{ "id": 5578916, "name": "MARIA LABOY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. U. S. REFRIGERATION SALES & SERVICES CORPORATION et al., Defendants.-(THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, Intervenor-Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "Laboy v. U. S. Refrigeration Sales & Services Corp.", "decision_date": "1979-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 77-1638", "first_page": "462", "last_page": "465", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 462" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1075", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1079" }, { "page": "1079" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3366599 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1038" }, { "page": "1038" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953913 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464462 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958233 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0439-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 439, "char_count": 8066, "ocr_confidence": 0.912, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.16218088390481453 }, "sha256": "77f829d14249daa849a2a9200e5bddc2de6a984d416af93d241fc5593a7396cd", "simhash": "1:cfffc62f674adbe6", "word_count": 1295 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:20.751997+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARIA LABOY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. U. S. REFRIGERATION SALES & SERVICES CORPORATION et al., Defendants.\u2014(THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, Intervenor-Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Illinois Department of Public Aid (Department) brings this appeal from orders of the circuit court adjudicating welfare liens asserted by the Department against plaintiffs, and denying the Department\u2019s motion that said adjudication be vacated. On appeal, the Department contends that the court\u2019s adjudication order was an abuse of discretion and should be reversed.\nThe following facts are pertinent to the disposition of this appeal.\nPlaintiffs filed complaints alleging that on September 8, 1973, they sustained severe and permanent injuries as a result of an accident caused by defendants\u2019 negligence. Plaintiff Maria LaBoy accordingly requested a judgment against defendants in the amount of *1,000,000. Nicholas, her husband, and Miguel LaBoy, her son, and a minor, requested judgments of *50,000. Prior to trial, however, settlements were reached between them and defendants in the respective amounts of *244,000, *45,000 and *6,000.\nMaria and Nicholas LaBoy petitioned the circuit court to adjudicate welfare liens filed against them by the Department. The agreed amounts of these liens were *5,737.14 against Maria, *6,752.04 against Nicholas and *631.55 against Miguel. At a hearing on plaintiffs\u2019 petitions, plaintiffs\u2019 attorney stated that attorneys\u2019 fees of 331/3% of any settlements had been agreed to by adult plaintiffs Maria and Nicholas and that fees of 25% had been fixed by the probate division of the Circuit Court of Cook County for the minor Miguel. Their attorney asserted that the settlement funds were made available through the efforts of plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys, and that the Department\u2019s liens on those funds should be reduced by the appropriate percentages representing their fees. Following the hearing, on June 16, 1977, the circuit court entered a \u201cfinal order of dismissal and adjudication\u201d of the Department\u2019s liens. The court ordered, over the Department\u2019s objection, that the liens against Maria and Nicholas LaBoybe adjudicated, respectively, from *5,737.14 and *6,752.04 to *3,825, and *4,502, each adjudicated amount \u201crepresenting a reduction of 33 1/3% to cover the attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of the pro rata share of the attorneys\u2019 fees allocable to the collection of that share of the settlement.\u201d The lien against Miguel was ordered similarly reduced from *631.35 to *474, representing a 25% reduction to cover attorneys\u2019 fees. The Department\u2019s motion to vacate this order was denied, and the Department then brought this appeal.\nOpinion\nThe Department contends that the trial court\u2019s order reducing its liens against plaintiffs, as well as the court\u2019s refusal to vacate that order, were improper and should be reversed. The liens were reduced by the court under the terms of section 11 \u2014 22 of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 23, par. 11 \u2014 22), which states in pertinent part that:\n\u201cThe Illinois Department shall have a charge upon all claims, demands and causes of action for injuries to an applicant for or recipient of financial aid 990 for the total amount of medical assistance provided the recipient from the time of injury to the date of recovery upon such claim, demand or cause of action.\n# * #\nThe court may approve the settlement of any claim, demand or cause of action either before or after a verdict, * * *. The court may determine what portion of the recovery shall be paid to the injured person and what portion shall be paid to the Illinois Department, the local governmental unit or county having a charge against the recovery.