{ "id": 3313971, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT TRUMBULL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Trumbull", "decision_date": "1978-12-11", "docket_number": "No. 78-12", "first_page": "262", "last_page": "265", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 262" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305750 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3410399 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 866", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3406634 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5625609 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2813975 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 N.E.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461953 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S. Ct. 1603", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 L. Ed. 2d 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 956", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12161026, 12160898, 12160932, 12160867, 12161000, 12160876, 12160943, 12160976, 12160887, 12160914, 12160855, 12160955, 12160861 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0956-13", "/us/430/0956-06", "/us/430/0956-08", "/us/430/0956-03", "/us/430/0956-12", "/us/430/0956-04", "/us/430/0956-09", "/us/430/0956-11", "/us/430/0956-05", "/us/430/0956-07", "/us/430/0956-01", "/us/430/0956-10", "/us/430/0956-02" ] }, { "cite": "346 N.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2716147 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404489 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181032 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 534, "char_count": 8519, "ocr_confidence": 0.873, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0105706383114611e-07, "percentile": 0.542039709651026 }, "sha256": "f9b0c93f8e2f8d1f0d649431bc4e4b429d2bd940cbd69cefe677e583ede3d338", "simhash": "1:611f34ccb3c59952", "word_count": 1382 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:17:27.014484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT TRUMBULL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Robert Trumbull, was found guilty of the offense of battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 3) in a bench trial and sentenced to 90 days in the House of Corrections.\nComplainant, Tad Pickens, testified that on September 26, 1977 at about 12:30 a.m. he was walking in the vicinity of 3133 West Roosevelt Road, Chicago, Illinois. Complainant met and walked with an acquaintance known as \u201cJap.\u201d At this time, defendant walked up to him, pushed him in the chest, and brandished a knife. Defendant said only, \u201cI want to see you\u201d and then slashed Pickens\u2019 left cheek with the knife. Pickens also alleged that defendant took money that defendant claimed Pickens owed him. Pickens ran home, called the police, and subsequently accompanied the police to defendant\u2019s home.\nOfficer Carano testified that he contacted Pickens pursuant to his complaint of an armed robbery. At defendant\u2019s apartment, Carano and his partner arrested defendant and advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602. According to Officer Carano, after being advised of his rights, defendant made a voluntary statement that he had been involved in a fight with Pickens, that he did not take any money, and that he had no knife. Defendant explained that he cut Pickens\u2019 face when he punched him while wearing a ring.\nDefendant testified that he met Pickens walking down the street at about 12:30 a.m. on September 26, 1977. They began to quarrel. Defendant claimed Pickens had a broken pop bottle behind his back and attempted to cut him with the bottle. Defendant then hit Pickens cutting Pickens\u2019 face with his ring.\nOn cross-examination the prosecutor asked defendant if he ever mentioned Pickens\u2019 broken bottle at any time during his post-arrest statement to Investigator Carano. Defendant testified that he did not mention the broken bottle to Carano.\nHenrietta Trumbull, defendant\u2019s mother, also testified and upon recross-examination claimed that her son did tell Carano that Pickens had a broken bottle in his hand.\nAt this point, the State recalled Officer Carano and completed impeachment regarding the broken bottle. Carano said that defendant made no mention of the bottle in his post-arrest statement.\nDuring closing argument and rebuttal, the State commented upon defendant\u2019s failure to tell the police Pickens possessed a broken bottle. The prosecutor urged that defendant\u2019s credibility had been impeached by not telling this exculpatory story before trial.\nOn appeal defendant contends that the State improperly: (1) cross-examined defendant regarding his failure to mention the bottle; (2) introduced Carano\u2019s testimony of defendant\u2019s post-arrest silence; and (3) commented upon same in closing arguments all in contravention of the rule enunciated in Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240.\nWe find Doyle distinguishable from the instant case and affirm the trial court.\nIn Doyle the United States Supreme Court held that due process precludes the state from impeaching defendant\u2019s exculpatory story offered for the first time at trial by cross-examination on his failure to offer that explanation to police as an arrestee advised of his Miranda rights. The court found that under these circumstances silence is \u201cinsoluably ambiguous\u201d since it may constitute an invocation of the arrestee\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence rather than a tacit admission of no defense to incriminating circumstances. The Doyle court felt Miranda warnings contain an implied assurance that an arrestee\u2019s silence cannot be used to jeopardize his chances at trial or destroy strategies saved for trial.