{ "id": 3321254, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT CAUSEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Causey", "decision_date": "1978-11-30", "docket_number": "No. 77-277", "first_page": "12", "last_page": "18", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 12" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 845", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2972480 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0845-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 S. Ct. 2650", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 L. Ed. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519716, 1519495, 1519401, 1519338, 1519467, 1519404, 1519980, 1519414, 1519703, 1519384, 1519707, 1519743 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0935-12", "/us/417/0935-07", "/us/417/0935-08", "/us/417/0935-05", "/us/417/0935-03", "/us/417/0935-06", "/us/417/0935-09", "/us/417/0935-11", "/us/417/0935-02", "/us/417/0935-04", "/us/417/0935-10", "/us/417/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 N.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405411 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2511166 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/17/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.E.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 Ill. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2515443 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/392/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 N.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2474080 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/127/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5294734 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/64/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 Ill. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2621233 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/403/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5376950 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "378 Ill. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2549252 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/378/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 Ill. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2619821 ], "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/403/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378996 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 N.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390520 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2715940 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. 2d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5355409 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0491-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 832, "char_count": 14422, "ocr_confidence": 0.882, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6477078657806074e-07, "percentile": 0.6921818607957453 }, "sha256": "0dc057d3703d3e9074699d8674179bf276a3c224dd2794cb4821587d10e27adc", "simhash": "1:0b7ac80f1f3baaf7", "word_count": 2399 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:20.946597+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT CAUSEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Peoria County defendant was convicted of rape and murder and sentenced to two 50- to 75-year prison terms to be served concurrently.\nOn the afternoon of April 28,1976, Peoria police responded to defendant\u2019s call seeking an ambulance, and upon arriving at the apartment of defendant\u2019s ex-wife, found the woman dead lying on the bed in the arms of the sobbing defendant. Initially defendant told the police he had found the decedent already dead, but the next day he gave a statement detailing his involvement in her death.\nAbout six months before her death, while married to defendant, the victim began having an affair with one of her co-workers, Leon Lowe. The victim divorced defendant 1% months prior to her death, and she was given custody of the couple\u2019s young child.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s statement, concern about his baby prompted him to start looking for his ex-wife early on the morning of April 28. Being unable to locate her, defendant went to the victim\u2019s apartment at about 1:30 p.m. and let himself in with a key. While waiting for his ex-wife, defendant got out an axe handle which he said he used to scare her. When he heard the victim arriving defendant hid in a closet. While in the closet defendant heard the victim place a call to Lowe in which she said defendant was dumb and stupid. Defendant claims to have been upset by these statements and when the victim started swearing at the baby he came out of the closet, picked up the axe handle, unplugged the phone and pulled her towards him.\nAccording to defendant he and his ex-wife then had a \u201cnormal conversation\u201d for about 15 minutes, until she refused to change the baby\u2019s dirty diaper. A quarrel ensued in which the victim asked defendant to leave and pushed him several times while holding the baby in her arms. Defendant responded by hitting the victim on the side of the head with a vase filled with pennies. The woman dropped the baby, but continued attacking defendant, hitting him, biting him on the chest and tearing his shirt. Defendant claims he tried to fight her off, but he was unsuccessful until he pinned her up against the wall by placing his forearm on her neck. The victim lost consciousness and fell to the floor knocking a lamp off an end table. Defendant had intercourse with her while she was lying unconscious on the floor. He then placed her on the bed, straightened up the apartment, asked several neighbors if they had seen her and, after several attempts to revive her, he called an ambulance.