{ "id": 3322514, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADOLPHUS MOLSBY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Molsby", "decision_date": "1978-11-17", "docket_number": "No. 62648", "first_page": "647", "last_page": "661", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 647" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1061", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1065" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2962034 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 U.S. 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159521 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/353/0053-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1192, "char_count": 32103, "ocr_confidence": 0.883, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0056363631550606e-07, "percentile": 0.7436004956273512 }, "sha256": "9f892457dd8e511a14d6f6a8e9c4e3645eab2baf11fa90bcb47c6303c910e97c", "simhash": "1:b77f30e737ddfdb5", "word_count": 5420 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:20.946597+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADOLPHUS MOLSBY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE WILSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, defendant, a Chicago police officer, was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and of cannabis and was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of 1 to 3 years and 6 months in the penitentiary. His appeal originally raised 12 separate issues. Three have been stricken on the State\u2019s motion for failure to file transcripts of certain pretrial proceedings and a fourth apparently has been incorporated into another of the issues. The remaining issues are whether a verdict of guilty may be sustained: (1) when the trial court has denied the motion of the defense to produce an informer; (2) when the trial judge has refused to allow a search warrant into evidence; (3) when the State has withheld evidence from the defense; (4) when the trial court has refused to allow the defendant to put on evidence regarding his character; (5) where the prosecution has demeaned the character of a defense witness; (6) when the trial court has limited the defense in putting on evidence; (7) where based on allegedly false and perjured testimony; and (8) when the trial court has refused to offer certain instructions of the defense. We affirm.\nState\u2019s Case\nThe evidence for the State indicates that on the night of February 2, 1972, several members of the \u201cD\u201d squad, a special group of law enforcement officers formed to seek out Chicago police officers engaged in illegal narcotics trafficking, went to 7150 South Cyril to execute a search warrant on the person of John Finley, a known narcotics user and dealer, and on his apartment. The search warrant had been issued on the basis of information provided by an informer. The informer had told Special Agent Charles McKissack of the Illinois Bureau of Investigation (IBI) that he had purchased heroin from Finley in his apartment. Several officers testified that they had information that a police officer by the name of Adolph also was present at the time of the sale. However, his name was not mentioned in the search warrant. Officer Floyd Turner testified that this information was not mentioned in the search warrant because the \u201cD\u201d squad was a confidential unit and they did not want to reveal anything until the officer was apprehended.\nAt approximately 8:40 p.m. on the evening in question, the informer apparently told several of the officers that Finley and Adolph were selling drugs in Finley\u2019s apartment. At 8:45 p.m., Agents McKissack and Coleman of the IBI, Sergeants Turner, Mosely, and Williams of the Chicago Police Department\u2019s Internal Affairs Division, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Louis Bianchi, and others entered the building at 7150 South Cyril. They proceeded to Finley\u2019s apartment to conduct the search. Upon entering, the officers saw three children \u201chuddled up\u201d next to two women in the living room. Neither Finley nor Adolph was present.\nDuring the search, Turner had left the apartment to check a vehicle parked outside the building. On his return, he saw defendant and Finley entering the building. The three of them took the elevator to the 5th floor. When Finley got off, one of the officers said, \u201cThere is Finley.\u201d Defendant then left the elevator and went in the opposite direction through a door and down a staircase. Turner followed defendant and, after announcing that he was a police officer, ordered him back up the stairs. When defendant returned, Coleman came over to give assistance to Turner. Defendant told Turner that he was a police officer and that his name was Adolphus Molsby. Turner then said, \u201cAw, Adolph\u201d, or \u201cAdolphus.\u201d He said that he was familiar with the name \u201cAdolph\u201d because of information previously provided by the informer. On cross-examination, he stated that he had told the grand jury that the officer was known as Adolphus Molsby.