{
  "id": 3321580,
  "name": "ROBERT W. DOBBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Dobbs v. Safeway Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1978-10-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 78-351",
  "first_page": "400",
  "last_page": "403",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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      "year": 1967,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:20.946597+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "ROBERT W. DOBBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRobert W. Dobbs (plaintiff) sued Safeway Insurance Company (defendant) and Scott Anchor Insurance Agency, Inc. (Scott) for breach of a contract of insurance, alleging that defendant failed to defend plaintiff in a lawsuit resulting from an automobile collision. After defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was granted, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow plaintiff a continuance in order to conduct discovery necessary to a determination of the motion for summary judgment.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint alleging that he purchased an automobile insurance policy from defendant through its general agent, Scott. His policy was placed by the Votava Insurance Agency (Votava), a general broker. Plaintiff paid for six months\u2019 coverage. During the effective period of the policy, plaintiff was involved in a collision with another vehicle. Within a week of the collision, plaintiff orally notified the Votava agency of the collision. On that same date, Votava notified Scott of plaintiff\u2019s collision. Two months later plaintiff was sued for damages arising out of the collision. Plaintiff delivered the complaint and summons to Votava, which sent them to Scott. Plaintiff became aware of the existence of an ex parte judgment against him when wage deduction proceedings were commenced. When plaintiff informed defendant of the judgment and wage deduction proceedings, defendant denied that it had any obligation to defend or indemnify plaintiff, but retained an attorney to defend plaintiff and reserved its rights to defend and investigate without assuming liability.\nAfter a continuance to answer or plead was granted, defendant filed motions for summary judgment and to dismiss on August 4, 1977. Defendant denied that it had notice of the lawsuit against plaintiff prior to being informed of the judgment against plaintiff. It denied that Scott was its agent. It alleged that plaintiff\u2019s failure to conform to the requirements of the policy absolved it of responsibility. In support of its motions, defendant filed the affidavit of Barry Winter, its claims manager. He stated that defendant had no notice of the lawsuit against plaintiff until it was informed of the ex parte judgment and wage deduction proceedings in April 1977. He denied that Scott was defendant\u2019s agent. Defendant also submitted the affidavit of Lawrence Mann, Scott\u2019s president, who denied that Scott was defendant\u2019s agent. Hearing on the motions was set for August 11, 1977.\nPlaintiff moved to continue the hearing in order to conduct discovery depositions of defendant\u2019s and Scott\u2019s employees, which he alleged were vital and necessary to reply to defendant\u2019s motions. The circuit court, on August 10, 1977, granted plaintiff a 60-day continuance to conduct discovery.\nOn October 12,1977, the circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment for defendant on November 1, 1977, and requested a continuance for 90 days to complete discovery, alleging that he had been denied discovery which was essential to a determination of the issues on summary judgment. In support of his motion, plaintiff\u2019s counsel attached his own affidavit, stating that he had scheduled the depositions of Barry Winter and of defendant\u2019s agency manager. They were commanded to produce records concerning defendant\u2019s relationship with Scott. He also scheduled the depositions of Lawrence Mann, Scott\u2019s president, and of the latter\u2019s secretary. Scott\u2019s records of its dealings with defendant were to be produced at the deposition. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel agreed to continue Mann\u2019s deposition when defendant\u2019s attorney stated he would not be available because of a religious holiday. On the day scheduled for the agency manager\u2019s deposition, defendant informed plaintiff\u2019s attorney that Barry Winter was both the agency and claims manager. No deposition would be held that day because Winter\u2019s deposition was scheduled for a later date.\nThe affidavit of plaintiff\u2019s counsel further stated that Scott was willing to settle. Upon inquiry, Scott\u2019s president stated that defendant\u2019s counsel had no authority to settle on Scott\u2019s behalf. Scott\u2019s counsel, stating that he was unfamiliar with the case, wanted to continue the depositions of Scott\u2019s employees in order to prepare. Winter did not produce the requested records at his deposition. As a result of deposing Winter, plaintiff\u2019s counsel determined that several other of defendant\u2019s employees had information concerning the case. Defendant\u2019s counsel stated that those employees\u2019 depositions could be arranged by calling him. When plaintiff\u2019s counsel attempted to make the arrangements, defendant\u2019s counsel did not respond.\nThe circuit court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate the summary judgment.\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing him additional time for discovery essential to the determination of the summary judgment issues. We agree. A reviewing court will not interfere with a trial court\u2019s ruling on discovery matters unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. (Hanes v. On & Associates (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 72, 368 N.E.2d 584, citing People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6.) On this record, the denial of additional time to conduct discovery was a manifest abuse of discretion. The court recognized that the discovery was important to a determination of the motion for summary judgment by granting the first continuance for discovery. Counsel\u2019s uncontradicted affidavit showed that the deposition of one of defendant\u2019s affiants had not been conducted in spite of his efforts. Defendant\u2019s agency and claims manager had not produced requested records. The record clearly indicates that plaintiff\u2019s counsel attempted to secure the discovery during the first continuance. Furthermore, defendant had not fully cooperated with plaintiff\u2019s efforts to secure discovery. A stay pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219(c) (i) (Il. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 219(c) (i)) would have served the ends of justice without unduly delaying disposition of the case. (See Hanes v. Orr & Associates (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 72,368 N.E.2d 584.) The circuit judge should have granted plaintiff\u2019s request for time to conduct discovery.\nThe denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion to vacate and the summary judgment for defendant are both reversed. After plaintiff completes the discovery requested in his motion to vacate, the trial court is directed to conduct further hearings on defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nMcGLOON and LINN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Levatino & Levatino, of Chicago (Phillip C. Levatino, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Parrillo, Bresler, Weiss & Moss, of Chicago (David J. Weiss, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "ROBERT W. DOBBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-351\nOpinion filed October 30, 1978.\nLevatino & Levatino, of Chicago (Phillip C. Levatino, of counsel), for appellant.\nParrillo, Bresler, Weiss & Moss, of Chicago (David J. Weiss, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0400-01",
  "first_page_order": 422,
  "last_page_order": 425
}