{
  "id": 3336237,
  "name": "In re ALEXANDER YOUNG, a Minor.-(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER YOUNG, Respondent-Appellant.)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Young",
  "decision_date": "1978-08-17",
  "docket_number": "No. 77-1614",
  "first_page": "897",
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    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:24:25.660634+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re ALEXANDER YOUNG, a Minor.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER YOUNG, Respondent-Appellant.)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe minor-respondent, Alexander Young, was adjudged delinquent based on the offense of burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1) and committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division. On appeal, respondent contends the State failed to prove at the adjudicatory hearing that he committed the offense before he reached 17 years of age, and the court erred in committing him to the Department of Corrections.\nThe sufficiency of the evidence concerning respondent\u2019s culpability is not questioned. The record shows that the police apprehended respondent hiding in a closet of a burglarized house. Respondent\u2019s claim, which the trial court rejected as implausible, was that he fled into the house in order to avoid numerous police officers whom he thought were about to shoot him. Neither at the adjudicatory hearing nor prior thereto was testimony proffered as to respondent\u2019s age, and no question as to this matter was raised.\nRespondent contends it is essential that the State prove he committed the offense prior to his 17th birthday. Recently, this court considered this issue in our decision of In re Dyess (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 571,_N.E.2d_, and stated that where a petition for the adjudication of wardship alleges that respondent is a juvenile and he fails to specifically raise the issue of his age, he is deemed to have waived it. In the present case, respondent did not question in the trial court that he was not yet 17 years of age at the time of the burglary. We adhere to our decision in Dyess and conclude that respondent\u2019s initial contention has been waived.\nRespondent contends the trial court also erred in committing him to the Department of Corrections because the finding that he was beyond parental control and commitment was in his best interest (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 705 \u2014 10) was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In this regard, the record shows that respondent had no prior delinquency adjudications, although one delinquency petition has been previously dismissed. However, he had received 10 station adjustments involving, inter alia, unlawful use of a weapon, robbery, and property-related offenses. The court was also presented with a detailed social report prepared by a probation officer concerning the 16-year-old respondent. The report showed that he was one of nine children living with their mother who blamed respondent\u2019s problem on his peer group. Five of these children were in trouble with law enforcement authorities. The report also indicated that respondent had left high school and spent much of his time at a playground. While the probation officer recommended a probationary disposition, the trial court rejected this recommendation. It is the function of the trial court to determine the dispositional order to be entered and the decision will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion demonstrated. (In re Stead (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1014, 376 N.E.2d 689, 691; In re Wilson (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 619, 622, 352 N.E.2d 251, 254.) We have considered the information provided to the trial court in formulating its disposition and cannot say the court\u2019s dispositional order was an abuse of discretion.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDIERINGER and ROMITI, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JOHNSON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Zaven Peter Tokatlian and Frances Sowa, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Rimas F. Cernius, and James V. Marcanti, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re ALEXANDER YOUNG, a Minor.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ALEXANDER YOUNG, Respondent-Appellant.)\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 77-1614\nOpinion filed August 17, 1978.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Zaven Peter Tokatlian and Frances Sowa, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Rimas F. Cernius, and James V. Marcanti, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0897-01",
  "first_page_order": 919,
  "last_page_order": 920
}