\nAfter giving his name, defendant asked if he could get \u201ca break.\u201d Turner then took two bags containing food from him and removed his service revolver. Defendant again asked for \u201ca break.\u201d Turner then searched defendant\u2019s pockets and found a small tinfoil packet and a coin-type manila envelope containing marijuana. After this was discovered, defendant once again asked for \u201ca break.\u201d He was placed under arrest.\nTurner and Coleman then took defendant into the washroom of Finley\u2019s apartment to conduct a more thorough search. Mosely also was present during this search. While removing his coat, defendant reached into the inside pocket. Turner ordered him to remove his hand and when he did, Turner reached in and discovered a small tinfoil packet of heroin in the pocket. Upon his further search, Turner discovered a pipe containing a residue of marijuana and a vial containing traces of cocaine in defendant\u2019s coat and a matchbook containing a marijuana cigarette in defendant\u2019s pants. Defendant continued to ask for \u201ca break\u201d throughout the search. At one point, Mosely told him to talk to Bianchi, but defendant did not respond to this suggestion.\nAt the completion of the search, defendant told Turner that the coat did not belong to him. He said that he had just \u201cgrabbed\u201d it from a pile of clothes that were on the bed, and that he had put his own coat in the bedroom closet. Turner testified that both the coat and pants seemed to fit defendant. Nevertheless, the officers searched the bedroom closet, but they did not find any men\u2019s clothing. Defendant then said that his coat was in the closet by the bathroom. The officers searched that closet, but they did not find defendant\u2019s coat. Turner then told defendant to tell them the truth. Defendant stated that he worked as a security guard at a school and had taken the drugs from some students. He said that he had simply neglected to inventory the drugs.\nLater that evening, Turner left the apartment with defendant. Before returning to the \u201cD\u201d squad\u2019s headquarters, he stopped to search defendant\u2019s car. He found nothing unusual in the car. On cross-examination, he stated that he found some clothing in the trunk of the car.\nDefendant\u2019s Case\nThe evidence for the defense indicates that at either 7 or 8 p.m. on February 2, 1972, defendant arrived at Finley\u2019s apartment with his girl friend, Andrea Scott, and her child. When they arrived they noticed several moving boxes and many items of clothing piled on the bed. Finley, defendant\u2019s brother-in-law, asked defendant to help him move his belongings to his mother\u2019s house. Defendant agreed to help, but he said that he did not want to soil the clothes which he was wearing. Finley then offered to let defendant wear some of his clothes. Defendant put on a coat and a pair of pants, and began to take some of the boxes down to his car.\nSeveral witnesses who had seen defendant earlier in the evening were shown a photograph which was taken of defendant after his arrest. They testified that the clothes which he was wearing in the photograph were not the same as the clothes he was wearing when they had seen him. Scott, who had been with defendant throughout the evening, and Finley also testified to the change in clothing.\nDefendant testified that after he had changed into Finley\u2019s clothing, he took his own clothing and put it into the trunk of his car. He said that he removed his service revolver and star folder from the pants, but he left his wallet and his money in his pants. Finley testified that defendant did not take his clothes down to his car, but that he left them in the apartment. After defendant and Finley had filled defendant\u2019s car with boxes, they drove to Finley\u2019s mother\u2019s house.\nAfter stopping for some food, defendant and Finley returned to the building and they took the elevator up to Finley\u2019s apartment. When Finley got off the elevator, defendant heard someone say, \u201cthere\u2019s Finley, there,\u201d and then saw four men jump out with carbines. He said that he immediately froze because he assumed that they were police officers. He then told Turner, who had been on the elevator with him, that he was a police officer. He handed him his star folder.\nWhen Turner found the manila envelope in his pocket,' defendant told him that the clothes were not his, that he was only helping his brother-in-law move, and that his clothes were in his car. He testified that he never had any cause to check the pockets of the coat or pants which he was wearing. He said that he did not feel anything bulky in the pockets. Defendant said that he knew Finley had been previously arrested, but he did not know that he was an addict. Finley testified that he had put some of his drugs in the pockets of some of his clothing in preparation for the move from his apartment. Defendant testified that during this initial search he never asked any of the officers for \u201ca break.