{
  "id": 5579780,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILFREDO DE JESUS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. De Jesus",
  "decision_date": "1979-05-03",
  "docket_number": "No. 77-601",
  "first_page": "235",
  "last_page": "238",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 235"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "95 Cal. Rptr. 919",
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      "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "18 Cal. App. 3d 504",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        4404985
      ],
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      "case_paths": [
        "/cal-app-3d/18/0504-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:52:26.554099+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILFREDO DE JESUS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Wilfredo De Jesus, was charged by information with aggravated battery and cruelty to children. The incidents allegedly occurred on December 2 and 3,1976, and involved defendant\u2019s two-year-old daughter. Defendant was found guilty of both charges in a jury trial, and he was sentenced to one to eight years in the penitentiary. On appeal he contends he was denied a fair trial because (1) physicians testifying for the State gave as the diagnosis of the child\u2019s injuries, \u201cthe battered child syndrome\u201d; and (2) certain alleged hearsay was admitted.\nDefendant urges that testimony diagnosing his daughter\u2019s injuries as \u201cthe battered child syndrome\u201d coupled with an explanation of that term served to raise hostility in the jury and to suggest that defendant was guilty of prior offenses not charged. The testimony of a physician regarding his diagnosis of an injury is generally made through words which are terms of art. The use of such terms of art and their explanation by the physician do not necessarily indicate any wrongdoing by a particular defendant, but are merely descriptive of the nature of the injuries observed by the physician. (People v. Jackson (1971), 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919.) Other evidence must still be produced to show that the defendant was the cause of the injuries complained of. Because such a diagnosis does not state that the defendant battered the child, there is no inconsistency with a defense that the injuries were caused by another person, such as defendant attempted to show at trial in the present case.\nDefendant complains of two separate instances in which alleged hearsay was improperly admitted. The first is the testimony of a State\u2019s witness who was present at a prior juvenile court proceeding regarding the custody of defendant\u2019s children. The witness in the present cause related what some of defendant\u2019s testimony was in the prior proceeding, and defendant urges that because his own testimony in the prior proceeding was made through an interpreter, the interpreter must be called as a witness to avoid a hearsay problem. The interpretation of testimony of a witness made in a foreign language, by an interpreter who is sworn in court and translates the t\u00e9stimony to the court, does not violate the hearsay rule because both the original witness and the interpreter are under oath and are subject to cross examination. (29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence \u00a7501, at 558 (1967).) Since the interpreter\u2019s qualifications are subject to challenge in the original proceeding, and because an interpreter is sworn to translate accurately (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 51, par. 47) we hold that an interpreter\u2019s translation of a party\u2019s testimony from a prior judicial proceeding does not constitute hearsay, because the interpreter is merely a conduit for testimony and makes no statement which is his or her own. Defendant\u2019s statements at the former proceeding were, as stated in his brief, admissions and were admissible as such under that exception to the hearsay rule.\nThe second instance of alleged hearsay occurred when police questioned defendant, which took place in the following manner. Police asked defendant a question in English and defendant responded in English and would make a gesture which was descriptive of a portion of his answer to the question. Another officer was then told to repeat the question in Spanish, and a conversation between this officer and defendant would take place in Spanish, followed by the same gesture being made by defendant. Defendant argues that testimony that the \u201csame question\u201d was asked in Spanish is hearsay because the translating officer did not testify at trial and the officer who testified as to the questioning did not himself speak or understand Spanish. Defendant further argues that a description of the gesture made after the Spanish conversation is irrelevant because it could only relate to the question which was asked in Spanish, about which there was no competent testimony at trial.\nAs a result of defense objections raised at trial, the court prevented the police from testifying that the \u201csame question\u201d was asked in Spanish, but did allow testimony that a conversation in Spanish followed the question and answer in English. Assuming, arguendo, that testimony regarding the existence of a conversation in Spanish and gestures which followed the conversation was irrelevant, it is our opinion that these matters were not prejudicial to defendant because there had already been testimony that defendant answered the relevant questions in English and made gestures in conjunction therewith.\nThe decision of the circuit court is accordingly affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGUILD, P. J., and NASH, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE WOODWARD"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mary Robinson, Michael Mulder, and Mark Schuster, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.",
      "Dennis Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Phyllis J. Perko and Barbara A. Preiner, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILFREDO DE JESUS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 77-601\nOpinion filed May 3, 1979.\nMary Robinson, Michael Mulder, and Mark Schuster, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDennis Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Phyllis J. Perko and Barbara A. Preiner, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0235-01",
  "first_page_order": 257,
  "last_page_order": 260
}