{ "id": 3328494, "name": "In re WILLIE RELIFORD.-(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. WILLIE RELIFORD, Respondent-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Reliford", "decision_date": "1978-09-20", "docket_number": "No. 77-691", "first_page": "177", "last_page": "185", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 177" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "323 N.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ill. App. 3d 907", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2704659 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/25/0907-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3422124 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 N.E.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 889", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5378188 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 A.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Pa. Super. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 6771273 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/234/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 715", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173472 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11957048 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.E. 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3334488 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/224/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 874159 ], "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/118/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 563", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9560 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "2493" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "2493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 504", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722821 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Cal. Rptr. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "569 P.2d 1286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Cal. 3d 921", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2291136 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/19/0921-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Notre Dame Law. 133", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Notre Dame Law.", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Mass. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 307111 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/368/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 2d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2583195, 2583510 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/73/0072-02", "/ill-app-2d/73/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812888 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2615534 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0315-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 907, "char_count": 19549, "ocr_confidence": 0.888, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1605506964751194e-07, "percentile": 0.5839853983765076 }, "sha256": "0994829078bea91f3c742bacd04344c73e7406f04a740f6cf61eb0ca7728f1d6", "simhash": "1:cbf63014d2d8be85", "word_count": 3069 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:44:41.585178+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re WILLIE RELIFORD.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. WILLIE RELIFORD, Respondent-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe circuit court of Cook County found 17-year-old Willie Reliford mentally retarded and in need of hospitalization. He was committed to the facility recommended \u201cas appropriate to his needs\u201d by the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. In this appeal Reliford argues that his institutionalization, pursuant to portions of the Mental Health Code of 1967 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 91/2, pars. 1 \u2014 1 et seq.) contravenes several provisions of both the United States and the Illinois constitutions. We find that, as applied to Reliford, the Mental Health Code violates the due process clauses of both constitutions. Because this finding is dispositive of the case we need not reach Reliford\u2019s other arguments.\nReliford was indicted for theft, but found not fit to stand trial; his custody was transferred to the Department of Mental Health. A petition, filed in the circuit court, asserted that he was mentally retarded and in need of mental treatment as defined by the Mental Health Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 911/2, pars. 1 \u2014 12 and 1 \u2014 11.) It stated that Reliford required admission to a mental hospital and requested that the court conduct a hearing to determine whether Reliford needed mental treatment. As required by the statute, two doctors filed certificates in support of the petition. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 911/2, par. 8 \u2014 3.) One said Reliford required hospitalization because of his \u201cquestionable ability to care for [himjself.\u201d The other suggested that he was psychotic. Both certificates characterized Reliford as mentally retarded.\nAt a hearing on the petition, Reliford was represented by an assistant public defender. Sister Meckley, a social worker, testified that Reliford\u2019s legal guardian, his aunt, was unable to attend the proceeding. The trial judge telephoned the aunt and obtained permission to proceed in her absence. The phone conversation was not made part of the record.\nThree doctors, all of whom had examined Reliford, testified for the State. They all found him to be moderately mentally retarded and recommended his hospitalization. All agreed that Reliford suffered from some sort of personality disorder, manifested by his frequent thefts, but that the disorder was not related to his mental retardation. Except for this testimony of the doctors, no other information about Reliford was introduced into the record.