{ "id": 3313441, "name": "AUGUST H. SKOGLUND COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "August H. Skoglund Co. v. Department of Transportation", "decision_date": "1978-12-12", "docket_number": "Nos. 76-1361, 76-1655 cons.", "first_page": "276", "last_page": "280", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 276" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313175 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 N.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2841383 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2514487 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/17/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5381073 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436512 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496708 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 913", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2961947 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 1035", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2610829 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/1035-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 545, "char_count": 10602, "ocr_confidence": 0.874, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5084102688875515e-07, "percentile": 0.8102426048777361 }, "sha256": "d07cadfb7c9096d26d9f3631ea91a7382be55baa0a0443ccf862c942b1e6b73e", "simhash": "1:9bb799bfbf65ff9f", "word_count": 1623 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:17:27.014484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AUGUST H. SKOGLUND COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Illinois Department of Transportation to prequalify plaintiff as an eligible bidder on highway construction contracts. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings and granted mandamus, ordering defendant immediately to prequalify plaintiff. Defendant appeals.\nThe issues presented for review are (1) whether the trial court had authority to grant a writ of mandamus, (2) whether the trial court erred in entering judgment on pleadings, and (3) whether defendant\u2019s prequalification of plaintiff for the period ending July 31,1978, allegedly to comply with the court\u2019s order, renders this matter moot.\nWe reverse and remand.\nIn August 1973 August H. Skoglund Co. received notice from the Department of Transportation that plaintiff\u2019s existing prequalification rating for the period ending July 31, 1974, had been cancelled. On May 24,1974, plaintiff submitted a new application for prequalification for the period ending July 31, 1975, and the Department of Transportation notified plaintiff that this application was denied. At plaintiff\u2019s request a hearing was held on November 21, 1975, before John H. Long, a Department of Transportation hearing officer, to permit plaintiff to submit additional information to supplement plaintiff\u2019s May 24, 1974, application for prequalification. The following facts were adduced at the hearing: Frank Pantaleo had purchased the August H. Skoglund Co. in 1966. Pantaleo testified that he resigned as Skoglund\u2019s president on September 23, 1967; since that time Howard Grom has been Skoglund\u2019s president. Pantaleo testified that Grom received no salary as president until 1974 when he was paid *200 a week. Pantaleo also testified that as chief operating officer of Skoglund, Pantaleo received from Skoglund a salary and various bonuses every year since 1966.\nPantaleo\u2019s income tax returns and Skoglund\u2019s corporate records for the years 1968-1975 were examined at the hearing. The hearing officer found that the information in the tax returns and corporate records differed significantly from statements made by Pantaleo, both in Skoglund\u2019s application and at the hearing. The corporate records indicate that Howard Grom was never recorded as Skoglund\u2019s president, nor did he ever receive any salary from the company. Hearing Officer Long concluded that Pantaleo attempted to \u201cconceal\u201d and \u201cmisrepresent\u201d his position as chief executive officer with Skoglund and the amount of compensation he received. On April 16,1976, plaintiff was notified that its application for prequalification was denied, citing violations of the Department\u2019s instructions which prohibit filing of false information and require disclosure of officers and directors.\nOn May 14,1976, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review and for a writ of mandamus to compel defendant to prequalify plaintiff. The parties then stipulated to the dismissal of the count for administrative review. After defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the petition for mandamus was denied, defendant filed an answer alleging the prequalification application was denied on the basis that plaintiff intentionally submitted false information.\nOn October 4, 1976, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion and granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court thereupon issued a writ of mandamus commanding defendant immediately to prequalify plaintiff. After plaintiff filed a motion for a rule to show cause, the Department issued a prequalification certificate dated November 18, 1976, for the period expiring July 31, 1977. The Department subsequently approved plaintiff\u2019s prequalification application for the period ending July 31,1978, and issued a new certificate.\nI\nPlaintiff contends that it complied with the rules of the Illinois Department of Transportation which provides for the agency to issue a prequalification certificate; thus the court had authority to issue the writ of mandamus. Mandamus will lie to command performance of an official act which is purely ministerial. (Corn Belt Bank v. Cellini (4th Dist. 1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1039, 310 N.E.2d 470.) However, mandamus will not lie to command performance of an act predicated upon an exercise of discretion. (See People ex rel. Boddington v. Robinson (4th Dist. 1976), 34 Ill. App. 3d 913, 915, 341 N.E.2d 1.) Thus the question is whether the issuance of a prequalification certificate by the Department of Transportation is ministerial or a matter of discretion.