{ "id": 3330849, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES O. RICHARDS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Richards", "decision_date": "1978-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 14716", "first_page": "472", "last_page": "476", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 472" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971537 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 907", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2507736 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0907-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 3d 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2748786 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/2/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 S. Ct. 1945", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 1722", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 U.S. 910", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 572384, 572298, 572397, 572317, 572592, 572626, 572308, 572663, 572445 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/337/0910-06", "/us/337/0910-07", "/us/337/0910-08", "/us/337/0910-01", "/us/337/0910-03", "/us/337/0910-05", "/us/337/0910-02", "/us/337/0910-09", "/us/337/0910-04" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 Ill. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2617944 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/402/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1601107 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/104/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314025 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 N.W. 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "86 Iowa 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2075750 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/86/0216-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 476, "char_count": 8844, "ocr_confidence": 0.905, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.250086309606896e-07, "percentile": 0.6098521574037714 }, "sha256": "025f86da3c0a1cbca5b3c796b827c3b4b553a4039be2fca3bd947adc5de39707", "simhash": "1:b60af4f9f63afdf2", "word_count": 1447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:48:21.732212+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES O. RICHARDS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, the defendant, James O. Richards, was convicted of indecent liberties with a child in violation of section 11 \u2014 4 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 4). He was subsequently sentenced to a term of 4 to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that the State\u2019s jury instruction which made reference to prior sexual acts of the defendant was improper and denied him a fair trial. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.\nAt trial, the complaining witness noted, during direct examination, that other instances of indecent liberties had occurred prior to the one charged in the instant case. After this testimony had been elicited, the defendant\u2019s counsel objected to the reference to these prior incidents. The trial judge overruled the objection noting that this testimony was subject to cross-examination.\nAt the instruction conference, the defendant\u2019s counsel objected to the State\u2019s Instruction No. 10 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14) concerning the prior sexual acts of the defendant with the complaining witness. After a brief discussion of the instruction, the trial court stated that it would be given over the defendant\u2019s objections. That instruction as given was:\n\u201cEvidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in crimes other than that charged in the information. This evidence has been received solely on the issue of the defendant\u2019s design. This evidence is to be considered by you only for the limited purpose for which it was received.\u201d\nDuring closing argument, the Assistant State\u2019s Attorney argued that the defendant did not deny that the alleged deviate sexual act was not the first time with the complaining witness. The defense counsel immediately objected and that objection was sustained.\nThe post-trial motion preserved the issue for review. The trial judge denied the motion for a new trial and noted that the prior conduct was not admitted as evidence of prior crimes, but rather it was admitted for the limited purpose of showing the relationship and familiarity of the parties as discussed in People v. Wendt (1968), 104 Ill. App. 2d 192, 244 N.E.2d 384.\nAs the trial court correctly noted, the admission of evidence of prior conduct between the parties is proper for the limited purpose explained in Wendt. The error in this case, however, lies in the jury instruction that was given regarding this prior conduct. That instruction should have stated that the evidence of the prior conduct was limited to establish or indicate the relationship and familiarity between the parties rather than to establish design. Moreover, the use of the term \u201ccrimes\u201d in the instruction was most certainly error since the defendant had not been charged or convicted of any crime.\nThe function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the correct principles of law applicable to the evidence submitted, so that the jury may, by the application of proper legal principles, arrive at a correct conclusion according to the law and the evidence. (People v. Gambony (1948), 402 Ill. 74, 83 N.E.2d 321, cert. denied (1949), 337 U.S. 910, 93 L. Ed. 1722, 69 S. Ct. 1945.) Furthermore, it is reversible error to inject into the case, by way of instruction, issues which are not properly before the jury. People v. McCauley (1972), 2 Ill. App. 3d 734, 277 N.E.2d 541.