\nDoctor Gerald Wellens, a registered psychologist, investigated Reliford\u2019s mental abilities through a variety of tests. He reported that results of those tests showed that Reliford was in a mildly \u201ceducable range\u201d of mental retardation with a mental age near 9 years old, and an I.Q. of 54. Wellens testified that he read Reliford\u2019s \u201crecord\u201d which showed an 8-year history of stealing. According to Wellens, this indicated an antisocial personality disorder. He called Reliford \u201ccompulsive\u201d and a \u201cthief\u201d but said that the behavior was unrelated to the mental retardation. While the stealing did not mean that Reliford was \u201cof danger\u201d to the community, Wellens believed that Reliford needed some treatment. He did not know what kind of therapy would solve the problem. Without the antisocial personality disorder, Reliford\u2019s mental retardation, Wellens said, would not itself cause him to recommend institutionalization but rather he would suggest community treatment. However, Wellens thought that Reliford should be removed from his home environment because he needed treatment for this personality disorder. He explained that he understood that community treatment had been \u201cunsuccessfully attempted\u201d with Reliford already.\nDoctor Edward Page-El, M.D., also evaluated Reliford\u2019s mental status and diagnosed him as mildly mentally retarded. Page-EI characterized Reliford as oriented in time and place but having little insight into the solution to problems. Reliford\u2019s affect, said Page-El, was \u201csomewhat flat.\u201d In addition to the retardation, Page-El found that Reliford had epilepsy and an unspecified personality disorder. Page-El said that Reliford was not psychotic. The doctor associated the personality disorder with the disruption of Reliford\u2019s relationship with his aunt which occurred when Reliford\u2019s sisters began living with him and his aunt. Page-El said community placement would have been appropriate except for Reliford\u2019s \u201cchronic history of stealing and numerous arrests.\u201d Removing Reliford from his home environment, according to Page-El, would cause a decline in this stealing. Page-El cautioned, however, that any positive attempt at treatment might reinforce the behavior as a means of getting attention. Page-El recommended institutionalization.\nDoctor Basil Siomopoulous, M.D., said he, too, conducted a psychiatric interview with Reliford and he agreed with the diagnosis that Reliford suffered from mild retardation. He found that although coherent and oriented, Reliford\u2019s vocabulary and general fund of information was limited, and that he had a speech defect which made communication difficult. Siomopoulous said that Reliford also had a seizure disorder which was being successfully treated with medication.\nIt was Siomopoulous\u2019 opinion that Reliford would not be able to provide for his own needs if he were not hospitalized. According to Siomopoulous, Reliford\u2019s stealing habits are related to a \u201csocial-cultural factor.\u201d He hypothesized that the stealing was a means by which Reliford gained esteem among his peers. Siomopoulous said that he had no information about Reliford\u2019s \u201cfamily constellation\u201d and that he disagreed with the other two doctors, saying that even in the absence of the thievery, he would recommend institutionalization. Siomopoulous specifically named the Kankakee State Hospital, a developmental disability facility, as the place in which to situate Reliford. However, Siomopoulous had no specific contact with that hospital and was recommending it only because he believed they treated mentally retarded patients.\nThe State presented no other evidence. Reliford\u2019s motion to dismiss the petition was denied. Reliford presented no evidence. The hearing was continued on the court\u2019s motion for further evaluation of the appropriate facility for Reliford.\nThe second hearing, held two weeks later, was presided over by a different judge. The State informed the court that Reliford\u2019s attorney was not present due to illness but that she was in accord with the suggestion that Reliford be placed in the Kankakee Development Center if he were to be institutionalized. Doctors Wellens and Siomopoulous both testified, repeated their diagnosis of mental retardation and the antisocial personality disorder, and both suggested institutionalization at Kankakee. A recommendation by Doctors Wellens and Cafill from the Illinois Institute for Developmental Disabilities was read into the record by the State\u2019s Attorney. It said that Reliford would benefit from placement in the Kankakee Development Center because it had a program for higher functioning \u201cDD\u201d (developmentally disabled) patients with a \u201cworkshop.\u201d It also would be most able to program for Reliford\u2019s secondary diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. In reply to the court\u2019s inquiry, Reliford said that he was aware of the nature of the proceedings. The court entered an order stating that Willie Reliford was mentally retarded, in need of hospitalization, and should be placed in the behavioral control unit at the Kankakee Development Center.\nSeveral cases have considered the constitutionality of the Mental Health Code as it relates to those with mental disorders. (See, e.g., People v. Sansone (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273.) We have found no case, however, which examined it in relation to those who are mentally retarded. This case, then, presents the question: When is it constitutionally permissible for a State to involuntarily institutionalize a person as mentally retarded.