c71d9b8b315ad18c2def56b42a4adb2972f4513", "simhash": "1:1013fc4153dcf554", "word_count": 1010 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:25.660634+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. LAWRENCE KELLER, JR., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE MILLS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCondemnation.\nNot \u201cquick take.\u201d\nWhen does interest accrue?\nTime of verdict?\nTime of judgment?\nTime of possession?\nWe hold: Time of possession.\nReversed.\nThis appeal stems from an eminent domain proceeding which resulted in the condemnation of defendants\u2019 property. In the prior legal history of our subject matter (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Keller (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 320, 335 N.E.2d 443), the.supreme court held that the State possessed the power to condemn property \u2014 upon which a gravel quarry was being operated \u2014 for the purpose of the preservation of the natural beauty of areas through which State highways are constructed.\nThe case then proceeded to trial and on May 12,1977, a jury awarded defendants the sum of *47,375 as compensation for the loss of their property. A final judgment was subsequently entered by the trial court on July 20, 1977, in which the trial court decreed that the State could take possession of the property upon payment of the award within 180 days from the entry of the order. Circuit Judge Howard Lee White also determined \u2014 and it is this segment of his decision that has precipitated the instant appeal \u2014 that interest at legal rate should insure from the date of the jury verdict. (This is not a \u201cquick take\u201d proceeding.)\nOn appeal, the State contends that interest does not ensue from the date of the jury verdict but can only begin to accumulate when the condemnor takes possession. In response, condemnees argue that section 3 of the Interest Act is applicable and therefore interest should accrue on the jury verdict and be included in the amount of judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 74, par. 3.) In addition, the Kellers argue that they are entitled to interest on the judgment until the condemnation award is paid.\nTherefore, the issue on appeal is as follows: When does interest begin to accrue on a jury award rendered in a condemnation proceeding?\nThere are three alternative times at which interest until payment might begin to run on a condemnation award: (1) from the date the jury returns with its verdict; (2) from the date judgment is rendered; and (3) from the date of possession.\nWe find alternative 3 to be the most satisfactory choice and therefore reverse and remand the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nIn support of alternatives 1 and 2, defendants contend that the Interest Act is applicable to the instant proceedings. Section 3 of the Interest Act reads (in part) as follows:\n\u201cJudgments recovered before any court or magistrate shall draw interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the same until satisfied. When judgment is rendered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be computed at the rate aforesaid, from the time when made or rendered to the time of rendering judgment upon the same, and made a part of the judgment.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 74, par. 3.\nHowever, the word \u201cjudgment\u201d in the Interest Act is limited to those judgments which can be executed upon. (City of Chicago v. Albert J. Schorsch Realty Co. (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 287 N.E.2d 93.) It has been held that the judgment of a court in a condemnation proceeding does not impose a liability upon the condemnor and no execution may issue upon the award. (County of Cook v. Malysa (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 376, 235 N.E.2d 598.) Therefore, the Interest Act is not applicable in the instant case. See Schorsch.\nFurthermore, we find defendants\u2019 assertions to be inconsistent not only with Illinois law but also with the purpose of condemnation suits.\n\u201cNormally, the purpose of such suits is to gain possession (and, incidentally, some degree of ownership) of particular lands, and it has always been held in this State that a condemnation award bears interest from the date of entry of possession thereunder until the same is paid.\u201d Leitch v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1944), 388 Ill. 236, 246, 58 N.E.2d 16, 20, cited with approval in Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Exchange National Bank (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 346, 335 N.E.2d 496; but see Commissioners of Lincoln Park v. Schmidt (1942), 379 Ill. 130, 39 N.E.2d 1012.\nMoreover, common sense dictates that interest should not accumulate until actual possession takes place. The condemnor, absent estoppel, can withdraw from the condemnation proceeding at any time prior to payment of the condemnation award. Even if an estoppel argument could be asserted against the State in a condemnation proceeding, such an assertion would require evidence that the State actually invaded or directly damaged defendant\u2019s property. (Department of Transportation v. Veach Oil Co. (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 229, 317 N.E.2d 404.) There is a void of such evidence in the record before this court.\nSince the condemnor was not obligated to pay the condemnation award and take possession of the Keller property, it is unreasonable to compel the State to pay interest on the award until actual possession does take place. This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the judgment order gave the condemnor 180 days in which to deposit the money. And this condition was fulfilled. (It would appear that many of the condemnees\u2019 problems were caused by the State\u2019s failure to make immediate payment of the award and could have been alleviated by a shorter time provision in the judgment order. However, the Kellers apparently did not dispute the time provision at trial nor did they appeal the trial court\u2019s decision to allow the petitioner 180 days to pay the condemnation award.)\nIn conclusion, we find that interest should not accumulate on a condemnation award until actual possession takes place.\nReversed and remanded.\nREARDON, P. J., and CRAVEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE MILLS" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roy E. Frazier, Jr., and Denis A. McGrady, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Schwarz & Self, of Jerseyville, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. LAWRENCE KELLER, JR., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 14749\nOpinion filed August 18, 1978.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roy E. Frazier, Jr., and Denis A. McGrady, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.\nSchwarz & Self, of Jerseyville, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0237-01", "first_page_order": 259, "last_page_order": 262 }