{ "id": 3310358, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNOLD F. PROPER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Proper", "decision_date": "1979-01-31", "docket_number": "No. 78-111", "first_page": "250", "last_page": "255", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 250" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2896191 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 757", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2873911 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2511166 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/17/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S. Ct. 247", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 L. Ed. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 914", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6387235, 6387720, 6388013, 6387406, 6387565, 6387853, 6388177, 6386935, 6387064 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0914-03", "/us/409/0914-06", "/us/409/0914-08", "/us/409/0914-04", "/us/409/0914-05", "/us/409/0914-07", "/us/409/0914-09", "/us/409/0914-01", "/us/409/0914-02" ] }, { "cite": "282 N.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390520 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2993679 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 N.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 1062", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2789935 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 N.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857760 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937684 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2957947 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3372580 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0707-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 682, "char_count": 12888, "ocr_confidence": 0.89, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.746753462677528e-07, "percentile": 0.7078752467807968 }, "sha256": "50a9d76d0d749b88542ad4932eef36db33cabec73bf3bae32166e955fe75da04", "simhash": "1:ab0658ba5b6abd64", "word_count": 2119 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:49:10.381789+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNOLD F. PROPER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KARNS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Williamson County, defendant was convicted of the murder of his wife, Barbara A. Proper. Defendant appeals challenging the propriety of the trial court\u2019s refusal to instruct the jury on criminal capacity, voluntary intoxication and on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. In addition, defendant challenges the trial court\u2019s ruling permitting the State to re-create the murder scene in a separate courtroom.\nThe testimony at trial revealed that during the day prior to the death of Barbara A. Proper no tension or controversy existed between defendant and his wife. At approximately 2 p.m. of that day, defendant and his family went to the home of Bill Fisher, where they socialized and ate dinner. During this visit, which lasted approximately nine hours, defendant and his wife had a number of drinks. Defendant estimated that he had 12 beers before supper and one to two six-packs thereafter. On cross-examination, defendant admitted that he had previously made a statement to the police that he had had only 12 beers. Defendant testified that \u201cI guess I was drunk\u201d upon leaving the Fisher residence at 11 p.m. that evening. Bill Fisher testified that defendant had 8 to 10 beers the entire evening and appeared sober when he left. Robert Woodson, a guest at the Fisher residence, testified that when he left at 9 p.m., defendant did not appear intoxicated.\nDuring the car ride home, defendant and his wife began to argue about a *109 phone bill. The quarrel continued at home shortly after Barbara put her son to bed. Defendant stated that they did not need a telephone if they could not keep the bills down and then proceeded to rip the phone off the wall. Barbara then told defendant that she was going to take their son and live in Chicago. Apparently, she had previously left her husband for a short period of time. He asked her not to go, but she refused his request.\nDefendant was aware that he had a .45 automatic pistol in his back pocket although he could not remember how it got there. He later admitted that his prior statement to the police indicated that he had taken the gun from his dresser while his wife was putting their son to bed. He removed the gun from his pocket and pointed it at his wife to scare her. He raised the weapon waist high and it \u201cwent off.\u201d He continued to shoot the gun until all eight shots were fired. It was later determined that Barbara Proper died from the multiple gunshot wounds. After defendant saw Barbara fall in front of him, he ran out of the house and went to the police station.\nSandra Lee, the police dispatcher, testified that defendant walked into the police station at 12:15 that evening. Defendant told Ms. Lee that he had shot his wife and needed help. Defendant was crying and kept beating his hands against his head. He showed emotions ranging from anger to sadness and shouted that he \u201cdidn\u2019t mean to do it.\u201d Defendant realized that his son was still at home and asked for someone to remove him before he saw his mother. Ms. Lee was close enough to defendant to have smelled alcohol, but did not. In her judgment defendant was not intoxicated. One of the officers at the police station testified that defendant appeared to be sober.\nAt trial, the State, over the objections of defense counsel, was permitted to re-create the living room of the Proper residence in an adjoining courtroom. As part of the set, the State used the couch which was covered with blood stains and, according to defense counsel, human excrement. Both the courtroom and the living room rug were sprayed with \u201cGlade\u201d to contain what was characterized as a musty odor. In overruling defendant\u2019s objections, the trial court stated that the couch was less gruesome than the photographs already admitted into evidence; that the demonstration would be relevant to shed light on whether defendant had the requisite intent to commit murder; and that the reconstruction would aid the jury in understanding the layout of the room in which the shooting occurred. After the State rested, defense counsel chose to examine defendant in the courtroom containing the re-creation exhibit. After defendant indicated that the television and some lamps were missing, he utilized the set to recount the events of the shooting.\nAt the instruction conference, defendant tendered Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal, No. 24.02 (\u201cVoluntary Intoxication or Drugged Condition\u201d) (hereinafter IPI), IPI Criminal No. 25.02 (\u201cIssues in Defense of Voluntary Intoxication or Drugged Condition\u201d) and IPI Criminal No. 7.04 (\u201cIssues in Voluntary Manslaughter-Provocation\u201d). In refusing these instructions, the trial court stated that there was no evidence that would support a voluntary manslaughter conviction nor sufficient evidence that would support the defense of voluntary intoxication.\nThe State argues that defendant has waived any contentions of error by his failure to file a post-trial motion. Notwithstanding the general rule that the failure to proffer a post-trial motion constitutes a waiver of errors raised on appeal (People v. Hammond, 48 Ill. App. 3d 707, 362 N.E.2d 1361 (5th Dist. 1977)), we nevertheless feel compelled to give consideration to defendant\u2019s contentions to determine the existence of any possible plain error.