{
  "id": 3310206,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERNEST DUKE McNEIL, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. McNeil",
  "decision_date": "1979-01-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 78-239",
  "first_page": "499",
  "last_page": "501",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:49:10.381789+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERNEST DUKE McNEIL, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn April 2,1976, two complaints were filed by the Attorney General of Illinois in the circuit court of Cook County, Municipal Department, charging defendant, Ernest Duke McNeil, with the offense of wilful failure to file Illinois State income tax returns for the years 1973 and 1974. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 120, par. 13 \u2014 1301.) The complaints alleged (1) that defendant earned sufficient income in those years to require defendant to file a return, and (2) that defendant wilfully failed to file the required return.\nOn October 20,1977, defendant moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground that they had been filed by the Attorney General in contravention of People v. Massarella (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 774, 368 N.E.2d 507. On November 23,1977, the State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County sent the following letter to the Attorney General:\n\u201cThis will acknowledge receipt of your letter of this date wherein you request my authorization for your Office to prosecute the above captioned case. Please be advised that you have such authorization effective immediately.\nAs you know, I have previously indicated to members of your staff that we will not issue a blanket request for your Office to prosecute revenue matters, and that we will review each case individually. Accordingly, I cannot ratify the \u2018earlier blanket request\u2019 that you referred to since I never agreed to it.\u201d\nPursuant to a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, on November 28,1977, the circuit court, relying upon People v. Massarella (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 774, 368 N.E.2d 507, granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nThe Massarella decision of this court was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court and reversed. (People v. Massarella (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 531, 382 N.E.2d 262.) The supreme court stated the issue before it as follows:\n\u201c[WJhether, where the State\u2019s Attorney has expressed no objection, the Attorney General may properly initiate and prosecute an action including appearing before a grand jury. If so, did the State\u2019s Attorney object here?\u201d (72 Ill. 2d 531, 535.)\nHowever, the supreme court spoke more generally to the concurrent powers of the Attorney General and the State\u2019s Attorney when the court stated:\n\u201cWe have already determined that the Attorney General may assist the State\u2019s Attorney to the extent that he may discharge all those powers of the State\u2019s Attorney at all stages in a prosecution, including the preliminary proceedings such as presentations to a grand jury, where the latter does not object.\u201d (72 Ill. 2d 531, 538-39.)\nIt is clear that the supreme court\u2019s opinion in Massarella is applicable to proceedings other than presentations to a grand jury.\nWe note initially that the record does not contain the letter referred to in the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s letter heretofore set out, but apparently the Attorney General had previously made a \u201cblanket request\u201d to prosecute criminal cases arising out of the enforcement of the revenue laws and was refused permission by the State\u2019s Attorney, who stated that each prosecution would have to be individually reviewed before consent to prosecute would be given the Attorney General. In spite of this caveat, the Attorney General initiated the prosecution at bar without affording the State\u2019s Attorney an opportunity to review the same for the purpose of deciding whether the Attorney General should be granted the authority to proceed. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and raised the propriety of the Attorney General\u2019s initiation of prosecution without authority and without the consent of the State\u2019s Attorney. The Attorney General, aware of the merit of defendant\u2019s motion, immediately wrote to the State\u2019s Attorney seeking ratification of its acts to date. Such ratification was refused as was evidenced by the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s letter which states \u201c* * * I cannot ratify the \u2018earlier blanket request\u2019 that you referred to since I never agreed to it.\u201d The record does not contain the Attorney General\u2019s letter which prompted the letter of the State\u2019s Attorney but we assume that the Attorney General not only sought authority at this juncture of the prosecution but also approval of its initiation of the prosecution, that is, ratification. The State\u2019s Attorney only gave permission as of the date of his letter and we detect a rebuke to the Attorney General, who persisted in initiating the prosecution and, when the propriety of this action was questioned, sought to have the State\u2019s Attorney reverse his position and ratify the Attorney General\u2019s conduct.\nTo allow a practice which would enable the Attorney General to initiate and maintain prosecutions without authority and subsequently seek and obtain ratification from the State\u2019s Attorney would lead to chaos and confusion and would not promote the efficient administration of justice. The posture of this record leaves this court with no other alternative but to find that the trial court properly dismissed the complaints against defendant. We, therefore, affirm.\nAffirmed.\nDOWNING and PERLIN, JJ., concur.\nDefendant did not appear or file a brief in this court.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "No appearance for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERNEST DUKE McNEIL, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 78-239\nOpinion filed January 30, 1979.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellant.\nNo appearance for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0499-01",
  "first_page_order": 521,
  "last_page_order": 523
}