{ "id": 3331559, "name": "In re GEORGE ROMAN, a Minor.-(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. GEORGE ROMAN, Respondent-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Roman", "decision_date": "1978-09-07", "docket_number": "No. 78-77", "first_page": "59", "last_page": "63", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 59" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 973", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5637078 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2970007 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" }, { "page": "621-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3337873 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3415895 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 1012", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3356457 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/1012-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2500830 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 734", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 761", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 1016", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6498690, 6497989, 6498597, 6497703, 6497801, 6498059, 6498509, 6498318, 6497901, 6498769, 6498130, 6498421, 6498230, 6498875 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/1016-12", "/us/434/1016-04", "/us/434/1016-11", "/us/434/1016-01", "/us/434/1016-02", "/us/434/1016-05", "/us/434/1016-10", "/us/434/1016-08", "/us/434/1016-03", "/us/434/1016-13", "/us/434/1016-06", "/us/434/1016-09", "/us/434/1016-07", "/us/434/1016-14" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5465012 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0385-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 575, "char_count": 10349, "ocr_confidence": 0.881, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.3778494421875561 }, "sha256": "11db5898651fd4c53e6717cbcc971f6b62996dfbe83e672017a310ef05d9f64e", "simhash": "1:e1a9cd7c230c4f8c", "word_count": 1663 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:48:21.732212+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re GEORGE ROMAN, a Minor.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. GEORGE ROMAN, Respondent-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE ROMITI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe minor-respondent, George Roman, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, Juvenile Division, committing him to the Department of Corrections after he was found delinquent for committing the offense of theft. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, eh. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(a)(1).) Respondent argues (1) that the court abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Corrections since the trial court\u2019s finding that he was beyond the control of his parents was against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to the testimony and the recommended placement of the probation officer, and (2) that the trial court\u2019s reference to the seriousness of the respondent\u2019s misconduct impermissibly applied an adult standard to this juvenile.\nWe affirm.\nRespondent does not question the procedure followed when he entered an admission to the charge of theft on March 11, 1977, and our examination of the record shows that the court properly and in great detail admonished respondent concerning his rights and the consequences of his admission. The record demonstrates the admission was voluntarily and intelligently entered. (In re Beasley (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 385, 362 N.E.2d 1024, cert, denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1016, 54 L. Ed. 2d 761, 98 S. Ct. 734.) In particular, the court was careful to point out that it was not a party to the pretrial conference, that it was not bound by any agreement reached by the attorneys and that it might or might not accept any disposition recommended by the attorneys. Respondent indicated that he understood.\nAs a factual basis for the admission, it was stipulated that the victim would testify that on October 15, 1976, respondent tried to sell him a bracelet, which he recognized by two initials on it as belonging to him. The victim went to his apartment where he had last seen his bracelet and found the rear porch window was broken.\nAfter the court accepted the admission, found respondent delinquent and adjudged him a ward of the court, a dispositional hearing was held. The court considered a written social investigation report compiled by Probation Officer Rohan, who testified that respondent had four previous referrals to the juvenile court: a petition alleging burglary which was dismissed without prejudice in August of 1974; a second petition alleged burglary and resulted in a period of six months\u2019 supervision that was terminated satisfactorily on December 2, 1975; a third petition alleged theft and two counts of burglary but it was dismissed without prejudice on December 1, 1975; and a fourth petition charged criminal trespass to vehicle and theft, but it too was dismissed with leave to reinstate on March 11, 1977, following respondent\u2019s admission to the instant petition. Probation Officer Rohan\u2019s testimony established the history of 11 station adjustments during the preceding 4 years which were mainly directed toward property-related offenses such as theft and criminal trespass to property.\nThe probation officer also described respondent\u2019s home environment. He stated that the respondent\u2019s parents had difficulties between themselves. An older brother was currently in the county jail awaiting trial. Respondent, himself, stated to the witness that he was following the example of this older brother. Officer Rohan informed the court that respondent was in regular attendance in the eighth grade and his behavior had been \u201cpretty good\u201d the last six months. He was transferred to a special class for children causing troubles and related very well to a particular teacher and had not caused many recent problems in school. The probation officer commented on respondent\u2019s relationship with his parents and said that respondent got along well with other members of Ms family, although his \u201cstreet behavior\u201d was disruptive. The probation officer recommended that respondent be placed on probation despite his long record, stating he had referred him to a group counseling program directed by probation officers and respondent had agreed to participate. He had also referred respondent to another program and both programs together would bring the probation officer into contact with respondent twice a week. In addition, the family had agreed to engage in family therapy and a therapist at the court had indicated an interest in working with the family.