\nA finding of mental retardation does not necessarily mean that a person loses his rights and responsibilities under the law. (Peach v. Peach (1966), 73 Ill. App. 2d 72, 218 N.E.2d 504.) To the fullest extent possible, mentally retarded individuals possess the same rights as other individuals. (See Boyd v. Board of Registrars (1975), 368 Mass. 631, 334 N.E.2d 629.) People diagnosed as mentally retarded are a heterogeneous group, ranging in abilities from those who are \u201ctrainable,\u201d living relatively normal lives, to those who are profoundly retarded, unable to communicate or care for themselves. (See C. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 48 Notre Dame Law. 133 (1972).) These differences among the mentally retarded may necessitate a variety of procedures for dealing with their problems and a flexible concept of what is their \u201cbest interest.\u201d The role of a guardian in seeing to their welfare may require several approaches to analyzing their rights. (See, e.g., In re Roger S. (1977), 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286,141 Cal. Rptr. 298, which deals with the rights of a guardian to hospitalize a minor or incompetent.) However, \u201cthe principles of equality and respect for all individuals\u201d require the recognition of certain constitutional and personal rights in those that are mentally retarded, and the application of due process safeguards to protect those rights. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz (1977),_Mass._,_, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427.\nPreeminent among these rights is personal liberty, the right to live in freedom from unwarranted interference by the State. Involuntary commitment of any person disrupts this freedom, entailing a \u201cmassive curtailment of liberty.\u201d (Humphrey v. Cady (1972), 405 U.S. 504, 509, 31 L. Ed. 2d 394, 402, 92 S. Ct. 1048.) Forced institutionalization can only be justified by a recognized and substantial government interest. O\u2019Connor v. Donaldson (1975), 422 U.S. 563, 575, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 405, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544, 554, 367 N.E.2d 1273, 1276.\nSimilarly, the law recognizes an individual\u2019s interest in preserving the \u201cinviolability of his person,\u201d from unendorsed intrusion through unconsented to treatment. (Pratt v. Davis (1905), 118 Ill. App. 161, 166, aff\u2019d (1906), 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562.) Again, the State\u2019s infringement of privacy is tolerated only when the State\u2019s interest meets an acceptable and narrow governmental purpose. Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 153,35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 177, 93 S. Ct. 705; Saikewicz (1977),_Mass__,_, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424.\nAt the very minimum, in order to meet due process standards, the statute permitting a State to involuntarily hospitalize an individual must articulate the State\u2019s purpose for the institutionalization. The mere status of mental illness or mental retardation of a person without further inquiry or rationale, is an insufficient justification for involuntary institutionalization. (O\u2019Connor v. Donaldson (1975), 422 U.S. 563, 575, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 405, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493; People v. Samone (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 323, 309 N.E.2d 733, 739.) Section 1 \u2014 11 of the Mental Health Code, used to institutionalize those with mental disorders, requires a showing that a person has a mental disorder and because of that disorder he may harm himself or others. In contrast, section 1 \u2014 12, defining mental retardation, does not articulate any reason besides mental retardation for the necessity of commitment. Several of the sections in the Mental Health Code dealing with commitment procedures maintain this limited approach, only calling for the assertion of mental retardation for their application. (See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 911/2, par. 9 \u2014 6.) Therefore, to the extent that these provisions in the Illinois Mental Health Code can be interpreted to authorize unconsented-to institutionalization and treatment merely on a finding of mental retardation they are of questionable constitutionality.\nThe State, however, contends that the Mental Health Code does not base involuntary commitment of a person who is mentally retarded on the finding of mental retardation alone. Under the State\u2019s reading of the Mental Health Code, unconsented to hospitalization of a person who is mentally retarded is proper only when there is evidence that the person is (1) mentally retarded; and (2) in need of treatment. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 911/2, pars. 8 \u2014 1 and 9 \u2014 5, which apply to persons \u201cin need of treatment as mentally retarded.\u201d) Its interest in treatment is justified, the State argues, under its parens patriae power which authorizes it to act in a person\u2019s best interest to cure or alleviate illness. (See O\u2019Connor; Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715,32 L. Ed. 2d 435, 92 S. Ct. 1845.) The State identifies due process safeguards in section 9 \u2014 6, which limits a court\u2019s choice of disposition of a case after a finding of mental retardation to the least restrictive method of treatment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 911/2, par. 9 \u2014 6.\nNeither the United States Supreme Court nor the Illinois Supreme Court has considered whether a State\u2019s interest in providing treatment is a sufficient enough reason under the constitution to abrogate personal privacy and freedom. (See O\u2019Connor v. Donaldson (1975), 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 406 n.10, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493 n.10.) The one court that considered a standard somewhat similar to the \u201cneed for treatment\u201d purpose put forth to justify Reliford\u2019s commitment, rejected it as impermissively vague. In Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop (1975), 234 Pa. Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764, 778, it was held that \u201cin need of care\u201d was inadequate because once an individual is found to have a mental disorder or to be mentally retarded \u201cit would be impossible not to find that the individual is in need of care.\u201d However, we need not reach the question of whether a showing of \u201cneed of treatment\u201d alone is a constitutionally adequate standard for a State\u2019s involuntary hospitalization of a person who is mentally retarded, since in this case the State failed to prove that Reliford needs any \u201ctreatment\u201d at all.\nEven if we were to accept the State\u2019s argument that a \u201cneed of treatment\u201d standard is acceptable, a review of the record discloses that it has been improperly applied to Reliford, violating his due process rights. First, the nature of Reliford\u2019s asserted mental affliction, mental retardation, has nothing to do with the necessity for his treatment, which is the reason the State asserts for his institutionalization. Second, the evidence the State presented is insufficient to prove the necessity of Reliford\u2019s involuntary treatment.\nDue process requires that there be a reasonable relationship between the State\u2019s purported interest in institutionalizing a person and the reasons for which the individual is ultimately committed. (See Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 738, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435, 451, 92 S. Ct. 1845.) Further, the language of the Illinois Mental Health Code necessitates this, with wording that makes institutionalization proper only when a person is \u201cin need of treatment as mentally retarded.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 911/2, pars. 8 \u2014 1, 8 \u2014 3 and 8 \u2014 4.) In this case, the State has failed to show the causal link between the retardation and the treatment. All the evidence connected with the necessity for treatment of Reliford is directed at his unidentified \u201csocial disorder\u201d; his alleged thievery. All three doctors said that this disorder is unrelated to his mental retardation. Two of the doctors said that without the disorder they would not recommend institutionalization. In order to institutionalize Reliford for his disorder, proof satisfying the criteria of section 1 \u2014 11 is necessary, showing that Reliford is either a danger to himself or to others because of the disorder. (In re Sciara (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 889, 896, 316 N.E.2d 153, 158.) The record does not sustain either proof and institutionalization of Reliford therefore, violates his due process.\nFinally, if \u201ctreatment\u201d is an acceptable standard for commitment the information contained in this record pertaining to the type of treatment Reliford would be subjected to is insufficient to prove its necessity. It does not in the least meet the \u201cclear and convincing\u201d standard which must be established before a State can civilly commit an individual. (Samone-, In re Stephenson.) The only type of treatment suggested by the testimony of the doctors is the removal of Reliford from his home environment. The facility Reliford is placed in is recommended because it is able to \u201cprogram for\u201d Reliford\u2019s disorder, according to the Illinois Institute for Developmental Disabilities. Dr. Page-El, in fact, warned of problems if any affirmative treatment is attempted. No description of the type of treatment Reliford would experience is presented by the evidence; no discussion is available of the likelihood of Reliford\u2019s improvement from such treatment; whether there are any dangers involved and how much these weigh against the possibility of success of the treatment, or what consequences would occur if there were no treatment at all are factors largely missing from the evidence.\nWhile a court proceeding may not be the most perfect vehicle to determine medical matters, as noted in O\u2019Connor:\n\u201cWhere \u2018treatment\u2019 is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is present. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435.\u201d (422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 406 n.10, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493 n.10.)\nIn order for a court to decide to institutionalize a person as mentally retarded much more than the bare assertion from a medical expert that it is his opinion that treatment is necessary and beneficial is required. The weight of an expert\u2019s opinion is measured by the reason given for it and the factual details marshalled in support of it. (People v. Brown (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 528, 532, 373 N.E.2d 459, 462; Canned v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 907, 323 N.E.2d 418.) A court must be able to evaluate the opinion and make a decision whether treatment is in the person\u2019s best interest based on all relevant factors. (See Saikewicz.) The paucity of such explanation and facts in this case forces us to find that the evidence does not establish clearly and convincingly that Reliford needs any treatment.\nThe due process clauses of both State and Federal constitutions prevent the involuntary institutionalization of a person by the State solely because he is mentally retarded. Involuntary commitment can only be justified by a State purpose related to the person\u2019s mental affliction and established by clear and convincing evidence. This was not done in the case of Willie Reliford and therefore, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Cook County which found him mentally retarded and ordered his hospitalization.\nReversed.\nMcNAMARA and SIMON, JJV concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re WILLIE RELIFORD.\u2014(THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. WILLIE RELIFORD, Respondent-Appellant.)\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 77-691\nOpinion filed September 20, 1978.\nRalph Ruebner, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0177-01", "first_page_order": 199, "last_page_order": 207 }