{ "id": 3333672, "name": "RAYMOND DAYAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. McDONALD'S CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Dayan v. Mcdonald's Corp.", "decision_date": "1978-09-18", "docket_number": "No. 78-1125", "first_page": "984", "last_page": "988", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 984" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "300 N.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5341991 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 N.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2503159 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4947548 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/325/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 P.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Cal. App. 2d 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2274436 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/89/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 N.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2701127 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2866028 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0094-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 591, "char_count": 11736, "ocr_confidence": 0.898, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0988949939635505e-07, "percentile": 0.5675562552102459 }, "sha256": "09791770b29c03d7c206494d159a5334b492faa957b406a9d3ea643ff5d6c684", "simhash": "1:bb5fcfa39e168c10", "word_count": 1829 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:48:21.732212+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAYMOND DAYAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. McDONALD\u2019S CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Raymond Dayan entered into an agreement with defendant McDonald\u2019s Corporation for the acquisition and operation of McDonald\u2019s restaurants in Paris, France. As part of the agreement, the parties agreed that both Elinois and France had jurisdiction to resolve disputes that should arise thereunder. Subsequently, McDonald\u2019s filed a suit in France alleging that Dayan had breached certain conditions of the agreement and sought to terminate his operating licenses. McDonald\u2019s also filed a second suit for trademark infringement. Both suits are still pending. Thereafter, Dayan filed a suit in the circuit court of Cook County seeking an injunction enjoining McDonald\u2019s from terminating the operating licenses of the French restaurants and ordering the issuance of an operating license for the restaurant involved in the trademark infringement suit. After hearing arguments, the trial court granted Day\u00e1n\u2019s motion for a prehminary injunction, pending further hearings. McDonald\u2019s appealed.\nOn appeal, McDonald\u2019s argues that (1) the trial court improperly granted the preliminary injunction because the matter was pending in France; (2) Dayan failed to allege grounds sufficient for the issuance of a preliminary injunction; and (3) the trial court improperly ordered a preliminary injunction by failing to first hold a hearing.\nWe affirm.\nPlaintiff Raymond Dayan entered into a master license agreement with defendant McDonald\u2019s Corporation permitting him to acquire and operate McDonald\u2019s restaurants in Paris, France. Dayan was to follow a schedule of openings over a 30-year period at which time a minimum of 166 would be in operation. Under the agreement, operating licenses for each restaurant were to be issued as long as Dayan met McDonald\u2019s standards for quality, service and cleanliness.\nThe master license agreement provided that if Dayan were in default of any of his obligations under the agreement, McDonald\u2019s would give him notice of default and an opportunity to correct the deficiencies within 60 days. Failure to correct the deficiencies entitled McDonald\u2019s to terminate Dayan\u2019s master license.\nAfter the agreement was executed, Dayan assigned his interest to Raybill Associates, an Illinois limited partnership. Raybill then sublicensed Paris Mac, a French corporation, to operate the McDonald\u2019s restaurants in Paris. Thereafter, Paris Mac sublicensed Pigalux, another French company, to operate three restaurants in Paris. Paris Mac also sublicensed LeLazy Place, another French company, to operate four restaurants in Paris. Paris Mac also operates six restaurants in the Paris area itself.\nBy a supplement to the agreement, Dayan and McDonald\u2019s agreed that France and Illinois had jurisdiction to resolve disputes between them.\nThe supplement stated in relevant part:\n\u201cThe subsidiary, Raybill, Mac France and Paris Mac each agrees to and does hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department, Chancery Division (Circuit Court) for the sole purpose of enforcing compliance with the Agreement as supplemented by this Supplement and for determining any disputes which may arise in connection therewith * \u00bb * This provision shall not prevent presentation of any matter to courts of competent jurisdiction in France.\u201d\nMcDonald\u2019s alleges that from 1973 through April 1978 it notified Dayan of numerous operating deficiencies in the Paris restaurants. In June 1977 McDonald\u2019s conducted a full field study of several of the restaurants. At the conclusion of the study, McDonald\u2019s sent a letter to Dayan describing the deficiencies found and noting that a notice of default requiring remedial action within 60 days was justified. The letter stated that if a subsequent inspection found the operations still unsatisfactory, a default procedure under the master license agreement would follow.\nOn March 29, 1978, under the provisions of French law, McDonald\u2019s appeared before a judge of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, a civil court of general jurisdiction for the city of Paris. McDonald\u2019s purpose was to seek the appointments of four Huissiers to conduct investigations to determine whether there were facts indicating noncompliance with the master license agreement. (Under French law, Huissiers are court appointed officials authorized to investigate facts for potential use in legal proceedings.)\nBased on findings by the Huissiers, on April 14,1978, McDonald\u2019s gave notice to Dayan of default under the master license agreement. On April 24, the French corporations operating the restaurants in question appeared before the French court and filed a motion to quash the order appointing the Huissiers. The motion was denied and currently, the matter is still pending in that court.\nOn May 11,1978, McDonald\u2019s filed a second suit in the French court. In that cause, McDonald\u2019s alleged that LeLazy Place has infringed on its trademark by constructing a \u201cMcDonald\u2019s\u201d restaurant without first obtaining an operating license. Previously, McDonald\u2019s refused to grant the operating license, citing numerous deficiencies under the master license agreement. This matter is also still pending in the French court.