{ "id": 3241665, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Harris", "decision_date": "1979-02-27", "docket_number": "No. 77-595", "first_page": "91", "last_page": "93", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 91" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 946", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5640629 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "948" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0946-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S. Ct. 1143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 L. Ed. 2d 562", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 1109", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6976, 6849, 7361, 7683, 7267, 8133, 7849, 7768, 6964, 5750, 5943, 7896, 6841 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/1109-05", "/us/429/1109-13", "/us/429/1109-04", "/us/429/1109-07", "/us/429/1109-01", "/us/429/1109-02", "/us/429/1109-09", "/us/429/1109-03", "/us/429/1109-12", "/us/429/1109-06", "/us/429/1109-11", "/us/429/1109-08", "/us/429/1109-10" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2630021 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427823 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 1033", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3328397 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/1033-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 420, "char_count": 6369, "ocr_confidence": 0.888, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.837810321910092e-08, "percentile": 0.45838502553623783 }, "sha256": "171a32377a540f41057e5ed1740712242b9c2b63ceecc1b76faab0bc506f209b", "simhash": "1:bb4390cc52483477", "word_count": 1048 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:51:15.332188+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a term of 4 to 8 years. He appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it failed to suppress his confession.\nOn August 6, 1976, two men with nylons pulled over their faces, armed with a revolver, robbed the Disco Gas Station in Rockford. An off-duty police officer observed the two leave the scene and pursued them. He captured Timothy Chapman, one of the two subjects. Chapman subsequently implicated the defendant.\nAt 9:45 the next morning the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station. At approximately 10:45 a.m., Officers Anderson and Salomone began to interview the defendant. They read the defendant his rights from a \u201crights\u2019 waiver\u201d form and ascertained that the d\u00e9fendant understood each of his rights. When the officers asked the defendant to sign the \u201crights\u2019 waiver,\u201d the defendant responded that although he understood his rights and would talk to the officers, he did not want to sign anything. The defendant initially denied any involvement in the robbery. The officers changed the subject and spoke to the defendant about his \u201clife style,\u201d his involvement with drugs, his past record and the possibility that he could receive treatment for his drug problem. The defendant admitted that he was a heroin addict, and the officers told him that \u201ca number of programs\u201d were available to help with his drug problem and that, \u201cthe only way this type of a program would ever be effective would be if [the defendant] was willing to turn his life around and take advantage of what was available.\u201d\nAfter an hour and 50 minutes, the defendant told the officers that he \u201crealized his problems,\u201d wanted help, and for that reason would tell the truth about the armed robbery. The officers told the defendant that before he said anything, they wanted to once again advise him of his constitutional rights. A \u201crights\u2019 waiver\u201d form was read to the defendant, and this time he signed it. The officers told the defendant that his drug problem would be noted in their report, would be sent to the State\u2019s Attorney, and that the court would help him with his drug problem. The officers also told the defendant that an armed robbery conviction carried with it a mandatory sentence to a term in the penitentiary and erroneously stated that the defendant, \u201ccould do 1 to more years\u201d on the armed robbery charge; armed robbery, in fact, carries a minimum term of 4 years. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 18.2; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(c)(2).\nThe defendant contends that his confession was involuntary. To support this conclusion, he relies in part on his testimony that he had injected heroin just 10 hours before the interrogation began and had neither slept nor eaten for two days prior to his arrest. However, the defendant contradicted his testimony regarding the use of heroin, for at another point he testified that he had last used heroin two days before he was arrested. Under cross-examination, he admitted that he had read the written confession before he signed it. Further, the officers testified that throughout their interview with the defendant, the defendant was attentive and never appeared to be \u201cnodding off,\u201d or \u201cstaring into space.\u201d Under these circumstances, the trial court was not bound to find that the defendant\u2019s confession was involuntary by reason of drug intoxication. See, e.g., People v. Jones (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 1033.\nThe defendant also argues that the interrogating officers\u2019 representations regarding the availability of drug treatment programs and their misstatement of the minimum sentence for armed robbery amounted to broken promises of leniency which prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. We disagree. At the outset, we observe that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the officers were engaging in a subterfuge, or intentional misrepresentation. While it is true that the defendant was not eligible for sentencing and treatment under the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 120.1 et seq.; People v. McCoy (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 40), he has made no showing that he will be denied access to other drug abuse programs operated within or in conjunction with the Department of Corrections. Although the officers discussed the defendant\u2019s need for help with his drug problem, they testified that they made no promises to the defendant and, in fact, informed him that an armed robbery conviction would mandate a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary. While the officers misstated the minimum sentence for armed robbery, they never advised the defendant that he would receive the minimum sentence, and the defendant did not even mention the officers\u2019 statement that the defendant would \u201cdo 1 to more years,\u201d when he testified at the suppression hearing. Thus, there is nothing in the record which indicates that the officers\u2019 statement about the prison term was a material factor in the defendant\u2019s decision to waive his rights and confess. The defendant was 21 years old and it is clear from his prior record of conviction that he was no stranger to the criminal justice system. Under these circumstances, we cannot hold that the trial court\u2019s finding that the defendant\u2019s confession was freely and voluntarily given was against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Houston (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 695, cert. denied sub nom. Gibson v. Illinois (1977), 429 U.S. 1109, 51 L. Ed. 2d 562, 97 S. Ct. 1143. Compare People v. Carroll (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 946, 948 (interrogating officer\u2019s statement that if defendant confessed, \u201cthere was no reason why we couldn\u2019t recommend a low bond,\u201d held not to render subsequent confession involuntary).\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nGUILD, P. J., and LINDBERG, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary Robinson and Mark Schuster, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Daniel Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 77-595\nOpinion filed February 27, 1979.\nMary Robinson and Mark Schuster, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDaniel Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0091-01", "first_page_order": 113, "last_page_order": 115 }