\nThe assistant public defender representing respondent argued in behalf of the probation officer\u2019s recommendation. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney argued that the respondent should be committed to the Department of Corrections in light of his past history of contacts with the police and the juvenile court.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:'\n\u201c[Bjased upon the totality of the evidence and information submitted and after duly considering the positions and recommendations of the parties, I find a disposition of probation in the case at bar to be inappropriate, I find it would deprecate the seriousness of the minor respondent\u2019s misconduct, and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice. I also find the minor respondent, George Roman, to be beyond the control and discipline of his parents and guardians and in his best interest and the best interest of the community at large, that he be committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, * *\nRespondent first urges that the trial court\u2019s finding that he was beyond the control of his parents was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Primarily, respondent contends the court\u2019s finding that he was beyond the control of his parents was not substantiated by the evidence. This argument is based on the testimony of the probation officer that respondent behaved at home, respected his parents and maintained a good relationship with his brothers and sisters; that the family had agreed to engage in therapy; and that his school behavior for several months had been \u201cexemplary.\u201d Although there was testimony that respondent\u2019s behavior in school had improved since his relationship with a particular teacher, there was no testimony that it had been \u201cexemplary.\u201d Although the family had agreed to engage in therapy, such therapy had not been arranged or initiated at the time of the hearing. The frequency and the seriousness of respondent\u2019s behavior outside the home was sufficient to establish that he was beyond the control of his parents. The probation officer implied as much when he pointed out that he \u201cbelieved\u201d that respondent did behave well at home, a proposition he apparently realized was surprising in light of respondent\u2019s \u201cstreet behavior\u201d which the probation officer described as having been \u201cquite disruptive.\u201d The trial court\u2019s finding that respondent was beyond the control and discipline of his parents was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Seibert (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 129, 132, 329 N.E.2d 799; In re Stead (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 376 N.E.2d 689.\nRespondent also contends the court\u2019s finding that commitment was in the best interest of the respondent and of society was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, that the court seemingly ignored the vast probationary facilities available, abruptly removing respondent from the community, in spite of the respondent\u2019s \u201cgood behavior\u201d during the prior eight months when, it is claimed, any alleged \u201cchain of habitually wrongful conduct\u201d was broken. However, respondent\u2019s record dated from 1972. In view of this well-established pattern of behavior, it cannot be said that the trial court\u2019s finding that commitment was in his best interest and that of the community was against the manifest weight of the evidence or that respondent\u2019s behavior had in fact changed. Compare In re Thomas (1978), 56 Ill. App. 3d 587, 594, 372 N.E.2d 134.\nRespondent claims that the trial court incorrectly used an adult standard when it remarked that probation was inappropriate because it would deprecate the seriousness of respondent\u2019s conduct and would not be consistent with the ends of justice. This language appears in section 5\u2014 6 \u2014 1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141), and refers to a standard employed for determining whether probation or conditional discharge is appropriate for an adult criminal offender. But the record also shows that the trial court considered and enunciated the appropriate juvenile standards in arriving at its disposition (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 705 \u2014 10(1)), thereby alleviating any possible prejudice. (See In re Antosz (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 829, 380 N.E.2d 847.) And as this court noted in In re Wilson (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 619, 622, 352 N.E.2d 251, and In re Stead, the choice of a dispositional order rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and absent a showing of abuse the trial court\u2019s determination should not be reversed on review. The court in Wilson also pointed out that dispositional hearings for minors are not comparable to sentencing hearings for adults and that \u201cstation adjustments,\u201d even though some might be remote in time, could be considered at the dispositional hearing because they are relevant to the question of the best interest of the minor and the public. (40 Ill. App. 3d 619, 621-22.) Therefore, in addition to the charge of theft to which the minor admitted in this proceeding, the court could also consider the other evidence of respondent\u2019s conduct introduced at the hearing. Compare In re Miller (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 772, 774-75, 364 N.E.2d 973.\nIn our opinion, no abuse of discretion has been shown in view of this and the other evidence received and considered by the trial court at the dispositional hearing. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nJOHNSON, P. J., and LINN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE ROMITI" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Geraldine V. Biggs and Frances G. Sowa, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Mary Ann Callum, and Stephen D. Ferrone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re GEORGE ROMAN, a Minor.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. GEORGE ROMAN, Respondent-Appellant.)\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 78-77\nOpinion filed September 7, 1978.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Geraldine V. Biggs and Frances G. Sowa, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Mary Ann Callum, and Stephen D. Ferrone, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0059-01", "first_page_order": 81, "last_page_order": 85 }