{ "id": 3332908, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDY COOPER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cooper", "decision_date": "1978-10-19", "docket_number": "No. 77-290", "first_page": "880", "last_page": "886", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 880" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966794 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3390662 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 2d 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5294455 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/64/0284-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 707, "char_count": 15567, "ocr_confidence": 0.911, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2492056083120172e-07, "percentile": 0.6096851592505972 }, "sha256": "b9cc35a23ee82c54d286434741be70b2e5b3547fb4a731b9ba229bd12b19796f", "simhash": "1:b9cbd6f9c7d29050", "word_count": 2530 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:48:21.732212+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDY COOPER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was charged with the offense of indecent liberties with a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 4). The State subsequently filed a petition seeking psychiatric examinations and a hearing under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 105 \u2014 1.01 et seq.). After a bench trial, the defendant was found to be a sexually dangerous person, and ordered committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections. He appeals, contending that (1) the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a sexually dangerous person and (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain psychiatric testimony, which was based on a psychological report, where the reliability of the report had not first been established. We affirm.\nAn information charging the defendant with indecent liberties with a child was filed on May 7,1976. On June 9,1976, the defendant moved for the appointment of two psychiatrists to examine him in accordance with the provisions of \u201cAn Act to provide for trial in a circuit court and for a psychiatric examination of persons charged with sexual crimes against children\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 23, par. 2401 et seq.). The trial court granted the motion and appointed Doctors Graybill and Hamann. On June 29,1976, Dr. Graybill sent a letter to the court which concluded that the defendant \u201cappears to be an insecure individual, uncertain of his masculinity, entertaining considerable hostility particularly toward female figures in his life # \u00b0 On July 16,1976, the State filed a petition under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 105 \u2014 1.01 et seq.), seeking the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists to examine the defendant, pursuant to the Act. The court entered an order providing that the defendant was to b\u00e9 examined by Doctors Graybill and Hamann, for the purpose of determining whether the defendant was a sexually dangerous person, within the meaning of the statute. On August 24, 1976, Dr. Graybill advised the court by letter that he had conducted a second examination of the defendant, and that \u00b0 \u00b0 in view of this man\u2019s repeated sexual involvements, the only information I can add to my letter to you dated June 29, 1976, is that this man is a seriously disturbed and sexually dangerous individual.\u201d There is no similar report or letter from Dr. Hamann in the record. However, counsel for defendant informed the court that he had received Dr. Hamann\u2019s report, which Dr. Hamann subsequently referred to during his testimony.\nAt trial, the complainant testified that she was 11 years old on April 27, 1976, when the defendant called and requested that she come to his home. She went to the house where the defendant lived with his girl friend. After the defendant\u2019s girl friend left, the defendant called the complainant over to him, pulled her down on his lap, and started kissing her. The complainant told the defendant that she had to leave,- but the defendant locked the door, and told the complainant that there was something that he wanted to show her in the bedroom. The complainant went into the bedroom and the defendant closed the door, turned off the light, kissed the complainant, and pushed her down on a bed. The defendant unzipped the complainant\u2019s jacket, unbuttoned her shirt, and put his hand under her bra strap, near the buckle. He kissed her again, inserting his tongue into her mouth. The complainant began to struggle, and the defendant told her to get up and button her shirt. She did so and when the defendant opened the bedroom door, she ran out, unlocked the front door and left. The complainant testified that on the day before this incident she had told the defendant that she was 11 years old.\nOver defense objection, the trial court admitted a certified copy of a conviction entered against the defendant in Stephenson County in 1972, after the defendant had pleaded guilty to the crime of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child.\nThe State also presented testimony by both of the examining psychiatrists. Dr. Carl Hamann testified that he was familiar with the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person and that he had worked with the definition for many years, having given testimony under the former statute as long ago as 1940. Dr. Hamann stated that he had elicited a case history from the defendant, including the defendant\u2019s account of the earlier incident in Stephenson County, involving a young girl. The defendant\u2019s mother had become a semi-paraplegic after the defendant\u2019s birth, and the defendant had been forced to do household work, tasks which he bitterly resented. Defendant had been demoted seven times while in the Army because of getting into fights. He told Dr. Hamann that he had been stopped 50 to 100 times by the police during the past year, \u201cmost frequently on suspicion of some sexual circumstances.