\u201d\nThe Department does not attempt to argue with the rule, cited by plaintiffs, that section 11 \u2014 22 \u201cpermit[s] trial courts to exercise sound discretion in adjudicating charges claimed by the Department of Public Aid and to apportion any recovery between the Department and the plaintiff, taking into account attorneys\u2019 fees and costs.\u201d (Davis v. City of Chicago (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 439, 444, 322 N.E.2d 29, 32.) Rather, the Department argues that the court below abused its discretion because proper and sufficient evidentiary support for a reduction of its liens was not presented or adduced. Accordingly, the Department requests that the reduction order be reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court so that proper evidence may be heard.\nWe agree with this argument, and find Johnson v. Lynch (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 242, 362 N.E.2d 345, cited and relied on by the Department, to be dispositive. In Johnson, our supreme court reversed the trial court\u2019s reduction of a perfected charge for medical expenses held by the Department of Public Aid against the plaintiff. The court noted that an adjudication and reduction under section 11 \u2014 2 of the Public Aid Code is an abuse of discretion when not supported by evidence (see Bender v. City of Chicago (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 284, 319 N.E.2d 34), and stated that \u201cthe burden of producing evidence to support such a reduction rests with the recipient against whom the charge is asserted.\u201d (66 Ill. 2d 242, 246, 362 N.E.2d 345,347.) The court then concluded that \u201cthe pleadings, answers to interrogatories, and argument of counsel are not evidence,\u201d that the record lacked any showing of evidence which could have supported the reductions, and that the cause would therefore be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. (66 Ill. 2d 242, 246-47, 362 N.E.2d 345, 347.) In the instant case, plaintiffs concede that the court in Johnson \u201crightfully disapproved of a seemingly arbitrary reduction of the [Department\u2019s] lien.\u201d However, they are unable to point to anything in the record which would prevent the trial court\u2019s decision herein from being considered equally \u201carbitrary.\u201d Our review of the record reveals that nothing was presented to or heard by the trial court as a basis for its decision, other than assertions in plaintiffs\u2019 petitions and by their attorney, that attorneys\u2019 fees were paid as described and that the Department\u2019s liens should therefore be reduced. Under Johnson, those assertions clearly are not evidence, and cannot be considered adequate support for the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion to adjudicate and reduce the Department\u2019s lien.\nA conclusion similar to the one stated above was reached in Schramer v. Wurtinger (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 362 N.E.2d 1075. In ordering that the decision of the trial court be reversed because under Johnson it lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation, the second district of this court stated that \u201c[w]e do not exclude the possibility that a formal evidentiary hearing may not be required in all cases if the basis and the need for a reduction clearly appears in evidence from the documents before the court.\u201d (47 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1038, 362 N.E.2d 1075, 1079.) We also do not rule that a formal evidentiary hearing must be held in all cases where a reduction of a lien held by the Department is sought. We nevertheless agree with the Schramer court that \u201c[t]he record must, at the least, provide an adequate factual foundation for the trial court\u2019s sound exercise of discretion.\u201d (47 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1038, 362 N.E.2d 1075, 1079.) Here, as we stated above, the evidentiary support required by our supreme court in Johnson was not presented in the trial court, and its decision therefore lacks an adequate foundation to be sustained as a sound exercise of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, and remand the cause with directions that a proper evidentiary hearing be conducted.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nSULLIVAN, P. J., and MEJDA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joseph D. Keenan, III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "S. Jerome Levy, of Lieberman, Levy, Baron & Stone, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARIA LABOY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. U. S. REFRIGERATION SALES & SERVICES CORPORATION et al., Defendants.\u2014(THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, Intervenor-Appellant.)\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 77-1638\nOpinion filed March 30, 1979.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joseph D. Keenan, III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nS. Jerome Levy, of Lieberman, Levy, Baron & Stone, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0462-01", "first_page_order": 484, "last_page_order": 487 }