\nIn the instant case, the only issue before the jury regarding defendant\u2019s prior conduct was that concerning his relationship and familiarity with the complaining witness and not the issue of the defendant\u2019s design. It is obvious that the evidence of prior conduct and the subject jury instruction are not in accord. As a result, the jury was instructed on a theory not supported by the evidence.\nIn addition to the defect in the jury instruction, the evidence presented at the trial surrounding the alleged crime was conflicting. The complaining witness testified that he had made several statements prior to trial to his mother, his father, and to defense counsel in which he had stated that the defendant did not commit the crime, and that he had on other occasions told the State\u2019s Attorney that the defendant did commit the crime. The witness also testified that he was threatened by the Assistant State\u2019s Attorney that he would be put in a juvenile home and his mother would go to jail if he did not testify that something happened between him and the defendant.\nThe complaining witness\u2019 mother also admitted making two pretrial statements that were contradictory. In one statement she stated to defense counsel that she felt nothing had happened between the defendant and her son. In the other statement to defense counsel she indicated that she just assumed something had happened.\nOn the basis of this record, it is apparent that the error in the jury instruction was not harmless since the other proof did not overwhelmingly establish defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The reference to defendant\u2019s prior conduct as crimes as well as the failure to properly connect up that evidence with a correct jury instruction was undoubtedly prejudicial. Moreover, since the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was close, it cannot be said that the jury\u2019s verdict would have been the same had the proper instruction been given. People v. Weathers (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 907, 320 N.E.2d 442, revd on other grounds (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 114, 338 N.E.2d 880.\nAccordingly, the defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded for a new trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN" }, { "text": "REARDON, J.,\nconcurs.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "REARDON, J.," }, { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN,\ndissenting:\nI dissent.\nThe principal issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in using the word \u201cdesign\u201d in Illinois Pattern Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.14, to describe the limited purpose for which the evidence of the defendant\u2019s alleged prior sexual offenses with the victim might be considered. That word has been given the following definition when applied to evidence:\n\u201cPurpose or intention, combined with plan, or implying a plan in the mind. Burrill, Circ. Ev. 331; State v. Grant, 86 Iowa 216, 53 N.W. 120.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 533 (rev. 4th ed. 1968.)\nWebster\u2019s New World Dictionary (2d college ed.) gives as a secondary definition of the word \u201cdesign\u201d when used as a noun: \u201cpurpose; intention; aim.\u201d\nGenerally when a defendant is charged with a sexual offense, his prior sexual offenses committed against the same victim are admissible for the limited purposes of showing not only the familiarity and relationship between the parties (Wendt) but also the defendant\u2019s intent and guilty knowledge. (People v. Kerney (1952), 413 Ill. 404, 108 N.E.2d 779.) Here, the question of whether the defendant committed the conduct charged with the requisite intent or guilty knowledge was inherently an issue in the case. Both in legal definition and in common parlance the word \u201cdesign\u201d is sufficiently synonymous with the words \u201cintent\u201d or \u201cintention\u201d that it is unlikely that the jury was confused. Only a general objection was made to the instruction. Had the use of the word \u201cdesign\u201d been specifically objected to, the court should have substituted the word \u201cintent\u201d or \u201cknowledge.\u201d In the absence of such an objection, the use of the word was not error.\nThe majority also finds error in the use of the word \u201ccrimes\u201d in Illinois Pattern Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.14, when evidence is introduced of crimes for which the defendant has not been convicted. Illinois Pattern Instructions Committee cites cases in support of the instruction in which evidence of crimes for which the defendant had not been convicted was presented (see IPI Criminal No. 3.14, Committee Note). The most frequendy quoted modern text on evidence speaks of evidence of other crimes by the accused being admissible for limited purposes without reference to a requirement that a conviction must have been obtained except when the evidence is used for impeachment. (McCormick, Evidence \u00a7190, at 447 et seq. (2d ed. 1972).) For the instruction to refer to evidence that the defendant has been involved in crimes does not infer that he has been convicted of those crimes. I see no error in that portion of the instruction.\nAlthough the evidence was confused and conflicting, I would affirm.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard J. Wilson and Jeffrey D. Foust, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Fahey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Robert C. Perry and Gary J. Anderson, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES O. RICHARDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 14716\nOpinion filed September 29, 1978.\nGREEN, P. J., dissenting.\nRichard J. Wilson and Jeffrey D. Foust, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Fahey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Robert C. Perry and Gary J. Anderson, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0472-01", "first_page_order": 494, "last_page_order": 498 }