\u201d He was critical of the legal representation he had received and stated that both Dr. Graybill and the judge presiding over his case were prejudiced against him. Dr. Hamann testified that although the defendant did not have paranoia in the diagnostic sense, his suspicions were a \u201cparanoid type of behavior.\u201d Dr. Hamann said that the defendant \u201chad a great tendency of insecurity and needed to prove his masculinity,\u201d and was \u201ca little hostile toward women.\u201d These conclusions were confirmed by the \u201cMinnesota Multi-Phasic Test.\u201d Dr. Hamann concluded that if the current charge against the defendant were true, he would regard the defendant as sexually dangerous within the meaning of section 1.01 of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 105 \u2014 1.01).\nUnder cross-examination, Dr. Hamann admitted that he was not familiar with all of the details of the \u201cMMPI test,\u201d although he knew that the test could be used to detect serious character disorders or depressive traits. He also conceded that there was no psychological definition of a \u201csexually dangerous person,\u201d and that this was solely a legal term. He stated that he would regard a person \u201cwith sexual problems who tends to act out aggressively\u201d as dangerous sexually and in other ways. When asked what charge he was referring to when he stated that if the charge presently pending against the defendant were true, he would regard the defendant as sexually dangerous, Dr. Hamann exhibited some confusion; counsel asked him if he meant \u201cthe indecent liberties charge with a minor and not the sexually dangerous person [charge],\u201d and Dr. Hamann responded, \u201cit was sexual involvement, whatever, I don\u2019t know what it was.\u201d Dr. Hamann admitted that he had no way of knowing for certain whether the defendant\u2019s various suspicions were justified.\nThe other psychiatrist who testified, Dr. Graybill, was in general agreement with the findings made by Dr. Hamann. Dr. Graybill stated that he was familiar with the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person and that he had worked with the statutory definition ever since he began practicing in Illinois in 1955. He had first seen the defendant in regard to the charge in Stephenson County in 1971, at which time he had obtained information regarding the defendant\u2019s background. At that time the defendant had told Dr. Graybill that his inlaws had harassed him after his unsuccessful marriage, by phoning his employers and getting him fired from every job opportunity he had had; the defendant claimed that, \u201cthey have all sworn to get me.\u201d It was Dr. Graybill\u2019s opinion in 1971 that the defendant suffered from what is classed as a \u201cpersonality disorder.\u201d In the interview after his appointment in this case, the defendant stressed that he had been harassed by local police, and claimed that the police had beaten him up, which caused him to be hospitalized for 8 days at a time. Dr. Graybill stated that the defendant \u201cdemonstrated thought conduct with a strong paranoid flavor.\u201d After a subsequent examination of the defendant, Dr. Graybill concluded that the defendant was a sexually dangerous person, within the meaning of the statute.\nUnder cross-examination, Dr. Graybill conceded that if an individual\u2019s suspicions and fears were grounded in fact, then the individual could not be regarded as paranoid. He also conceded that it was possible that he had considered the test results from the \u201cMinnesota Multi-Phasic Inventory\u201d test in making his evaluation, although he could not recall whether or not he had received the test results, prior to making his report. When asked to define a \u201csexually dangerous\u201d person, Dr. Graybill responded that such a person was \u201can individual who has a propensity for behaving aggressively in a sexual area, particularly involving younger children \u00ae * \u00ae.\u201d When asked to clarify what he meant when he used the term \u201caggressive,\u201d Dr. Graybill responded that a person could be \u201caggressive\u201d without the use of force.\nAt the conclusion of this cross-examination, the trial judge read the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person to Dr. Graybill. The court then asked him if he had an opinion, \u201cbased on all of the data\u201d he had accumulated and considered \u201cboth in 1971 and 1976,\u201d as to whether the defendant was a sexually dangerous person. Dr. Graybill responded that he believed that the defendant was a sexually dangerous person \u201csince he fulfills all of the requirements of that statute.\u201d\nThe only witness presented by the defendant was his girl friend, who testified regarding events immediately prior to and after the incident on April 27, 1976. No psychiatric testimony was presented by the defendant.\nDr. Hamann\u2019s apparent failure to file his report was a violation of section 4 of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 105 \u2014 4), which requires that the court appointed psychiatrists file a written report with the court after their examination. However, since defense counsel was evidently furnished with a copy of Dr. Hamann\u2019s report prior to trial and since no issue was raised either before the trial court or this court, regarding Dr. Hamann\u2019s failure to file his report, we do not feel that the failure to file a report is relevant to the issues on appeal, or by itself, requires a sua sponte reversal of the judgment. Cf. People v. Pygott (1965), 64 Ill. App. 2d 284.