{ "id": 5580520, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACK BRIDGES, a/k/a Jack Belton, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bridges", "decision_date": "1979-05-07", "docket_number": "No. 78-298", "first_page": "868", "last_page": "876", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 868" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "147 N.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2776029 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 C 1262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 273", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 894", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6405124, 6405222, 6405325, 6406317, 6405935, 6405421, 6405041, 6405555, 6404951, 6405786, 6405661, 6406111 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0894-03", "/us/434/0894-04", "/us/434/0894-05", "/us/434/0894-12", "/us/434/0894-10", "/us/434/0894-06", "/us/434/0894-02", "/us/434/0894-07", "/us/434/0894-01", "/us/434/0894-09", "/us/434/0894-08", "/us/434/0894-11" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 N.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2780613 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3383122 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 948", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5624700 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394202 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 N.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1588927 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/114/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 N.E. 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4957149 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/288/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 N.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320071 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1585423 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/118/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 1532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 L. Ed. 2d 866", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 931", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11749451, 11749132, 11748909, 11748815, 11749263, 11749071, 11749360, 11749628, 11748756, 11749209, 11749018, 11749532, 11748957 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0931-11", "/us/402/0931-07", "/us/402/0931-03", "/us/402/0931-02", "/us/402/0931-09", "/us/402/0931-06", "/us/402/0931-10", "/us/402/0931-13", "/us/402/0931-01", "/us/402/0931-08", "/us/402/0931-05", "/us/402/0931-12", "/us/402/0931-04" ] }, { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2904464 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" }, { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933485 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0280-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 891, "char_count": 20523, "ocr_confidence": 0.909, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.758116458062017e-08, "percentile": 0.3600478251820859 }, "sha256": "1d31f6ed142848112bf731a8010454c62dc5cc4507f3aeb0d4c70b7f574b699c", "simhash": "1:b1369aecc34d8cf3", "word_count": 3394 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:52:26.554099+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACK BRIDGES, a/k/a Jack Belton, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Jack Bridges, also known as Jack Belton, was indicted for attempt murder and two counts of aggravated battery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 8 \u2014 4, 9 \u2014 1, 12 \u2014 4(a), 12 \u2014 4(b)(1).) A jury found defendant not guilty of attempt murder, but guilty of each count of aggravated battery. The trial court entered a judgment of guilty of aggravated battery and sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment of not less than 2M nor more than 7% years.\nOn appeal, defendant asserts that: (1) the State committed prejudicial error in its opening statement; 2) repeated references to defendant\u2019s alias by the State were improper and prejudicial; and 3) the trial court erred in imposing concurrent sentences for each count of aggravated battery where both counts arose from the same act.\nDefendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, a detailed rendition of all the facts is not necessary. Additional facts will be recounted in connection with the contentions of the parties.\nOn October 25, 1973, Larry Henderson was the victim of a shotgun shooting. Henderson testified that he drove to his mother-in-law\u2019s residence to pick up his wife, Debra. Upon arrival, he observed a man he knew only as \u201cJackie\u201d reach into the trunk of his car, a 1965 or 1966 black over white Cadillac. At trial, Henderson identified \u201cJackie\u201d as the defendant. Henderson entered the home and told his wife to leave with him. At this point, he noticed \u201cJackie\u201d had also come into the residence.\nDebra Henderson insisted that she and her daughter were not ready to leave, but walked with her husband outside to his car. While sitting on the car they continued to discuss whether Debra would leave. At this point, defendant came running out of the house with a shotgun. Defendant approached Henderson and shot him in the back of his right shoulder and neck. On cross-examination, Henderson admitted that, while on the front porch, he put his hands around his wife\u2019s neck and slapped her on her face.\nLeona Lake and Bernice Smith were also occurrence witnesses. Smith was Debra Henderson\u2019s mother and Lake was a friend of the family. Both were at Smith\u2019s home the day of the incident and testified that defendant shot Henderson. Smith also testified that Debra and Larry Henderson were on the car fighting and that Larry was slapping and choking Debra immediately before defendant emerged from the house with a shotgun. Lake stated that she heard someone yelling \u201cJackie\u201d before defendant ran out of the house toward the Hendersons. Both Lake and Smith made positive, in-court identifications of defendant as the assailant.\nOn cross-examination, Lake explained that she did not contact the police before trial because she did not want to get involved as she was fearful for her safety and that of her child. On cross-examination, Smith testified that the evening of the shooting she told police that Jack Bridges did the shooting. She further stated that Bridges had been \u201cgoing out\u201d with her daughter.\nOfficer Edmond Larenz testified for the State that on the day of the shooting he interviewed the victim at the hospital. Henderson identified his assailant as \u201cJackie.