\nThe crucial distinction in the instant case is that defendant did not remain silent after arrested and advised of his rights. Instead, in response to a general question from Officer Carano as to his account of the incident, defendant gave a full and meaningful response.\nThere has been concern as to whether Doyle overrules prior Illinois cases holding that where an arrestee does not remain completely silent, his failure to offer an exculpatory story to the police may be used for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., People v. Queen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 560, 310 N.E.2d 166; People v. Allen (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 619, 346 N.E.2d 486; cert. denied (1977), 430 U.S. 956, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806, 97 S. Ct. 1603; People v. Kent (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 523, 305 N.E.2d 42.\nA thorough review of the Illinois decisions subsequent to Doyle convinces us that this rule has continuing vitality. In People v. Robinson (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 447, 358 N.E.2d 43, the court intimated this line of cases was still good law but distinguished that situation from Doyle. Several other cases, however, expressly reaffirm the rule. People v. Henson (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 42, 373 N.E.2d 852; People v. Szabo (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 866, 371 N.E.2d 117; People v. Eubanks (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 492, 371 N.E.2d 92.\nDefendant was confronted with allegations that might have supported his arrest and prosecution for the felonies of aggravated battery and armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 4(b)(1) (knife), 18 \u2014 2 (robbery at knife-point)). In his statement to police he made exculpatory claims that he neither possessed a knife nor robbed complainant. He further alleged that he cut complainant when he punched Pickens with his \u201cring hand.\u201d Under these circumstances it would clearly have been logical and expected that defendant mention Pickens\u2019 alleged provocative attempt to cut him with a broken bottle in order to negate all criminal liability.\nDefendant was properly impeached both as to his omission of mentioning the bottle in his post-arrest statement and as to the inconsistency between his account of his post-arrest statement and his mother\u2019s account. Officer Carano was properly recalled to complete this impeachment and we also find there was no error committed in the State\u2019s closing arguments pertaining to legitimate inferences flowing from such impeachment of defendant\u2019s credibility. People v. Queen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 560, 310 N.E.2d 166; People v. Mitchell (1975), 35 Ill. App. 3d 151, 341 N.E.2d 153.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Robinson (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 447, 358 N.E.2d 43, is misplaced. Robinson is distinguishable from the instant case because there defendant expressly invoked his right to remain silent after making a partial statement to the police. Robinson was arrested with a \u201csmoking gun\u201d in his hand and informed of his rights. He told police, \u201cI know my rights. I did it, but I\u2019m not going to tell you why.\u201d At trial defendant claimed he had acted in self-defense. Cross-examination by the State concerning his failure to tell police this exculpatory story was held to be error.\n\u201c[A] person under arrest does not have to refrain from saying anything in order to preserve his fifth amendment rights. It is his privilege to stop at any point during custodial interrogation to assert his rights. By telling the police that he shot the deceased, the defendant was merely stating the obvious, and he did not waive or forfeit all his fifth amendment rights by this admission.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 44 Ill. App. 3d 447, 449, 358 N.E.2d 43, 45.\nIn the present case it was clear that defendant did not invoke his fifth amendment rights but chose to give a lengthy explanation of his account of the incident to police. While his privilege against self-incrimination was not inextricably waived, it could only be invoked by defendant\u2019s positive affirmation or assertion. There is no evidence that defendant invoked his right to silence after his initial waiver via his statement. Accordingly, the rule in Robinson is inapplicable.\nFor the aforementioned reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcGLOON and O\u2019CONNOR, JJ., concur.\nThis opinion was prepared by Justice Buckley while assigned to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Timothy P. O\u2019Neill and Joseph Ignatius Cronin, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Pamela L. Gray, and Carol A. Kearney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT TRUMBULL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-12\nOpinion filed December 11, 1978.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Timothy P. O\u2019Neill and Joseph Ignatius Cronin, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Pamela L. Gray, and Carol A. Kearney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0262-01", "first_page_order": 284, "last_page_order": 287 }