\u201d Scott testified that she had heard defendant twice ask if he could be of some assistance.\nWhen the officers took defendant into the bathroom, he again said the clothes were not his. He asked to talk to the officer in charge. He then explained to him that his clothes were in his car. Defendant denied ever reaching into the inside coat pocket as Turner had testified. He denied ever telling the police officers that his coat was in the bedroom closet. He also denied saying that he had taken the drugs from students, although he did state that he once worked for the Board of Education in a security capacity.\nWhen the police officers left the apartment, they went to defendant\u2019s car. They opened the trunk and found the clothing which defendant claims he was wearing earlier in the evening. Later that evening, Scott opened the trunk and took money from defendant\u2019s pants in order to pay his bond. She testified that those were the same pants he was wearing when they arrived at Finley\u2019s apartment.\nOpinion\nThe first issue we must consider is whether the trial court erred in denying the defense motion to produce the informer. The informer provided the information which was the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. He also told several police officers that when they executed the search warrant on Finley\u2019s apartment they would find Finley and a police officer by the name of Adolph, or Adolphus, dealing in drugs. Defendant contends that the informer should have been produced because his identity was material to the establishment of his defense.\nIn determining whether to order production of an informer, a court must balance the public interest in protecting a free flow of information against the individual\u2019s interest in presenting a defense. (Roviaro v. United States (1957), 353 U.S. 53, 62, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 646, 77 S. Ct. 623; People v. Rinaldo (1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1001, 341 N.E.2d 166, 168.) In making this balance, the court must consider all relevant factors, including the crime charged, the possible defenses, and the possible significance of the informer\u2019s testimony. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53, 62, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 646, 77 S. Ct. 623; People v. Chaney (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 216, 225, 347 N.E.2d 138, 143.\nIn this case, defendant was charged with possession of certain drugs. The drugs were found in clothing which he was wearing. Ilis defense was that he had borrowed the clothes from Finley because he did not want to soil his own clothes while helping Finley move from his apartment. Finley testified that the clothes did belong to him and that he could have put some of his drugs into the pockets of those clothes.\nWe fail to see how anything which the informer could have testified to at trial could have had any bearing on the crime charged or on defendant\u2019s defense. The informer did not participate in, witness, or set up the crime. (People v. Chaney (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 216, 225, 347 N.E.2d 138, 143; People v. Monroe (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 482, 486, 335 N.E.2d 783, 787.) He merely provided information which led the law enforcement officials to Finley\u2019s apartment on February 2, 1972.\nThe court in People v. Robinson (1969), 105 Ill. App. 2d 57, 245 N.E.2d 137, considered the value of an informant\u2019s testimony under similar circumstances. In Robinson, a police informant had identified defendant as the person who had just sold him drugs. The court rejected defendant\u2019s request for the informant\u2019s identity, noting that \u201c[t]he offense charged was possession of a narcotic drug and, as the informer was not present when the defendant was searched, the testimony of the informer would have no significant value on the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\u201d (105 Ill. App. 2d 57, 66, 245 N.E.2d 137, 142.) We also find that the informer\u2019s testimony would have no significant value on the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence in this case. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the defense motion to produce the informer.\nThe next issue we consider is whether the trial court erred in refusing defendant\u2019s request that the search warrant be admitted into evidence. Defendant contends that the absence of any reference to him in the warrant contradicts trial testimony of police officers that, prior to the issuance of the warrant, they had information that he was engaged in the illegal sale of drugs. As a result, he states that the search warrant should have been admitted as an impeaching document.