\nAt the instruction conference defense counsel requested instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and these were denied.\nDefendant contends that the court erred in refusing to give the requested instructions. It is well settled that if there is evidence in the record which, if believed by a jury, would reduce the crime to manslaughter, a manslaughter instruction tendered by defendant must be given. (People v. Canada (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 491,187 N.E.2d 243; People v. Harris (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 431, 134 N.E.2d 315.) It is equally well settled however, that such an instruction should not be given if the evidence clearly demonstrates that the crime was murder and there is no evidence to support a conviction of manslaughter. People v. Handley (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131; People v. Latimer (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 178, 220 N.E.2d 314; People v. Marsh (1949), 403 Ill. 81, 85 N.E.2d 715; People v. DeRosa (1941), 378 Ill. 557, 39 N.E.2d 1.\nSection 9 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2) defines voluntary manslaughter as follows:\n\u201c(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:\n(1) The individual killed, or\n(2) Another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligendy or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed.\nSerious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.\u201d\nThe Committee Comments to section 9 \u2014 2 indicate only four categories of activities which can be considered serious provocation \u2014 substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest and adultery with the offender\u2019s spouse.\nDefendant here contends that there was serious provocation by a mutual quarrel with the decedent. This argument overlooks the fact that the law does not permit one who initiates a combat to rely on the dispute to mitigate his offense from murder to manslaughter. The defendant further contends that in determining a slayer\u2019s mental state, that is, whether or not defendant was acting under a \u201csudden and intense passion,\u201d reference is not limited solely to what takes place at the time of the killing. The defendant claims that he was upset and hurt by his divorce and knowledge of his ex-wife\u2019s extra-marital relationship prior to their divorce, and his knowledge that she was giving money to her boyfriend that belonged to defendant\u2019s baby. Shortly prior to the quarrel which led to the death of Betty Causey, the defendant, while hiding in a closet, overheard his ex-wife, while speaking on the telephone to her boyfriend, say that he (the defendant) was \u201cdumb and stupid.\u201d Defendant stated that when he heard this he felt bad and started crying, and that he began to feel worse when he heard the decedent \u201ccussing\u201d at their baby. He then came out from the closet, unplugged the telephone, and engaged in an argument with decedent over the fact that she was neglecting their baby by not making a necessary diaper change. When decedent pushed the defendant, he took the axe handle, with a hand on each end, put it over her head and pulled her towards him. Defendant put the axe handle down, and they then sat and talked in the living room for about 15 minutes before they engaged in the physical quarrel which ultimately resulted in the death of defendant\u2019s ex-wife.\nAs this court said in People v. Matthews (3d Dist. 1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 249, 253, 314 N.E.2d 15, 18:\n\u201cPassion on the part of the slayer, no matter how violent will not relieve him from liability for murder unless it is engendered by a provocation which the law recognizes as being reasonable and adequate. If the provocation is not sufficient the crime is murder. It is the general rule that language, however aggravated, abusive, opprobrious, or indecent, is not sufficient provocation to reduce a killing committed with a deadly weapon from murder to manslaughter. (People v. Marrow, 403 Ill. 69; People v. McMurry, 64 Ill. App. 2d 248.) The rule does not apply where as a result of insulting or opprobrious words, the parties become suddenly heated, and engage in a mutual combat, fighting on equal terms, and death results from the combat. 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide sec. 64.\nThe term mutual combat has been defined as one into which both parties enter willingly, or in which two persons, upon a sudden quarrel, and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal terms. 15 C.J.S. p. 358.\nA slight provocation will not be adequate since the provocation must be proportionate to the manner in which the accused retaliated and therefore if accused on a slight provocation attacked deceased with violence out of all proportion to the provocation and killed him the crime is murder. This is especially true if the homicide was committed with a deadly weapon. See 40 C.J.S. Homicide, sec. 46, p. 908; Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law and Procedure (1957), sec. 276.\u201d\nThe defendant relies on People v. Newberry (1st Dist. 1970), 127 Ill. App. 2d 322, 262 N.E.2d 282. In Newberry the defendant testified that he became so aroused and impassioned by the deceased\u2019s rude and obscene reply in response to his threat to kill himself if she would not agree to a reconciliation, that he immediately drew a gun from his pocket and shot her. In that case the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and on appeal sought reversal, arguing that the circumstances required a finding that the offense was murder rather than manslaughter. Newberry is inapposite on its facts. Moreover, the 15 minute interval, according to defendant\u2019s own statement, between the initial quarrel with decedent and then defendant\u2019s striking her with the vase, in our view, would be a period of sufficient length to negate the possibility that the defendant was acting under a \u201csudden and intense passion\u201d within the meaning of the statute. See People v. McMurry (2d Dist. 1965), 64 Ill. App. 2d 248, 212 N.E.2d 7.