\nIn arguing that he was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be a sexually dangerous person, defendant has attacked the State\u2019s proof in a number of particulars. He asserts that the State failed to prove that the defendant suffered from a mental disorder; however, the psychiatric testimony established that the defendant showed indications of paranoia, had doubts about his own masculinity and exhibited hostility against women. Further, the evidence showed that the defendant had engaged in aggressive sexual advances, forcing himself upon an 11-year-old girl\u2014 conduct clearly manifesting a mental disorder. The defendant has argued that even if there was proof of a mental disorder, there was no proof that the mental disorder existed for not less than 1 year proceeding the filing of the State\u2019s petition. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 105 \u2014 1.01.) Yet, Dr. Graybill testified that he had diagnosed the defendant in 1971 as a \u201cpassive-aggressive person\u201d who might, under the influence of alcohol, \u201cact out of an aggressive manner\u201d; although his condition was classed as a \u201cpersonality disorder\u201d in 1971, continued psychiatric treatment was deemed necessary. Dr. Graybill found that the same diagnosis could be applied to the defendant in 1976, \u201cwith the addition of a much stronger paranoid flavor to his present symptoms.\u201d We believe that such evidence of a long standing \u201cpersonality disorder\u201d suffices as proof of a \u201cmental disorder\u201d which has existed for more than 1 year prior to the filing of the State\u2019s petition herein. People v. Thorpe (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 576.\nThe defendant has argued that the conclusions of the two State psychiatrists that the defendant was sexually dangerous should be disregarded. Dr. Hamann\u2019s opinion is asserted to be \u201cmeaningless\u201d since Dr. Hamann \u201cdid not have a full understanding of the allegations\u201d against the defendant, as evidenced by his confusion under cross-examination as to the nature of the charge brought against the defendant. However, the fact that Dr. Hamann became confused about the title of the offense under which the defendant was charged does not demonstrate that he was unaware of the factual allegations underlying the charge. The defendant argues that the psychiatrists applied a definition of \u201csexually dangerous\u201d which was broader than the definition contained in the statute, since both Doctors Graybill and Hamann indicated that a person could be \u201csexually dangerous\u201d without resorting to the use of force; it is apparently the defendant\u2019s view that it is necessary for the State to prove a propensity to commit sex crimes with the use of force in order to make out a prima facie case under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.\nHowever, the statute itself provides that persons e \u201d who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children \u201d \u00b0 (emphasis added), and fall within the other requirements of the Act are sexually dangerous. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 105 \u2014 1.01.) It seems clear in context that the psychiatrists, in defining \u201csexually dangerous,\u201d were including conduct involving not only the use of force, but also the incapacity of the victim to consent to the sexual advance, or in other words \u201csexual molestation\u201d of children. In so defining the term \u201csexually dangerous,\u201d the psychiatrists remained well within the intent of the statute.\nIn sum, the testimony of Drs. Hamann and Graybill, when coupled with that of the complainant, in the absence of any psychiatric testimony by the defense, clearly sufficed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a sexually dangerous person.\nFinally, the defendant has argued that it was error to admit psychiatric testimony which was based in part upon a report of the results of a \u201cMinnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory\u201d test, where the report\u2019s reliability was not first established. We disagree. Psychological reports which are of a type customarily utilized by the medical profession, may be considered by an expert witness in the determination of the mental state of the individual in question. (People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559.) Here, Dr. Hamann testified that the \u201cMinnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory\u201d test was capable of detecting serious character disorders or depressive traits and was designed to do so without the use of psychiatric personal time. Obviously, such a test report would be of a type customarily utilized by the psychiatric profession, and the fact that such a report was received by Drs. Hamann and Graybill would not warrant the exclusion of their testimony.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is therefore affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nBOYLE and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael Mulder, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Daniel Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko and Barbara A. Preiner, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDY COOPER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 77-290\nOpinion filed October 19, 1978.\nMichael Mulder, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDaniel Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko and Barbara A. Preiner, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0880-01", "first_page_order": 902, "last_page_order": 908 }