\nAssuming that the warrant contradicts the officers\u2019 trial testimony, we cannot see how its introduction would have added anything to defendant\u2019s case. At trial, Officers Turner, Mosely, and Williams, and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Bianchi each testified that there was no reference to defendant in the search warrant. This evidence was sufficient to apprise the jury of the omission of defendant\u2019s name in the search warrant. The search warrant only would have been cumulative evidence on this point. The trial court has broad discretion in deciding to accept or reject such evidence. (Long v. Bennett (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 50, 53, 370 N.E.2d 627, 629; Ross v. Pfeifer (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 789, 796, 350 N.E.2d 797, 803.) We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this instance and therefore did not err in refusing defendant\u2019s request to admit the search warrant into evidence.\nThe third issue is whether the State\u2019s failure to disclose evidence to defendant constituted reversible error. The defendant filed pretrial discovery motions requesting the State to produce (1) all tangible evidence which the State intended to use at trial or which was taken from or belonged to the accused, and (2) any material or information within its possession tending to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged. The State filed an answer denying the existence of any such evidence.\nAt trial, Scott testified that she neither had met Finley nor had visited his apartment prior to the evening of February 2,1972. On cross-examination, she was shown two photographs of herself, Finley, and defendant together in what was later identified by some witnesses as Finley\u2019s apartment and by other witnesses as defendant\u2019s sister\u2019s apartment. The photographs were taken before February 2, 1972. Defendant strenuously objected to the use of the photographs claiming that the State had deliberately and wilfully withheld them from the defense.\nUpon proper request, defendant is entitled to the State\u2019s production of photographs if (1) they were obtained from or belong to defendant; (2) the State intends to use them at trial; or (3) they are favorable to the defense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, pars. 412(a)(v), 412(c); People v. Newbury (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 228, 238, 290 N.E.2d 592, 598.) None of these situations are present here. First, the photographs were not taken from nor did they belong to defendant. The photographs were taken from an album belonging to Finley. Second, the State did not intend to use the photographs at trial. They only used them in an attempt to impeach Scott after she had made statements which were believed to have been untrue. Once used, the State had no objections to defendant\u2019s viewing the photographs.\nThird, defendant has not indicated to us how these photographs might be favorable to the defense. (People v. Newbury (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 228, 238, 290 N.E.2d 592, 598; People v. Camel (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1027, 295 N.E.2d 270, 273.) The photographs only show Scott, Finley, and defendant together in what is arguably Finley\u2019s apartment. Perhaps, the presence of Scott in this picture contradicts Scott\u2019s testimony that she had never met Finley or visited his apartment prior to February 2, 1972. Perhaps, it shows that defendant had more than a casual relationship with Finley. Yet, it does not in any way negate the guilt of defendant as to the charge of possession of drugs. Therefore, we find that defendant was not entitled to the production of these photographs prior to trial.\nDefendant also asserts that the State wilfully withheld the photographs which were taken in Finley\u2019s apartment on the night of February 2,1972. He contends that these photographs would have shown that Finley was in the process of moving from his apartment that night. Although not stated by defendant, the apparent value of such evidence would have been that it would have lent some support to his contention that he had only changed into the clothing from which the drugs were retrieved in order to help Finley move.\nIn answer to defendant\u2019s contention, we first note that the State cannot be accused of withholding evidence where neither the State nor its agents are in possession of the evidence. (People v. Gaitor (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 449, 454, 364 N.E.2d 484, 487; People v. Steptoe (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1079, 343 N.E.2d 1, 4.) The State had indicated that they could not produce the photographs because they were not in their possession. An attempt had been made to locate the photographs but it had proven unsuccessful. Also, Officer Coleman, who had taken the photographs, indicated that the \u201cD\u201d squad had been disbanded early in 1973 and that he did not know what had happened to the pictures. The State speculated that the photographs were either misplaced or destroyed when the unit was disbanded.