\nUnder sections 5 and 6 of the Illinois Purchasing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 127, pars. 132.5 and 132.6), the rules and regulations adopted by the Department of Transportation may require that prospective bidders be prequalified to determine their responsibility. After examining the \u201cInstructions for Prequalification of Contractors\u201d published by the Department of Transportation, it is apparent the Department has authority to determine whether a prospective bidder has complied with the Department\u2019s rules. However, once the prospective bidder has complied with the rules, the act of issuing the certificate is ministerial and the Department can be compelled by mandamus to issue a certificate. If petitioner establishes its strict and complete compliance with the Department\u2019s rules, mandamus should issue. Solomon v. City of Evanston (1st Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 782, 331 N.E.2d 380.\nII\nThe Department\u2019s \u201cInstructions for Prequalification of Contractors\u201d provide that a denial of prequalification \u201cshall be issued\u201d when a contractor submits a false statement. Defendant\u2019s answer alleged that plaintiff\u2019s prequalification was denied because plaintiff filed false statements in its application and at the subsequent hearing. In moving for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff admits the truth of the facts alleged in defendant\u2019s answer. Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 543, 553, 359 N.E.2d 113.\nGranting judgment on the pleadings is proper only where the court can determine the relative rights of the parties solely from the language of the pleadings. (Johnson v. City of Evanston (1st Dist. 1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 419, 423, 350 N.E.2d 70.) However, if examination of the pleadings discloses any issues of fact, evidence should be taken to resolve the issue, and judgment on the pleadings may not be entered. (Affiliated Realty & Mortgage Co. v. Jursich (1st Dist. 1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 146, 308 N.E.2d 118.) Whether, as defendant contends, plaintiff filed false statements in its application and at the hearing raises a genuine issue of fact to be resolved at an evidentiary hearing, and the court should not have entered judgment on the pleadings.\nIll\nPlaintiff contends that this case is moot because its prequalification certificate expired on July 31, 1977, and that defendant approved plaintiff\u2019s new prequalification application and issued a certificate for the period ending July 31, 1978. Defendant contends that it has, at all times, maintained an adversary position in this case and claims that it issued the certificate for the period ending July 31,1978, only pursuant to the belief that to do otherwise would violate the writ of mandamus.\nIn the case at bar it appears the Department, in issuing the certificate expiring July 31, 1978, did not voluntarily waive its position. Defendant issued the certificate expiring July 31, 1977, only after motions for a stay of mandamus were denied, and plaintiff filed a motion for a rule to show cause against the Department. Accompanying the certificate expiring July 31,1977, issued by the Department was a letter dated November 12,1976, which read:\n\u201c[T]he Certificate is issued pursuant to Judge Berg\u2019s order and is contingent upon resolution of the pending litigation. If the Department should prove successful in that litigation the Certificate will be immediately withdrawn.\u201d\nThus the Department\u2019s belief that the court\u2019s order compelled issuance of the certificate for the period expiring July 31, 1978, was not without merit.\nFurthermore, we note that all prospective bidders for State highway construction contracts are required to be prequalified by the Department. Since prequalification certificates are issued for only one-year periods, to hold this case moot would preclude the Department from obtaining appellate review of a court order compelling issuance. In In Re Estate of Brooks (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 361, 365, 205 N.E.2d 435, and People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz (1952), 411 Ill. 618, 622, 104 N.E.2d 769, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an exception to the mootness rule exists in circumstances which are likely to recur, and because of the short duration of the actions involved, they would ordinarily become moot before the question could be reviewed by an appellate court. For these reasons this case should not be deemed moot.\nWe reverse the order of the trial court and remand for a hearing consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTAMOS, P. J., and BROWN, J., concur.\nRule 1.3 of the Rules of the Department of Transportation requires that all prospective bidders on construction contracts be prequalified. The requirement of prequalification and the authority to prescribe rul\u00e9s for granting such status is set forth in sections 5 and 6 of the Illinois Purchasing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 127, pars. 132.5 and 132.6).\nThe delay between May 24, 1974, and November 21, 1975, is attributed to the pendency of another lawsuit between the parties based on the Department\u2019s cancellation of plaintiff\u2019s prequalification certificate in August 1973 for the period ending July 31,1974. The prior litigation resulted in a voluntary nonsuit by plaintiff.\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) defines ministerial as: \u201cThat which is done under the authority of a superior; opposed to judicial; that which involves obedience to instructions, but demands no special discretion, judgment, or skill.\nJustice Brown participated in this case during his assignment to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (George H. Klumpner, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.", "Jerome N. Zurla, of Chicago (John J. O\u2019Toole, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AUGUST H. SKOGLUND COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNos. 76-1361, 76-1655 cons.\nOpinion filed December 12, 1978.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (George H. Klumpner, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.\nJerome N. Zurla, of Chicago (John J. O\u2019Toole, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0276-01", "first_page_order": 298, "last_page_order": 302 }