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider evidence of defendant\u2019s insanity at the time of the commission of the offense. Apparently, defendant objects to the trial court\u2019s refusal of defense instruction No. 2 (IPI Criminal. No. 25.02), which provides in part:\n\u201cTo sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions:\n# # #\nThird: That the defendant was then capable of acting knowingly or intentionally.\u201d\nAlthough this instruction is usually submitted to the jury as part of the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication, defendant sought to introduce it to present a defense that defendant\u2019s diminished mental state prevented him from forming the requisite intent to commit murder. We note that defense counsel did not tender IPI Criminal No. 25.01 (\u201cIssues in Defense of Insanity\u201d) and apparently conceded at oral argument that defendant was not insane at the time of the offense. Nevertheless, he asserts that the jury should have been allowed to consider the possibility of defendant\u2019s insanity. While it is not clear what defendant is contending on appeal, we give him the benefit of the doubt and address the issue whether the court erred in refusing to submit the insanity defense to the jury.\nThe law is well established that in order to present the issue of an accused\u2019s insanity, the evidence must be sufficient to raise in a juror\u2019s mind a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s sanity at the time of the commission of the offense. See People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328,320 N.E.2d 321 (1974); People v. Smothers, 55 Ill. 2d 172, 302 N.E.2d 324 (1973).\nIn the present case, the record is devoid of evidence to even suggest defendant\u2019s insanity. The only evidence introduced by defendant in support of his contention was defendant\u2019s conduct in the police station following the shooting incident. The testimony reveals that defendant, in an excited state, was hitting his head with his hands and wandering around the police station. We note that in People v. Redmond the evidence that the defendant did not act \u201cnormal\u201d at the time of his arrest, along with the defendant\u2019s statement that he had \u201clost his mind,\u201d was insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s insanity. Considering defendant\u2019s grief and anger in the instant case, defendant\u2019s reaction to the shooting of his wife was not in the least unusual.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication. The rule is that in order to raise voluntary intoxication as a defense to a charge of murder so as to reduce the offense to manslaughter, the accused must show that the intoxication was so extreme as to suspend entirely the power of reason. People v. Gonzales, 40 Ill. 2d 233, 239 N.E.2d 783 (1968); People v. Smith, 26 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 325 N.E.2d 623 (4th Dist. 1975).\nThe testimony presented at trial reveals little or no evidence that defendant was so intoxicated as to negate the intent to commit murder. All of the witnesses who had observed defendant immediately prior to and following the incident testified that he had appeared sober. The only evidence supporting an intoxication defense is defendant\u2019s own proclamations that he consumed close to a case of beer and \u201cguessed\u201d that he was drunk. This testimony was contradicted, however, by defendant\u2019s prior written statement to the police that he had 12 beers during his entire visit to the Fisher residence. In addition, the transparency of defendant\u2019s defense becomes apparent when one considers defendant\u2019s coherent and detailed recollection of the events immediately prior to the shooting.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in its refusal to submit an instruction to the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The law is well settled that a manslaughter instruction tendered by a defendant must be given if there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, would reduce the crime to manslaughter. (People v. Simpson (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 497, 384 N.E.2d 373; People v. Handley, 51 Ill. 2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131 (1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 914,34 L. Ed. 2d 175,93 S. Ct. 247.) It is equally settled that such an instruction should not be submitted to the jury if the evidence clearly demonstrates that the crime was murder and there is no evidence to support a manslaughter conviction. People v. Simpson; People v. Handley.\nThe evidence in the record reveals no support for defendant\u2019s contention that a voluntary manslaughter instruction should have been given. A person commits voluntary manslaughter by the unlawful killing of an individual while under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2.) The provocation sufficient to support a reduced charge from murder to voluntary manslaughter must be such as to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person. People v. Arnold, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1043,309 N.E.2d 89 (3d Dist. 1974).\nDefendant alleges that the argument with his wife over a *109 phone bill was an adequate provocation to justify the giving of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Words between the victim and the accused, no matter how abusive or aggravating, do not constitute sufficient provocation to establish voluntary manslaughter in the absence of other serious provocation. (See People v. Curwick, 33 Ill. App. 3d 757, 338 N.E.2d 468 (3d Dist. 1975).) A careful search of the record reveals no evidence other than heated words which served to provoke defendant. It is, therefore, extreme to suggest that a quarrel about a phone bill would incite a reasonable person to such an intense passion as to commit a brutal attack with a deadly weapon. There being no evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter charge, it was proper for the trial court to refuse defendant\u2019s instruction on this matter.\nLastly, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to re-create the living room of the Proper residence in a nearby courtroom using the blood-stained couch. Although we find no Illinois authority concerning the propriety of re-creating the scene of an offense in the courtroom, it is the general rule that the admission of demonstrative evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Fair, 45 Ill. App. 3d 301, 359 N.E.2d 848 (1st Dist. 1977).\nIn the instant case, we find no abuse of discretion in permitting the State to re-create the murder scene. As stated by the trial court, the recreation set enabled the jury better to understand the events constituting the offense and evaluate defendant\u2019s contention that he lacked the intent to kill. In addition, the trial court stated that the blood-stained couch was less gruesome than the photographs of the deceased admitted into evidence. Defense counsel apparently agreed that the utilization of the couch was not prejudicial as he elected to examine defendant in the courtroom containing the living room set.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Williamson County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJONES and KUNCE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KARNS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bernard A. Paul & Associates, of Marion, for appellant.", "Robert H. Howerton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marion (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Martin N. Ashley, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNOLD F. PROPER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 78-111\nOpinion filed January 31, 1979.\nBernard A. Paul & Associates, of Marion, for appellant.\nRobert H. Howerton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marion (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Martin N. Ashley, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0250-01", "first_page_order": 272, "last_page_order": 277 }