{ "id": 3331137, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANNE R. BARGO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bargo", "decision_date": "1978-09-21", "docket_number": "No. 76-1079", "first_page": "1011", "last_page": "1013", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 1011" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "445 F.2d 977", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 818602 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/445/0977-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 F.2d 68", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2232155 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/430/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S. Ct. 465", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 L. Ed. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 U.S. 945", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6383698 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/364/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 F.2d 487", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1962884 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/272/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 F.2d 486", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 835913 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488-89" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/357/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 817", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2614147 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0817-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 447, "char_count": 7008, "ocr_confidence": 0.906, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.99973255991189e-08, "percentile": 0.37268987496954453 }, "sha256": "f8d78469b211076ce2704347d18f9f959de18f70021b36ec22690df54ed37d94", "simhash": "1:be6abe64674c9adb", "word_count": 1166 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:48:21.732212+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANNE R. BARGO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Anne R. Bargo, was charged with possession of controlled substances in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56M, par. 1402). On November 19, 1975, the defendant made a pretrial motion to quash the search warrant issued and to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to that warrant. The circuit court of Cook County denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash the search warrant, but granted her motion to suppress the evidence seized. The People of the State of Illinois appeal from that order, and we reverse and remand for trial.\nThe issue presented for review is whether the use of a subterfuge by police officers to gain entrance to a home for the purpose of executing a valid search warrant vitiates the legality of the subsequent search and renders all evidence seized inadmissible.\nThe record reveals the facts to be as follows: On October 29, 1975, a search warrant, authorizing a search of defendant, Anne Bargo, and the premises at 5346 North Laramie in Chicago, was issued based upon a complaint sworn by Chicago Police Officer John Kozarits. A search was subsequently conducted and the police officers seized, inter alia, 71 grams of amphetamine, 100 grams of a barbituric acid derivative, 122 capsules and tablets of methoqualine, 183 tablets of Deludin, 152 tablets of Preludin, and 53 capsules of liquid Placedyl. The defendant was arrested and charged with possession of controlled substances. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56%, par. 1402.\nThe trial court heard the testimony of witnesses on defendant\u2019s pretrial motion. The defendant testified that on October 29, 1975, at approximately 3 p.m., the doorbell rang at her home at 5346 North Laramie. She went to the door and observed a man dressed in the uniform of a United States postman. The man asked the defendant her name, and then stated that he had a package for her from California. He asked her to sign for it; however, she informed him that she was not expecting any package. According to the defendant, the man was inside of her home at the time of their conversation. The \u201cpostman\u201d then identified himself as a police officer. The defendant testified that she had voluntarily admitted the officer to her home before learning his true identity.\nOfficer John Kozarits testified that after the defendant opened her door he then ran up the stairs where both he and the investigator identified themselves as police officers. The defendant was given a copy of the warrant. According to Officer Kozarits, after the officers had identified themselves and served the warrant, they entered the residence.\nThe trial court specifically found that the police officers had entered defendant\u2019s residence before announcing their office. The court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the seized evidence on the ground that the manner of execution of the warrant was \u201ca sham and a subterfuge.\u201d\nThe State does not challenge the trial court\u2019s factual determination on appeal. Rather, the State contends that the officers\u2019 employment of a subterfuge, unaccompanied by any element of force, to secure entrance to a home for the purpose of executing a valid search warrant, does not affect the legality of the subsequent search or the admissibility of evidence seized under the warrant\u2019s authority. We agree.\nAs the parties point out, there appears to be no Illinois law directly applicable to these circumstances. Section 108 \u2014 8 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 108 \u2014 8) provides that \u201cAll necessary and reasonable force may be used to effect an entry into any building or property or part thereof to execute a search warrant.\u201d This statute has been specifically construed \u201cto prohibit forced entries to execute search warrants without a prior announcement of authority and purpose, unless at the time of entry there exist circumstances which excuse compliance with this requirement.\u201d (People v. Stephens (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 817, 821, 310 N.E.2d 755, 758.) In the instant case, however, there is no evidence that any force was employed to gain entry to defendant\u2019s home. Therefore, there is no need to discuss the existence or nonexistence of any exigent circumstances here. The employment of subterfuge alone in the execution of a valid search warrant is at issue here. We find, therefore, that absent the use of force, the employment of a subterfuge to gain entry to a home to execute a search warrant is not prohibited by section 108 \u2014 8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 108 \u2014 8), or by any decision of the courts of this State.\nFederal courts have upheld the constitutional validity of the use of a subterfuge or ruse in executing arrest warrants, and the validity of subsequent warrantless searches conducted incident to such lawful arrests. (See Smith v. United States (5th Cir. 1966), 357 F.2d 486, 488-89; Leahy v. United States (9th Cir. 1959), 272 F.2d 487, 490, cert, dismissed (1961), 364 U.S. 945, 5 L. Ed. 2d 459, 81 S. Ct. 465.) After stating that the same requirements regarding the use of force to gain entry applied to the execution of both search and arrest warrants (Leahy, at 489), the Leahy court distinguished the use of force from the use of mere subterfuge, and held that \u201cThere is no constitutional mandate forbidding the use of deception in executing a valid arrest warrant.\u201d (Leahy, at 490.) In United States v. Syler (7th Cir. 1970), 430 F.2d 68, 70, the United States Court of Appeals sustained the trial court\u2019s finding that no force was employed to obtain entry to the bungalow involved, and held that \u201cReliance upon ruse as a means of access to the interior of the house did not invalidate the legality of the entry and ensuing arrests.\u201d In Syler, a valid arrest warrant had issued and a Federal agent had posed as a \u201cGas man\u201d in order to induce the defendant to open her door. Syler, at 69.\nThe principle that is apparently promulgated by the Federal cases is that entrance gained by subterfuge or other use of deception for the purpose of executing a valid warrant is constitutionally permissible so long as force is not employed. (See United States v. Beale (5th Cir. 1971), 445 F.2d 977, 978; Smith v. United States (5th Cir. 1966), 357 F.2d 486, 488.) We believe that this principle is reasonable and therefore reverse and remand the instant case for trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded.\nReversed and remanded.\nROMITI and LINN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Paul Benjamin Linton, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Dean S. Wolfson, Francis E. Andrew, and Lawrence J. Suffredin, Jr., all of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANNE R. BARGO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 76-1079\nOpinion filed September 21, 1978.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Paul Benjamin Linton, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nDean S. Wolfson, Francis E. Andrew, and Lawrence J. Suffredin, Jr., all of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1011-01", "first_page_order": 1033, "last_page_order": 1035 }