{
  "id": 5577737,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE P. COOK, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cook",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE P. COOK, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KUNCE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, George Cook, appeals from his conviction for attempt rape. The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Clinton County of attempt rape and attempt murder. Relying upon People v. Trinkle (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888, the trial judge properly ruled that the attempt murder instructions were incorrect and granted defendant a new trial on the attempt murder charge.\nThe only issue raised on this appeal is whether the State\u2019s closing argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The defendant takes exception to the foEowing portion of that argument:\n\u201cSTATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: Now as to the attempt murder. He stabbed her and when you stab someone in the chest you do it with the intent to do great bodily harm or kill her. For a fleeting moment and like I said, I don\u2019t think he went back there with the intent to k\u00fcl her, but when she resisted he did. She\u2019s the only witness to his attempt rape. She\u2019s the only one who can say who did it. And if she\u2019s not there no one knows who did it. He\u2019s home free if she dies probably. Luckily, she didn\u2019t. He\u2019s home free because no one is in that trailer. It\u2019s in the early morning hours. Nobody knows he stabs her. He\u2019s back with his girl friend Mary Daily later in the evening. I submit to you this is attempt murder. It\u2019s not aggravated battery. He says, why are we on trial here? Why do we come in here to have a trial? Well both sides have a right to a trial. That\u2019s fair. It\u2019s the way it should be. We\u2019re on trial here because on the 21st of July, 1977 in my office we filed a charge of attempt murder. From that day until the 30th of November, today\u2019s date, I have said and I maintain this charge is attempt murder, it will remain attempted murder, it will not be reduced to anything less. And that\u2019s why we\u2019re on trial in this courtroom. Because I\u2019ve said its attempted murder. I\u2019ve researched it. I\u2019ve checked it. We\u2019ve talked to the witnesses and we\u2019ve presented it to you. It is attempt murder. Nothing less. He\u2019s got nothing left. Why not come in here and roll the dice? He either pleads guilty to attempted murder as is or he goes to trial.\nMR. DUNSTON [Defense Counsel]: I\u2019m going to object to the nature of the state\u2019s comments in that regard.\nTHE COURT: The court would caution the jury that the court will explain the law to you and you are the judges of the facts when you apply that to the law and you\u2019re not to decide this case on what the state\u2019s attorney thinks but on what you think.\nTHE STATE: You listen to what the judge tells you. But why are we here? The question was first asked by them, not by me, why are we in this courtroom on trial? We\u2019re on trial because roll the dice. Why not take a shot at it?\nMR. DUNSTON: Your Honor, I object again and I would ask that the record note that objection.\nTHE COURT: I will sustain that objection. I will sustain that objection. And disregard those remarks.\nTHE STATE: You know why we\u2019re here.\nMR. DUNSTON: Again Your Honor I object.\nTHE COURT: I would suggest to the jury that every defendant charged with an offense is presumed innocent and has a right to have a trial on these matters for any reason and I would ask you to ignore those remarks of the state\u2019s attorney.\nTHE STATE: Everyone has a right to a trial. We\u2019ve given this man his trial. You\u2019ve heard the evidence. And without question, he\u2019s guilty of attempted murder. He\u2019s guilty of attempted rape. If we\u2019re going to turn him out of here and just slap his wrists with aggravated battery, I just don\u2019t know what it will come to. Are we going to send a man out of here that goes into a woman\u2019s bedroom in the middle of the night with a knife and does what we\u2019ve heard he did? Stabs her twice and say let\u2019s slap your wrist with aggravated battery and send you out of here? I submit the twelve of you are not going to go to that extent and I thank you.\nTHE COURT: I would again caution the jury that if the state\u2019s attorney seems to have given his opinion you are not bound by his opinion. You are to be the finders of the fact and you are to consider the law in regard to this matter.\nTHE STATE: Well Your Honor, Mr. Dunston comments, I comment. I have every right to comment. I don\u2019t think it\u2019s proper for the court to comment on this.\nTHE COURT: Well I have ruled on this Mr. Hitpas. Please set down.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe State contends that the foregoing was either invited comment by the defendant or harmless error.\nDefendant had been staying at the home of prosecutrix and her boyfriend, who was working out of town on the evening of the offense. After watching television with the defendant, the prosecutrix went to bed after changing into a floor length bath robe. When she awoke, defendant had his hand between her legs near her vagina, and she asked him what he was doing. Defendant then stabbed her with a paring knife he had gotten from the kitchen, choked, beat, and knocked her to the floor. Defendant then got close to her and stated that he only wanted to have intercourse with her. Defendant did not unzip or tear her robe nor did he take off or unzip his pants. The prosecutrix passed out. Defendant subsequently gave a statement to the police after he was apprehended.\nWe have examined the entire record on appeal and find that the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. The defendant admitted the acts constituting the offense in a signed statement. Portions of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument were improper and deliberate indeed, and the prosecutor could have been held in contempt for continuing his line of argument. However, the court properly sustained defendant\u2019s objections thereto and cautioned the jury to disregard them (see People ex rel. Woodward v. Oliver (2d Dist. 1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 66, 322 N.E.2d 240, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 927, 46 L. Ed. 2d 255, 96 S. Ct. 275). Such remarks do not constitute reversible error unless they result in substantial prejudice to the accused. (People v. Nilsson (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 244, 255 N.E.2d 432, cert. denied (1970), 398 U.S. 954, 26 L. Ed.2d 296, 90 S. Ct. 1881; People v. Skorusa (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 577, 304 N.E.2d 630.) Furthermore, the prosecutor\u2019s arguments alluded to the attempt murder charge only which has been set aside. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the State\u2019s comments deprived defendant of a fair trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Clinton County.\nAffirmed.\nJONES, J., concurs.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KUNCE"
      },
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN,\ndissenting:\nThis is not a case where a highly inflammatory argument is made and the defendant does not object; neither is it a case of an improper argument being made and the court promptly sustaining the objection and telling the jury to disregard it. In this case the prosecutor made improper argument deliberately and compounded the improper argument by making inflammatory remarks after the judge had ruled the argument was improper. Here, the argument not only prejudiced the defendant\u2019s rights, but the comments made after the court\u2019s rulings amounted to contempt of court.\nSince in the majority\u2019s opinion the evidence in this case is overwhelming, the majority concludes that this prosecutorial misconduct was not reversible error. I have always believed that the measurement of evidence in a criminal case is a jury function. I also have always believed that both the innocent and guilty are entitled to a fair trial. This principle is so fundamental in a free society that it needs no citation of authority. I also have always believed that a defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial is never measured by the degree of his guilt as found by a court of review. Since the majority measures the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial with the degree of his guilt as determined by the majority, I most vigorously dissent.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard J. Wilson and David Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "Patrick Hitpas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlyle (Robert D. Perry and Karen L. Boyaris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE P. COOK, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 78-142\nOpinion filed May 1, 1979.\nG. MORAN, P. J., dissenting.\nRichard J. Wilson and David Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nPatrick Hitpas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlyle (Robert D. Perry and Karen L. Boyaris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0134-01",
  "first_page_order": 156,
  "last_page_order": 159
}