\nAdditionally, we believe that when the photographs are considered within the context of all the evidence, it cannot be said that the failure to produce the photographs requires the reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction. (People v. Gaitor (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 449, 454, 364 N.E.2d 484, 488.) The jury, of course, was aware of the State\u2019s failure to produce the photographs at trial. Defendant argued this very fact to the jury in his closing argument. Nevertheless, despite the inference which the absence of the photographs might create, the jury found defendant guilty. We see no reason to reverse the jury\u2019s verdict on this issue and therefore we hold the State\u2019s failure to produce the photographs did not constitute reversible error.\nWe are next asked to consider defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court refused to allow him to introduce character evidence. However, we cannot find any such refusal on the record. The record indicates that defendant was permitted to call three character witnesses and each was allowed to testify. There were no other requests to call character witnesses on the record. Since the record is devoid of any evidence supporting defendant\u2019s contention, we cannot consider an issue which is not properly before us.\nThe fifth issue we consider is whether a verdict may be sustained where the State \u201cwilfully and viciously\u201d demeans the character of a defense witness. During its rebuttal, the State called the defendant\u2019s sister, Julia Carr, who had earlier testified in defendant\u2019s behalf. While questioning her concerning the interior of an apartment depicted in a photograph, the following exchange took place:\n\u201cMR. BOLON [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]:\nMrs. Carr, will you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what is depicted on that wall of the wallpaper?\nMR. HOWARD [Defense Counsel]: If the court please, I am going to object to this because the witness has not identified the photograph of being something that she had ever seen before. She never seen [sic] the photograph before and therefore I am going to object to any questions being asked of the witness concerning the photograph.\nMR. BOLON: She said it\u2019s her room.\nMR. HOWARD: You can get somebody off the street and say that.\nMR. BOLON: That\u2019s exactly what you did, Mr. Howard.\nMR. HOWARD: I move at this time for a mistrial.\nTHE COURT: Your motion is denied and the jury is instructed to disregard the last statement that Mr. Bolon made.\u201d\nA verdict will not be disturbed where the improper remarks of counsel do not constitute a material factor in the conviction. (People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, 390, 288 N.E.2d 363, 371-72; People v. Watson (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 665, 670, 365 N.E.2d 95, 99.) Although the Assistant State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s remark here was clearly improper, it did not constitute a material factor in the conviction. Also, whatever harm may have been caused by the remark was sufficiently limited by the court\u2019s immediate instruction that the jury ignore the remark and the court\u2019s later instruction that the jury should only consider the testimony of the witness which the court had received. (People v. Watson (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 665, 671, 365 N.E.2d 95, 99; People v. Witherspoon (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 12, 23, 337 N.E.2d 454, 462.) Therefore, we find no error requiring a reversal in this instance.\nNext we consider defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court prevented him from putting on evidence which would meet the State\u2019s evidence. On cross-examination, Scott testified that defendant, a married man, was her boy friend. She further testified that his name appeared on the mailbox to her apartment but that he did not live with her. The defense attempted to \u201crebut\u201d this testimony during the direct examination of defendant. During his testimony, the defense sought to introduce a copy of the lease to Scott\u2019s apartment, indicating that defendant had leased it for Scott, and several rent receipts, indicating that Scott had paid the rent for her apartment. The trial court refused their admission.\nAs a general principle of law, each party is entitled to present evidence which is relevant to its theory of the case. (In re Application of County Treasurer (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 765, 772, 303 N.E.2d 476, 481.) The test for relevancy is whether the evidence offered tends to prove or disprove a disputed issue. (People v. Fair (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 301, 304, 359 N.E.2d 848, 851. See also Sheraton-Chicago Corp. v. Lewis (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 309, 311, 290 N.E.2d 685, 687.) The issue apparently raised by Scott\u2019s testimony is whether defendant lived with her. Evidence that the lease was taken out by defendant for Scott and that the rent payments were made by Scott does not tend to prove or disprove this issue. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not rule incorrectly in refusing to admit the lease and rent receipts into evidence.\nDefendant claims that the verdict of guilty should not be sustained because it was based on false and perjured testimony. The specific instances of perjury which he alleges include: (1) the police officers\u2019 testimony that they had information concerning the drug involvement of a police officer by the name of Adolph prior to the search despite their failure to either secure a search warrant in his name or to make out any reports concerning this information; (2) the testimony of Finley\u2019s landlord that he could describe Finley\u2019s apartment even though he could not describe any of the other 200 apartments which he managed; and (3) the testimony of Officer Turner that prior to the arrest of defendant he had not heard the name Adolphus Molsby. We will consider only the last allegation of perjury because, after having reviewed the record, we find that the other allegations are without merit.\nBefore a grand jury in this case, Officer Turner testified that \u201cinformation had been received that a person by the name of John was dealing in cocaine and in heroin in apartment 511 at 7150 Cyril Court, and that this person known as Adolphus Molsby was a Chicago police officer.\u201d (Emphasis added.) At trial, Turner testified that he had information that an officer by the name of Adolph was engaged in the sale of narcotics. Defendant contends that Turner\u2019s trial testimony contradicts his earlier testimony and therefore it constitutes perjury.\nMere conflicts in the testimony of a witness with his prior statements do not establish that he has committed perjury. (People v. Henderson (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 355, 384, 344 N.E.2d 239, 261; People v. Burnett (1975), 35 Ill. App. 3d 109, 122, 341 N.E.2d 86, 96.) This is especially true when the conflicts are minor and the testimony was given at different stages of the proceedings. (People v. Strother (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 95, 100-01, 290 N.E.2d 201, 204; People v. Burnett (1975), 35 Ill. App. 3d 109, 122-23, 341 N.E.2d 86, 96.) We believe that the conflict in Turner\u2019s testimony is only minor and is at least partially explainable by the nature of his testimony.\nTurner\u2019s testimony before the grand jury came after the arrest of defendant. At that time he was aware of defendant\u2019s full name. When he testified before the grand jury, he was merely testifying to his present knowledge of defendant\u2019s identity. We believe that his words, \u201cthis person known as Adolphus Molsby,\u201d indicate that. His testimony at trial was given in the context of the events which transpired on the night of February 2,1972. He said that when defendant told him that his name was Adolphus Molsby he called him Adolph because he had information that Finley and a police officer by the name of Adolph were dealing in drugs. He was only testifying as to what he knew prior to the arrest, not after it. We hold that as a matter of law, such a conflict in testimony does not constitute perjury.\nThe last issue in this appeal is whether the trial court\u2019s failure to instruct the jury on defendant\u2019s theory of the case requires reversal. Normally, a reviewing court will not even consider a review of objections to jury instructions unless the complaining party has provided the court with an abstract of all the instructions. (People v. Rosa (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 608, 617, 364 N.E.2d 389, 395; People v. Aprile (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 461, 463, 304 N.E.2d 642, 643-44.) Defendant has not provided us with an abstract in this case. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the transcript of the conference on jury instructions and we will discuss each of defendant\u2019s objections.\nFirst, defendant objects to the court\u2019s failure to give an instruction on perjury. A defendant is only entitled to an instruction as to the law applicable to any state of facts shown by the evidence. (People v. Carmack (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 983, 987, 366 N.E.2d 103, 106.) As we have already indicated, there was no evidence of perjury in this case. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on perjury.\nSecond, defendant objects to the court\u2019s failure to charge the jury with both paragraphs of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction on circumstantial evidence. (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.02 (hereinafter IPI).) IPI Criminal No. 3.02 provides:\n\u201cCircumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which give rise to a reasonable inference of other facts which tend to show the guilt or innocence of [the] [a] defendant. Circumstantial evidence should be considered by you together with all the other evidence in the case in arriving at your verdict.\n[You should not find the defendant guilty unless the facts and circumstances proved exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.]