{ "id": 3311185, "name": "REVANNA SKINDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LICENSE APPEAL COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Skinder v. License Appeal Commission", "decision_date": "1978-12-27", "docket_number": "No. 77-1519", "first_page": "410", "last_page": "415", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 410" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1585450 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/118/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2612507 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2672755, 2668228 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0978-01", "/ill-app-3d/7/0978-02" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 12202, "ocr_confidence": 0.91, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.09302897582059803 }, "sha256": "897c34a3b4ab59389f63eabdb437fdb1a77ae461c07596f892d06de399aa8ecf", "simhash": "1:6cdbff52060ca799", "word_count": 2007 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:17:27.014484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "REVANNA SKINDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LICENSE APPEAL COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Revanna Skinder, owner of a tavern in Chicago, is seeking appellate review (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.) of an adverse trial court decision in a proceeding to review decisions of the local Liquor Control Commissioner (the Commissioner) and the License Appeal Commission, which revoked her liquor license.\nTwo Chicago police officers testified before the Commissioner. Officer Robert Walsh testified that, accompanied by three other officers, he investigated a complaint about male go-go dancers at the plaintiff\u2019s tavern as well as whether there was an admission policy barring males which might be a civil rights violation. He stated that he entered the premises freely, and that inside were a bar, tables, pinball games, and a stage. Walsh said that 50 or 60 people, mostly women, were there, and that the male go-go dancers were performing 3 to 4 feet away from the audience, which Officer Walsh said was \u201cloud.\u201d\nOfficer Walsh testified that the male go-go dancer he later arrested was clad in a G-string, and gyrated on the stage for about 15 minutes, moving his crotch area, arms, and lower extremities back and forth toward the people at the bar. The dancer then began to dance on the bar near Officer Walsh, and, as women at the bar reached for him, he danced and gyrated about in front of one of the women who was at the bar with her husband. When the dancer bent down and kissed her, she reached up and put her hand into his G-string. At this point the officers made their arrests. Officer Walsh arrested the dancer for lewd conduct and being the inmate of a disorderly house, the plaintiff for keeping a disorderly house, and the patron who reached into the dancer\u2019s G-string for being the inmate of a disorderly house.\nOn cross-examination, Officer Walsh testified that he was standing about 3 feet from the woman patron, who was seated next to her husband, when she reached into the male dancer\u2019s G-string. He stated that he saw no money in her hand before she reached for the dancer, and that the dancer\u2019s crotch area was covered at all times.\nOfficer Richard Zielinski also testified before the Commissioner. Although his testimony tended to corroborate Officer Walsh\u2019s statements, it departed from Officer Walsh\u2019s in some respects. Officer Zielinski described the male dancer as nude except for the G-string, and said the dancer walked along the bar exhibiting his body to the women there. The dancer stopped before one woman, and crouched down with his G-string about a foot from her face. The woman moved her head forward, and then back, and then put her hand into the G-string.\nOn cross-examination, Officer Zielinski admitted that he had appeared in court on this matter, and that in a pretrial conversation he had said that what he observed occurs continually in restaurants which feature female belly dancers. Officer Zielinski also testified that during the same conversation he said he did not see the woman patron\u2019s hand touch the dancer\u2019s genital area, and that the dancer\u2019s genital area was covered throughout his performance. Officer Zielinski confirmed that the woman patron\u2019s husband was sitting next to her at the bar. He stated that the dancer\u2019s G-string was essentially an athletic supporter with a string around it, and that he did not know if the woman had any money in her hand.\nAlso appearing before the Commissioner were the plaintiff-licensee, and three patrons, including the woman who placed her hand in the dancer\u2019s G-string and was arrested. This woman testified that she entered the establishment with her husband and two women friends. When the dancer came across the bar, her husband handed her a dollar. As she reached up to stick the bill in the side of the dancer\u2019s bikini, she was arrested. She described the dancer\u2019s outfit as a long, black vest with fringes and black leather bikini underpants. She denied ever touching the dancer\u2019s genitals or placing her hand in his pants, and said that he never removed his pants or exposed his genitals. She described his dancing as \u201cdisco, modern dancing, like go-go dancing,\u201d in which the dancer moved his arms, legs, and body. She also testified that the State\u2019s Attorney dropped all charges against her, the dancer and the plaintiff-licensee. On cross-examination, she stated that although a G-string is more revealing than bikini pants, the dancer in her opinion was wearing bikini pants. She denied that she touched the dancer, and also denied that the dancer kissed or touched her.\nOne of the arrested woman\u2019s friends, who said she was sitting next to her, described the dancer as doing \u201cgo-go dancing\u201d \u2014 moving his whole body. She corroborated her friend\u2019s testimony about the dancer\u2019s actions, the lack of interaction between her friend and the dancer, and her friend\u2019s attempt to put a dollar into his clothing. She said her friend could not even reach the dancer\u2019s pants because of his height. The arrested woman\u2019s other friend then gave essentially the same version of the incident, describing the dancer\u2019s actions as \u201cmodern dancing,\u201d and his clothing as \u201cpanties.\u201d\nThe plaintiff-licensee testified that the male dancer \u201cwas dressed very exotically with * * \u00b0 a very shiny black costume with fringes and 000 black leather bikinis.\u201d She said he never removed those bikinis or acted in a lewd manner, and added that she did not observe any of the arrested patron\u2019s alleged actions.