\nOn June 6,1978, Dayan filed a motion for leave to file several pleadings in the circuit court of Cook County, the instant case. There he sought an injunction (1) enjoining McDonald\u2019s from terminating the operating licenses of the 13 Paris restaurants and (2) affirmatively ordering McDonald\u2019s to issue an operating license for the yet unopened Paris restaurant involved in the trademark infringement suit. McDonald\u2019s filed a written objection on the grounds that the circuit court of Cook County did not have exclusive jurisdiction and that the matter was pending in the French court. On June 12, the court entered an order granting Dayan leave to file his petition for injunction and simultaneously entered a preliminary injunction. The injunction enjoined McDonald\u2019s from terminating the master license agreement or any of the 13 operating licenses involved in the March 28 suit in France. It also affirmatively ordered McDonald\u2019s to issue the operating license for the restaurant involved in the separate trademark infringement suit. Immediately prior to the entry of the order granting the injunction, McDonald\u2019s tendered a verified answer to the petition for injunction. The trial court, however, refused to accept the answer until after it issued the injunction. The court stated that if it allowed the answer to be filed prior to the issuance of the injunction, it would then be required to hold a hearing which it did not want to do because of scheduling problems. Consequently, the trial court issued the injunction, gave McDonald\u2019s leave to file its answer, and then set the matter for hearing on October 10, 11, 1978. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307, McDonald\u2019s filed this appeal.\nOn appeal, McDonald\u2019s first argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dayan leave to file his petition for injunction since the matter was pending in the French court.\nWe disagree. In Illinois, the rule is that the mere pendency of a lawsuit in a foreign country is not a bar to proceedings in our courts. (Goldberg v. Goldberg (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 94, 327 N.E.2d 299; Farah v. Farah (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 481, 323 N.E.2d 361.) Though Goldberg and Farah were divorce proceedings, the rule has broader application. (See Pesquera Del Pacifico v. Superior Court (1949), 89 Cal. App. 2d 738, 201 P.2d 553.) We are not dealing with a judgment entered by a foreign court, but simply the pendency of another suit. The trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Dayan\u2019s petition for injunction, though concurrent jurisdiction was shared with the French court.\nMcDonald\u2019s next argues that Dayan failed to allege grounds sufficient for the issuance of an injunction.\nWe believe sufficient grounds were established and that the injunction was properly ordered. In general, injunctions rest on the authority of courts of equity to restrain persons within their limits of jurisdiction from doing inequitable acts to the wrong and injury of others. The authority is further derived from the power of the State to compel its citizens to respect its laws even beyond its territorial limits. (Kahn v. Kahn (1945), 325 Ill. App. 137, 59 N.E.2d 874.) Here, the controversy concerns the rights of the parties under the master license agreement, a contract executed in Illinois, according to Illinois law. Certainly the trial court had legitimate authority to issue the injunction and further, is in a better position to resolve the dispute than the French court, which must attempt to interpret Illinois law.\nAs to the actual issuance of the preliminary injunction, a trial court has broad discretion when issuing an injunction and said injunction will not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. (Board of Education v. Peoria Education Association (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 411,330 N.E.2d 235.) We find no abuse of discretion here. The trial court found that irreparable harm would result to Dayan if the injunction were not issued. As the trial judge found:\n\u201cI\u2019m not suggesting that McDonald\u2019s is wrong here. All I\u2019m saying is if I let them proceed, Dayan goes out of business and then it\u2019s too late. His business is destroyed.\u201d\nThe only hardship suffered by McDonald\u2019s by the issuance of the preliminary injunction is a potential delay in the cancellation of the franchise, should McDonald\u2019s prevail on the merits. Further noted by the trial judge when issuing the preliminary injunction was the likelihood that McDonald\u2019s may not prevail on the merits of the case since the judge observed that \u201c* \u201d * McDonald\u2019s is not acting in good faith here.\u201d Consequently, we conclude that the prehminary injunction was properly issued.\nMcDonald\u2019s finally argues that the issuance of the preliminary injunction without an evidentiary hearing was error. Supporting its position, McDonald\u2019s cites Paddington Corp. v. Foremost Sales Promotions, Inc. (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 170, 300 N.E.2d 484, for the proposition that a preliminary injunction may not be issued without a prior evidentiary hearing, where the pleading shows a verified answer that controverts material factual allegations in plaintiff\u2019s complaint, e 4 The instant case is distinguishable from Paddington, however. Here there were no factual disputes. As the attorney for McDonald\u2019s stated \u201cI don\u2019t think there are factual disputes * * It was only after the trial court heard arguments of counsel and decided to stay proceedings that McDonald\u2019s evidenced a desire to file a verified answer. The court appropriately characterized McDonald\u2019s last minute attempt to file a verified answer as an attempt to \u201cout-maneuver\u201d the court. Clearly, this was not a Paddington situation.\nOn July 25, 1978, on motion of defendant McDonald\u2019s, this court entered an order setting this appeal for oral argument. However, upon full consideration of the record and the briefs, we have concluded that no substantial question is presented, and accordingly we will dispose of the appeal as above set forth without oral argument. Supreme Court Rule 352(a), HI. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 352(a).\nAccordingly, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nOrder affirmed.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Foran, of Foran, Wiss & Schultz, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Saul A. Epton and Gerald B. Mullin, both of Epton & Druth, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND DAYAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. McDONALD\u2019S CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-1125\nOpinion filed September 18, 1978.\nThomas A. Foran, of Foran, Wiss & Schultz, of Chicago, for appellants.\nSaul A. Epton and Gerald B. Mullin, both of Epton & Druth, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0984-01", "first_page_order": 1006, "last_page_order": 1010 }