{ "id": 3318030, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT GORHAM, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gorham", "decision_date": "1978-06-28", "docket_number": "No. 77-898", "first_page": "320", "last_page": "325", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 320" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448512 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2896653 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966897 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937410 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5456228 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911720 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 U.S. 96", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175104 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 667, "char_count": 13113, "ocr_confidence": 0.906, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.33301012040716e-07, "percentile": 0.6292973065225038 }, "sha256": "3ca64425cac2404c3caa665e861f0d94eee1e4d9d3b5aa3df50220e8ebfd5e19", "simhash": "1:a770b520d7b49297", "word_count": 2162 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:20.946597+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT GORHAM, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Robert Gorham, was charged with the murder of Kenneth Thompson. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of that crime and the court sentenced him to 100 to 200 years. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress his confession.\n-At the hearing on the motion the following evidence was adduced. At approximately 4 p.m. on April 2, 1976, Officers Carl Kuester and Joseph Robustelli of the Chicago Heights Police Department arrested defendant in a drug rehabilitation center in the city of Peoria. Robustelli read the complaint and warrant to defendant and Kuester read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant did not respond. Defendant was involved in a methadone program and had received an eight-milligram dosage that morning. Defendant was not interrogated.\nDefendant was brought before a judge in Peoria. Following a hearing the judge remanded defendant to Cook County. The officers and defendant arrived in Chicago at 9:30 p.m. Defendant was not questioned during the trip.\nUpon arriving at the Cook County Criminal Courts building, defendant was taken to assistant State\u2019s Attorney Gillis\u2019 office. Kuester and Robustelli turned defendant over to a Lieutenant Barger and departed. Prosecutors Helsel and Prendergast and, later, IBI agent Thomas Naughton also were present.\nBarger advised defendant of his Miranda rights and asked him if he wished to make a statement. He told defendant that the arrest warrant could not have been secured without some evidence. Defendant asked, \u201cWhat evidence?\u201d but Barger did not reveal any evidence to him. According to Barger, defendant said he did not wish to make a statement.\nIBI agent Naughton testified that when asked by Barger if he would make a statement, defendant replied it was a \u201cpretty heavy beef\u201d and he was not sure whether he wished to make a formal statement. Defendant said he had spent four years at Menard and many people there were convicted only because they did give statements. Defendant was not sure he wanted \u201cto go that route.\u201d After Barger left the room Naughton asked defendant whether he ever felt guilty and defendant replied that sometimes he did. Naughton also asked defendant why he was so foolish to sell the gun when the murder was such \u201ca good hit.\u201d Defendant stated he sold the gun to obtain dope.\nAt about 10 p.m., Robustelli and Kuester returned to the prosecutor\u2019s office. They again advised defendant of his rights and he stated that he understood them. They asked defendant if he wanted to talk about \u201cit\u201d and he asked \u201cabout what?\u201d Robustelli told defendant that the police had recovered the gun and knew that the murder had been committed to obtain insurance money. Defendant was told that the authorities knew how the insurance money had been spent. He was then told that Kathleen Thompson, decedent\u2019s widow, had been arrested and had told the police everything.\nDefendant asked if she was in the building. When told that she was, he asked that he be allowed to see her. She was brought to the office immediately.\nWhen Thompson entered, defendant asked her what she had told the police. After Barger told her to tell defendant, she said, \u201cI told them everything.\u201d She sat on the couch with defendant and they kissed. Thompson told defendant that they should tell the police everything and get it all out in the open. At approximately 10:15 p.m. defendant gave the officers an oral statement relating his involvement in the murder of decedent.\nAt approximately 11:15 p.m., in the presence of two prosecutors, Officer Kuester, and a court reporter, defendant gave a statement. When reduced to writing, it consisted of 42 pages. Defendant read, corrected, and signed each of 42 pages. The prosecutors signed as witnesses, and testified that defendant did not exhibit any physical signs of withdrawal, was offered food, and was \u2022 not coerced. In the statement defendant admitted that he conspired with decedent\u2019s wife to kill decedent in order to get the latter\u2019s insurance. Defendant described the murder in detail.\nAt the hearing, defendant testified that he was 25 years old and had an 11th grade education. His testimony concerning his arrest and the trip to Chicago corroborated that given by the police officers. He also stated that he was advised of his rights. He testified that he replied negatively when asked if he would like to make a statement. According to defendant, Robustelli told him he would get \u201c100 to 300\u201d if he did not make a statement. Robustelli subsequently denied having said that to defendant. Defendant also testified that he told others he did not wish to make a statement and denied having requested to see decedent\u2019s widow. He further stated that she told him things would go easier for him if he talked and the police confirmed this statement. Robustelli said repeatedly that defendant \u201cwas going to get jammed if [he] didn\u2019t go along with him.\u201d Robustelli also denied making that statement. According to defendant, when he asked for his medication, a prosecutor told him that if things worked out with the police it would work out with him. Defendant testified that he was told things would be easier for the widow if he gave a statement and that he did so to protect her because she was carrying his child. He testified that at the time his joints were aching and that he sufi\u00e9red some other discomforts of withdrawal.\nDefendant testified that he had been arrested a number of times before and had served time in prison. He knew what his Miranda rights were. He was aware of what was happening when his rights were read to him and he knew what he was doing when he signed the statement.\nAfter hearing arguments, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the confession. Since the quantum of evidence at trial is not in issue, we shall mention briefly on the trial testimony of just one witness, decedent\u2019s widow.