\nWe think the total circumstances of the instant case demonstrated malice and deliberation, and the evidence in the record could not support a conviction of either voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter. The defendant\u2019s actions in going to his ex-wife\u2019s apartment where he no longer lived and opening the door with a key he had retained since before the divorce; secreting himself in a closet to wait for his ex-wife\u2019s return; procuring an axe handle as an available weapon; his earlier anger and frustration at her conduct; remaining hidden while eavesdropping on her telephone conversation; raping her while she lay unconscious and then leaving her to die \u2014 all these facts render untenable any claim that the fatal wounding of the decedent was the consequence of a sudden and intense passion. (People v. Brown (1946), 392 Ill. 519, 64 N.E.2d 739; People v. Arnold (3d Dist. 1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 309 N.E.2d 89.) In refusing to give the tendered voluntary manslaughter instruction, the trial court determined that the record was lacking in evidence from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. We concur in that determination.\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in refusing his instruction on involuntary manslaughter. A person commits involuntary manslaughter when he \u201ckills an individual without lawful justification * * * if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly e * (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 3(a).) Recklessness is defined by section 4 \u2014 6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 4 \u2014 6):\n\u201cA person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.\u201d\nThe issue presented, therefore, is whether the record contains any evidence of acts by the defendant which, if believed by the jury, could reasonably be concluded to be reckless conduct within the above definition, and which caused the death of Betty Causey.\nThe State contends that defendant\u2019s striking the decedent in the head with a vase filled with pennies caused her death. Dr. Immesoete, the coroner\u2019s physician, testified that the deceased suffered an injury to her jaw which probably caused her death and that this injury could have been caused by a blunt instrument such as a vase. Upon cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr. Immesoete testified that of the two bloodclots on the head, \u201cthe one on the jaw region was the most likely cause of death.\u201d The defendant contends that the act of pinning his ex-wife\u2019s neck against the door in order to restrain her and causing her to lose consciousness, fall and strike her head, was performed recklessly. This argument, of course, ignores the fact that defendant intentionally hit the deceased with the vase before she fell.\nRecklessness is an indispensable element of involuntary manslaughter and in the case before us there is even less evidence of recklessness than of serious provocation. All of defendant\u2019s acts indicate an intentional action, and certainly the victim would not have died but for the blows defendant inflicted. Nothing in the record supports the conclusion that defendant\u2019s acts were merely reckless, and no evidence was introduced to show that death resulted from any other cause. On the contrary, defendant\u2019s own statement forcefully indicates that he intended to strike the blow which caused Betty Causey\u2019s death. The trial court did not err in refusing defendant\u2019s tendered instructions.\nDefendant also claims that he was not proven guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. As our previous discussion indicates, we are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention concerning the court\u2019s discretion in sentencing defendant to concurrent 50 to 75 year terms for murder and rape merits some brief comment.\n\u2022 8 We note the sentence imposed was within the statutory limitations. The defendant argues that the court unduly emphasized several aggravating factors while ignoring certain mitigating factors. The principle of law that we choose to follow is that the sentence will not be changed unless it is greatly at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law. (People v. Sprinkle (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 257,307 N.E.2d 161, cert, denied (1974), 417 U.S. 935, 41 L. Ed. 2d 239, 94 S. Ct. 2650.) On review, the standard is not what the reviewing court, sitting as a trier of fact would have done, but whether the record shows an abuse of discretion mandating a reduction of sentence. (People v. Pardue (3d Dist. 1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 845, 361 N.E.2d 383.) We believe the record indicates the trial court considered all of the factors necessary in sentencing and then made a sound determination of the punishment to be imposed, and we will not disturb it. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P. J., and STOUDER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Michael Filipovic, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Michael M. Mihm, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (James E. Hinterlong and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT CAUSEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 77-277\nOpinion filed November 30, 1978.\nRehearing denied January 2, 1979.\nRobert Agostinelli and Michael Filipovic, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nMichael M. Mihm, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (James E. Hinterlong and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0012-01", "first_page_order": 34, "last_page_order": 40 }