{ "id": 3321360, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY BURRELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Burrell", "decision_date": "1978-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 77-401", "first_page": "806", "last_page": "808", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 806" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2503724, 2506406 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0431-02", "/ill-app-3d/23/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2867451 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2663119 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531-32" }, { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2973538 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 330, "char_count": 4373, "ocr_confidence": 0.918, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.913299171967653e-08, "percentile": 0.30929621765593285 }, "sha256": "5730f2257f983fc0f0debcf4abab5092c0eb2e196feb727c1f2f91cf9545e8cb", "simhash": "1:5b0a8ab8c2663572", "word_count": 753 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:20.946597+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY BURRELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Larry Burrell appeals from a judgment of conviction of robbery upon his negotiated guilty plea and from the sentence of 2-6 years imprisonment imposed. He contends that his plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made because he was misinformed of the consequences of a refusal to accept the plea agreement.\nIn count I of the information defendant was charged with taking *3,785.35 in currency from the presence of the manager of a Barnaby\u2019s restaurant in Downers Grove \u201cby threatening the imminent use of force\u201d; and in count II \u201cby the use of force.\u201d In plea bargaining the State agreed to nolle prosse count I in exchange for a plea of guilty to count II and to recommend a sentence of 2-6 years. The trial judge included in his admonishment the statement\n\u201cThey are separate counts, but they \u2014 it looks like they all arise out of the same transaction. So, if you were found guilty on either count, they would be concurrent sentences.\u201d\nThe defendant argues that this was an erroneous statement which suggested to defendant that he could be convicted of two offenses and that he was thereby led to believe that the State was giving him the benefit of dropping the extra charge in consideration of his plea; whereas, the conviction could only be on one of the charges in any event,\n\u2022 1 It is, of course, true that the defendant could not have been-convicted of more than one offense on the basis of a single physical act. (People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977).) The judge was therefore in error in advising defendant that he could be given even a concurrent, as opposed to a consecutive sentence, if he went to trial and was convicted.\nThe error, however, in our view does not require reversal. The defendant\u2019s counsel in his motion to withdraw his plea in the trial court argued only that the sentence was excessive and did not take into account defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation; and the defendant himself urged that he be given a lighter sentence because his wife was on welfare and he could be employed at *400 a week. The claim that the plea was involuntary was made for the first time on appeal. He has therefore waived the issue. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 604. See also, e.g., People v. Stojetz, 46 Ill. App. 3d 205, 208 (1977).\nIn the reply brief of defendant\u2019s appellate counsel we are asked for the first time to relax the rule of waiver on the premise trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel because the issue was not raised in the trial court; and because the defendant claims that he was unaware prior to the appeal that the court\u2019s advice was erroneous. We cannot agree. The admonishment does not amount to plain error on this record nor suggest that the waiver should be excused as a matter of fundamental fairness. Defendant was fully advised by the court of the minimum and maximum sentences he could receive; that the prosecutor would recommend a single sentence of 2-6 years, which he did; he agreed, and the bargain was kept. The defendant has not shown that the request for the withdrawal of his plea is based either upon a misapprehension of the law or the facts which led him to plead guilty (see People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 531-32 (1952)) or that it is necessary to permit the withdrawal to correct a manifest injustice. (See People v. Linden, 27 Ill. App. 3d 45, 48 (1975); People v. Dye, 23 Ill. App. 3d 431, 433-34 (1974).) The judge\u2019s remarks about concurrent sentences in the context of a full and complete admonishment cannot be deemed to have induced the plea of guilty. In fact the record suggests that the defendant sought leave to withdraw his plea of guilty because he was disappointed that he was not placed on probation. However, unfulfilled expectations of that nature do not form a basis for withdrawal of a plea voluntarily made. People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 532 (1952).\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWOODWARD and NASH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Robinson and Alan D. Goldberg, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY BURRELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 77-401\nOpinion filed December 6, 1978.\nMary Robinson and Alan D. Goldberg, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJ. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton, for the People." }, "file_name": "0806-01", "first_page_order": 828, "last_page_order": 830 }