\nThe Commissioner found that, through her agent the male dancer, the plaintiff-licensee \u201cknowingly committed acts of lewd conduct on the licensed premises,\u201d in violation of chapter 192, section 192-7 of the Chicago Municipal Code. Based on this finding, the Commissioner issued an order revoking the liquor license. The plaintiff filed a petition for a trial before the License Appeal Commission, but after a hearing and review of the record, the original order of revocation was found to be \u201csupported by substantial evidence\u201d and the motion was denied. The plaintiff-licensee then filed a complaint for judicial review of the administrative proceedings; the circuit court affirmed the orders of the local Liquor Control Commissioner and the License Appeal Commission. This appeal followed.\nAt issue here is whether the findings of the local Liquor Control Commissioner were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because we conclude that those findings were not supported by substantial evidence, we reverse the decision of the trial court affirming the revocation of the plaintiff-licensee\u2019s license, and vacate the orders revoking her liquor license. In view of this determination, it is unnecessary to consider the plaintiff\u2019s other objections to the proceedings instituted against her.\nChicago\u2019s Municipal Code provides:\n\u201cAny person who shall commit any indecent, lewd or filthy act in any public place in the city; * \u00b0 \u00b0 who shall make any obscene gesture in the presence of other persons; or, who shall make any overture of lewdness tending to pervert the morals of any person, upon or in the public ways or other public places or in any public conveyance in the city, is hereby declared to be a common nuisance and shall be fined not to exceed two hundred dollars for each offense.\u201d (Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code 1977, ch. 192, par. 192-97.)\nThe evidence presented to the Liquor License Control Commissioner in this case was insufficient to support a finding of a violation of this ordinance. It is undisputed that the male dancer put on a vigorous performance \u2014 gyrating, moving his entire body along the bar close to the female patrons. Yet the female patrons merely characterized his actions as \u201cmodern\u201d or \u201cdisco\u201d dancing, and even one of the arresting officers said that what he observed was common among female belly dancers. The other arresting officer, Robert Walsh, in describing the dancer\u2019s movements only stated that he was gyrating about the stage and moving his crotch area and his lower extremities back and forth toward the people sitting at the bar. It is also undisputed that while the dancer wore a rather scanty outfit, he never removed his G-string or bikini, or exposed himself to anyone. The testimony as to whether the woman patron actually placed her hand inside his bikini, or only attempted to do so, or whether she was merely attempting to give him a tip with a dollar bill in a manner common to audiences in establishments presenting belly dancers is conflicting. Even if the testimony that the woman placed her hand in the dancer\u2019s bikini is believed, there still is no evidence as to what part of the bikini she touched except for Officer Zielinski\u2019s testimony that she did not touch the dancer\u2019s genital area.\nIn short, the record confirms that the male dancer was throwing himself into his performance and eliciting some response from an appreciative, and predominately female, audience. But there is no testimony even suggesting that he removed any part of his clothing, or simulated any sexual act, or even that he danced in a fashion any more sexually suggestive than do dancers in many nightclubs or discotheques. Indeed, if anything, the record indicates that his gyrating movements while dancing were more similar to common and accepted \u201cdisco\u201d or \u201cgo-go\u201d or \u201cmodern\u201d dancing, than to any other form of dance. And this sort of record does not justify a finding that his actions violated the ordinance in question; otherwise, many members of reputable dance companies presenting theatrical performances might well find themselves in violation of the law.\nFrom the record, then, we can conclude that the dancer was doing his job, and that the police officers did not approve of whatever he was doing. But the question of exactly what he was doing that violated the ordinance remains unclear and a reviewing court cannot base a decision on conjecture. The record when viewed most favorably to the city does not contain evidence establishing a violation of the ordinance. Because there is insufficient evidence to support the findings of the local Liquor Control Commissioner (Easy Life Club, Inc. v. License Appeal Com. (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 879, 310 N.E.2d 705; Daley v. Jack\u2019s Tivoli Liquor Lounge, Inc. (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 264, 277, 254 N.E.2d 814), his decision must be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nJIGANTI, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SIMON" }, { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. It is undisputed that upon review of a decision made by an administrative agency, courts are not authorized to reweigh the evidence or to make an independent determination of facts, but are limited to a consideration of the record to determine whether the findings and conclusions of the agency are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Moriarty v. Police Board (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 978, 289 N.E.2d 32.\nIn the present case, the commissioner had before him testimony that a male employee of the licensed premises clad only in a G-string was dancing on the bar. The dance was one in which the dancer moved his pelvic area and his lower extremities back and forth towards the patrons who were seated at the bar. As the dancer was performing his gyrations in front of a woman patron, he bent down and kissed her. The dancer lowered his body so that his G-string was right in front of the patron\u2019s face. The patron then moved back and placed her hand into his G-string. The foregoing substantial evidence supports the commissioner\u2019s determination that plaintiff\u2019s agent violated the ordinance. The commission\u2019s decision was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sophia H. Hall, of Chicago, for appellant.", "William R. Quinlan, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Daniel Pascale and Henry Phillip Grass, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "REVANNA SKINDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LICENSE APPEAL COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 77-1519\nOpinion filed December 27, 1978.\nMcNAMARA, J., dissenting.\nSophia H. Hall, of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliam R. Quinlan, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Daniel Pascale and Henry Phillip Grass, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0410-01", "first_page_order": 432, "last_page_order": 437 }