{ "id": 3327275, "name": "EDDIE LEE BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Baker v. Chicago Transit Authority", "decision_date": "1978-10-12", "docket_number": "No. 61533", "first_page": "91", "last_page": "93", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 91" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 973", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5410524 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0973-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850013 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/12/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 N.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8499493 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/88/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2761946 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0401-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 388, "char_count": 5927, "ocr_confidence": 0.898, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.871964132982944e-08, "percentile": 0.4596856805165089 }, "sha256": "78a6724d91af1e2a1486c01e1953f0ec6e8446341daba48514e8111b6be9681a", "simhash": "1:c77631f67e5a10e0", "word_count": 979 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:44:41.585178+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EDDIE LEE BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs, Eddie Lee Baker and Lynn A. Douglas, sued the defendants, Chicago Transit Authority (hereinafter CTA) and Robert E. Hardy (the CTA bus driver), in the circuit court of Cook County. Plaintiffs alleged that they sustained personal injuries as a result of an accident caused by defendants\u2019 negligence. The trial court, on October 24, 1974, granted defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff Eddie Lee Baker appeals, and we affirm.\nThe issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendants. The defendants also request this court to consider that the testimony of all relevant witnesses is not included in the record on appeal.\nThe facts, stated briefly, are as follows: The plaintiff testified that on March 23,1970, he was a passenger on a CTA bus when the latter collided with a truck. Plaintiff stated that the bus driver, defendant Robert Hardy, pulled the bus over to a curb and came to a complete stop; however, the rear of the bus was \u201csitting sort of out into the street.\u201d The doors had opened to disembark passengers when the CTA vehicle was struck from behind by a truck. Plaintiff, who was sitting in the bus at the time of the impact, was injured. According to plaintiff, the CTA bus driver was negligent in leaving the rear of the bus \u201csort of out into the street,\u201d and his negligence proximately caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nThe defendant CTA, in its answer, denied, inter alia, that the conduct of its driver was in any way negligent, or that his conduct, acts, or omissions contributed directly or proximately to the collision which plaintiff alleges caused him injury.\nDefendant Robert Hardy, Lynn Douglas (a passenger), and Noel Tessier (a passenger) also testified at trial. However, the testimony of these three witnesses is not included in the record on appeal. The cause was heard before a jury, and on October 24,1974, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion for a directed verdict.\nThe plaintiff argues on appeal that he proved a prima facie case against defendants (see De Bello v. Checker Taxi Co. (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 401, 290 N.E.2d 367) and, therefore, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in defendants\u2019 favor at the close of plaintiff\u2019s case. According to plaintiff, he established (1) the existence of a passenger-common carrier relationship between plaintiff and defendants, (2) breach of defendants\u2019 duty of care owed to plaintiff through the negligent maneuvering of the bus, and (3) proximate cause \u2014 that the accident would not have occurred but for defendants\u2019 negligence. Plaintiff contends that defendants\u2019 negligence is clearly established by the record under the applicable city ordinance. (Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code, ch. 27, par. 27 \u2014 276(c).) That ordinance provides as follows:\n\u201cThe driver of a bus shall enter a bus stop or passenger loading zone on a public street in such a manner that the bus when stopped to load or unload passengers shall be in a position with the right front wheel of such bus not further [sic] than eighteen inches from the curb and the bus approximately parallel to the curb * \u00b0\nHowever, after hearing the evidence, the trial court failed to find that defendantsf conduct was negligent or the proximate cause of any injuries sustained by plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nIt has been held that the test to be applied in ruling upon a motion for a directed verdict is whether there is any evidence, or reasonable inference arising from the evidence, which tends to prove the material allegations of the nonmoving party\u2019s case. In determining whether there is such evidence, the weight and credibility of the evidence are not material, for the question is whether the nonmoving party has as a matter of law failed to sustain the elements of his case. (Bass v. Rothschild Liquor Stores, Inc. (1967), 88 Ill. App. 2d 411, 416-17, 232 N.E.2d 19, 22.) If there is evidence supporting the nonmovant\u2019s case, a verdict should not be directed except in those rare cases in which all the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the nonmoving party, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. (Bass, at 417.) In applying this test to the instant case, it is apparent that the trial court properly found that plaintiff failed to sustain the elements of his case.\nIt is true that the violation of an ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence and creates a cause of action if it is the proximate cause of any resulting injuries. (Watson v. Chicago Transit Authority (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 684, 691, 299 N.E.2d 58, 63.) However, the only evidence before us pertaining to this issue is plaintiff\u2019s testimony, and plaintiff\u2019s testimony is irresolute at best. We believe that the testimony of the plaintiff fails to establish any reasonable inference tending to prove the alleged violation of the ordinance (Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code, ch. 27, par. 276(c)), or negligence on the part of defendants. Therefore, we do not reach the question of proximate causation.\nFurthermore, in the absence of a proper and complete report of proceedings, this court is compelled to assume that the evidence presented at trial supported the judgment of the trial court and to affirm the judgment appealed from. Belcher v. Spillman (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 973, 975-76, 329 N.E.2d 550, 553-54.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDIERINGER and LINN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Alan Kawitt, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edward J. Egan, of Chicago Transit Authority, and John J. O\u2019Toole, both of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EDDIE LEE BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 61533\nOpinion filed October 12, 1978.\nAlan Kawitt, of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward J. Egan, of Chicago Transit Authority, and John J. O\u2019Toole, both of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0091-01", "first_page_order": 113, "last_page_order": 115 }