\u201d\nThe trial court only charged the jury with the first paragraph.\nThe committee comments accompanying IPI Criminal No. 3.02 indicate that a jury should only be charged with the second paragraph if all the evidence is circumstantial. (People v. Hill (1978), 56 Ill. App. 3d 510, 515, 371 N.E.2d 1257, 1260; People v. Estes (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894, 346 N.E.2d 469, 474.) It was not proper to charge the jury in this case with the second paragraph because all the evidence was not circumstantial. The evidence indicating that defendant possessed drugs was direct evidence. Since there was some direct evidence in this case, the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the second paragraph of this instruction.\nThird, defendant objects to the court\u2019s failure to charge the jury with the IPI instructions on violation of the Narcotics Drug Act. (IPI Criminal Nos. 17.01,17.02.) The court, instead, charged the jury with non-IPI instructions tendered by the State (People\u2019s Instructions 11 \u2014 14).\nSupreme Court Rule 451(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, par. 451(a)) provides:\n\u201cWhenever Illinois Pattern Instructions in Criminal Cases \u00b0 \u201d contains an instruction applicable in a criminal case, 0 6 0 the IPI-Criminal instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.\u201d (See also People v. Finley (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 26, 29, 363 N.E.2d 871, 874; People v. Kent (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 260, 350 N.E.2d 890, 894.)\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s IPI instructions did not accurately state the law. Defendant\u2019s instructions referred to a violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, pars. 22 \u2014 1 to 22 \u2014 49.1). That Act was repealed on August 16, 1971, and was replaced by the Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 56M, par. 1100 etseq.). The State\u2019s non-IPI instructions incorporated the language of the new Act into a simple and accurate statement of the law. The trial court has the discretion to accept or reject a non-IPI instruction. (People v. Hines (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 976, 985, 329 N.E.2d 903, 909.) Since we do not feel the trial court abused its discretion in this case, we hold that the trial court did not err in rejecting defendant\u2019s IPI instructions.\nFourth, defendant objects to the trial court\u2019s refusal to give his non-IPI instruction on \u201cintent to possess.\u201d Prior to the trial court\u2019s rejection of defendant\u2019s instruction, the court had accepted a number of the State\u2019s instructions (People\u2019s Instructions 11 \u2014 14) on basically the same principle of law. \u201cIt is well established that it is not error to refuse a requested instruction that accurately states a principle of law applicable to a case, if that principle has already been covered accurately and sufficiently by another instruction given.\u201d (People v. Hughes (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 490, 500, 360 N.E.2d 1363, 1369-70. See also People v. Looney (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 404, 411, 361 N.E.2d 18, 23.) Since the trial court had already accepted a number of instructions on the same principle of law, the court did not err in rejecting defendant\u2019s non-IPI instruction.\nLastly, defendant objects to the trial court\u2019s acceptance of the State\u2019s IPI instruction on motive. (IPI Criminal No. 3.04.) IPI Criminal No. 3.04 provides:\n\u201cMotive is that which prompts a person to act. The State is not required to prove a motive for the commission of the crime charged.\u201d\nAn instruction on motive is not improper when motive is not an essential element of a crime. (People v. Hobbs (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 263, 269, 220 N.E.2d 469, 472.) Motive is not an element of the crime of unlawful possession of drugs. One must only prove knowledge and possession. (People v. Green (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 636, 641, 367 N.E.2d 1061, 1065.) Since motive is not an element of the crime of unlawful possession of drugs, the trial court did not err in accepting the State\u2019s instruction on motive.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision in this case.\nAffirmed.\nSULLIVAN, P. J., and MEJDA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE WILSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "George C. Howard, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger and Linda Dale Woloshin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADOLPHUS MOLSBY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 62648\nOpinion filed November 17, 1978.\nGeorge C. Howard, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger and Linda Dale Woloshin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0647-01", "first_page_order": 669, "last_page_order": 683 }