\nDecedent was found shot to death in his van, on January 10,1975, in an alley in Chicago Heights. Kathleen Thompson testified that she had a relationship with defendant. She told defendant about decedent\u2019s life insurance and said he was worth more dead than alive. Defendant agreed to kill decedent if she would split the insurance proceeds. Late on January 10, 1975, defendant telephoned her and said that \u201che had taken care of business.\u201d An hour later she learned her husband was dead. She used part of the insurance proceeds to purchase a *4,000 auto, a *1,600 motorcycle and a *500 boat for defendant.\nDefendant contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the confession. The issue is whether the evidence demonstrates that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent.\nUnder Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436,16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, when an accused invokes his right to remain silent, it is incumbent upon the authorities to cease interrogation. In Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 96 S. Ct. 321, the Supreme Court interpreted that portion of the Miranda decision and stated that Miranda did not act as a permanent and absolute bar to continued or resumed questioning: \u201cWe therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody had decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his \u2018right to cut off questioning\u2019 was \u2018scrupulously honored.\u2019 \u201d 423 U.S. 96,104, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313,321, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326.\nIn People v. Higgins (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 221,278 N.E.2d 68, the court set forth the standard by which the State may show the accused voluntarily waived his rights. At page 227 the court stated:\n\u201cAn express, formalistic waiver is unnecessary for \u2018[a]ny clear manifestation of a desire to waive is sufficient. The test is the showing of a knowing intent, not the utterance of a shibboleth. The criterion is not solely the language employed but a combination of that articulation and the surrounding facts and circumstances.\u2019 [Citation.] As in the present case, \u2018[o]nce the defendant has been informed of his rights and indicates that he understands those rights, it would seem that his choosing to speak and not requesting a lawyer is sufficient evidence that he knows of his rights and chooses not to exercise them.\u201d\nWhen defendant was arrested, he was advised of his rights and no interrogation took place. Later, in the drive to Chicago, he was not questioned. Upon his arrival in the prosecutor\u2019s office, defendant again was advised of his rights. At the hearing on the motion, defendant stated he was aware of his rights and understood what was said to him. When defendant was informed that the authorities possessed considerable evidence, defendant inquired about the evidence. Defendant asked what could be done for him and was told that nothing could be done. According to Naughton, defendant vacillated and continued to consider whether he should talk. Naughton testified that defendant was mulling over what he believed to be the consequences of making a statement.\nWhen Officers Robustelli and Kuester returned that evening, they asked defendant if he wanted to talk about it. Defendant asked, \u201cabout what?\u201d The officers informed defendant of some specific evidence, including the widow\u2019s statement. When, pursuant to his request, the widow was brought to defendant, he immediately asked what she had told the police. While defendant denies that these proceedings occurred and asserts that he was coerced by promise of leniency and threats of imprisonment, these assertions were denied by State\u2019s witnesses.\nIt is not psychological coercion in violation of Miranda to reveal incriminating evidence against a defendant. (People v. McKinley (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 145, 370 N.E.2d 1040.) Defendant\u2019s insistence that he was undergoing withdrawal pains is unsupported elsewhere in the record. The State\u2019s witness testified that he was offered food and did not exhibit any symptoms of physical suffering. The trial court heard the evidence and its determination must be upheld unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Pittman (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 39,302 N.E.2d7.\nIn People v. White (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 288, 335 N.E.2d 457, defendant had exercised his right to remain silent and had requested an attorney when questioning was resumed. Defendant then relented and confessed to the crime. The court found that defendant had a low I.Q. and that Miranda was violated by failing to furnish defendant with an attorney as requested. The court held, however, that his familiarity with Miranda warnings through previous police encounters along with repeated admonitions operated to dissipate any taint. Similarly, in the present case, defendant acknowledged his familiarity with the system and knowledge of his rights. He did not request an attorney nor did he unequivocally exercise his right to remain silent. There is ample evidence in the record that the situation was free from psychological and physical coercion. Therefore, defendant\u2019s decision to give a statement was not made in violation of his \u201cright to cut off questioning.\u201d Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 104, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 321, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326.\nDefendant was given Miranda warnings on two separate occasions after arriving at the prosecutor\u2019s office. He also was warned of his rights before giving the written statement. Defendant agreed to give the statement 30 minutes after he first entered the office. There also is considerable evidence that he did not elect to remain silent. One of the officers testified that defendant was not sure whether he wished to make a statement. Several officers testified that he questioned them about the evidence which had been obtained. Where a person in custodial interrogation continues to discuss the matter, that person does not manifest a desire to terminate the questioning and there has been no denial of rights if the questioning is continued. (People v. Nestrick (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 519, 359 N.E.2d 503.) The question of a confession\u2019s competency is for the trial court and in making its decision the court need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Medina (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 254, 375 N.E.2d 78.\nIn the present case, defendant chose not to remain silent. He understood his rights and voluntarily waived the exercise of those rights. The trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the confession.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nJIGANTI, P. J., and McGILLICUDDY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Richard J. Geddes, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Joan S. Cherry, and Armand L. Andry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT GORHAM, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 77-898\nOpinion filed June 28, 1978.\nRehearing denied January 9, 1979.\nRalph Ruebner and Richard J. Geddes, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Joan S. Cherry, and Armand L. Andry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0320-01", "first_page_order": 342, "last_page_order": 347 }