\u201d Henderson provided no other information concerning the whereabouts or identity of \u201cJackie.\u201d Larenz also ascertained that Debra Henderson knew a man known as \u201cJackie.\u201d Larenz also had a conversation with Larry Henderson\u2019s grandmother at the hospital. At the scene of the incident, Larenz interviewed Smith and discovered that she also knew \u201cJackie.\u201d\nBased on these interviewed, Larenz located \u201cJackie\u2019s\u201d employer, the manager of a gasoline station. The station manager informed Larenz that he had an employee named Jack Bridges who drove a black over white 1965 or 1966 Cadillac. Larenz again contacted Larry Henderson, who nowiprovided \u201cJackie\u2019s\u201d home address. Larenz then checked with the records division of the Chicago Police Department and discovered that an individual named Jack Bridges, also known as Jack Belton, lived at the address Henderson had provided. Larenz then obtained a photograph of defendant which he presented to Henderson. Henderson identified the photograph as depicting his assailant \u201cJackie.\u201d\nOn January 7, 1974, Officer LaPorta and his partner noticed a 1965 black over white Cadillac, which had a cracked windshield and no brake lights. The vehicle was stopped and the driver produced a traffic summons made out to Jack Bridges. Officer LaPorta then saw a shotgun barrel on the floor of the rear seat. Defendant was placed under arrest and the gun and various shotgun shells were confiscated. Upon returning to the station, LaPorta checked certain police records and discovered that Jack Bridges, also known as Jack Belton, was wanted for aggravated battery.\nThe State also presented evidence probative of the fact that the shotgun found in defendant\u2019s car was the weapon used to shoot Henderson. It is not necessary to summarize this evidence, because defendant does not contest that his gun was the weapon used, but contends that at the time of the incident his gun and car were not under his control.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf that he had known Debra Henderson and her family since grade school. They were close friends, but defendant denied datingDebra. According to defendant, he had met Larry Henderson on only one occasion. He also acknowledged that he kept a 20-gauge shotgun and shells in the trunk of his 1965 black over white Cadillac.\nDefendant further testified that on October 25, 1973, Debra Henderson and her cousin came to his home to borrow his car. He had often lent his car to her and did so on this occasion. He had previously warned her to leave the shotgun in the trunk alone.\nShortly thereafter, defendant went to work at the gas station, where he stayed for an eight-hour shift. At 10:30 p.m., Debra Henderson returned with defendant\u2019s car. At this time, defendant first learned that her husband had been shot. Defendant maintained that he was at work during the time of the shooting and denied shooting Larry Henderson.\nDefendant also introduced a transcription of the hospital notes of Doctor Lenardo Chato, who had examined Larry Henderson the day of the shooting. According to his documented patient interview, Henderson told Dr. Chato that he did not see his assailant. Henderson had previously explained that he told Dr. Chato he did not know who shot him \u201cbecause I felt he wasn\u2019t the police.\u201d Finally, Officer Larenz testified for the defense that when he interviewed Bernice Smith at the hospital, she denied seeing the shooting.\nDefendant now appeals his conviction of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and causing great bodily injury.\nDefendant contends he was deprived of a fair trial due to three assertions made in the State\u2019s opening argument. He submits that these remarks were not later supported by evidence adduced at trial,\nThe State responds that defendant has waived any objections on appeal by failing to object at trial or in his motion for a new trial. As a general rule, the failure by the defendant to raise an issue in his written motion for new trial constitutes a waiver of that contention upon appeal. (People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856.) We note, however, that defendant listed a general objection to the State\u2019s prejudicial and inflammatory opening statement in his motion for a new trial. Moreover, since defendant contends that the State\u2019s remarks were not later supported by the evidence adduced at trial, there was no basis for objection during the opening statement. Accordingly, we do not consider this issue waived.\nFirst, defendant complains of the opening remark concerning the Hendersons\u2019 discussion about Debra\u2019s refusal to leave her mother\u2019s home:\n\u201cHe [Larry Henderson] and his wife [Debra] left the house together, went outside, and were talking outside, having a discussion about this matter. His wife was sitting on a car out front. And Mr. Henderson was talking to his wife. At which time, no argument was going on.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant asserts that all the testimony was directly to the contrary. We find that defendant misconstrues the record.\nThe remark complained of concerned the expected testimony of Larry Henderson. The time frame of the comment that \u201cno argument was going on\u201d is set by the earlier sentence: \u201cHis wife was sitting on a car out front.\u201d Larry Henderson\u2019s testimony was consistent with this statement. Henderson admitted placing his hands around his wife\u2019s neck and slapping her while they were on the front porch. However, he maintained that any physical contact had abated by the time the couple reached the car and that a normal conversation ensued. The fact that Bernice Smith contradicted Henderson by testifying that he slapped and choked his wife while they were sitting on the car has no bearing on this issue. The State was referring solely to Henderson\u2019s account of the incident. Since the State\u2019s opening remark was later supported at trial with admissible evidence, no error exists. People v. Palmer (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 289, 291, 265 N.E.2d 627, 629, cert. denied (1971), 402 U.S. 931, 28 L. Ed. 2d 866, 91 S. Ct. 1532.\nThe second statement complained of concerns the expected testimony of Dr. Chato, Henderson\u2019s treating physician:\n\u201cThe doctor will testify as to the extent of the injuries, the lower neck area, and the left side, the back of the head, with a 20-gauge shotgun.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant contends he was prejudiced because Dr. Chato did not testify concerning the type of shotgun used in the crime.\nDr. Chato testified that on October 25, 1973, he treated Larry Henderson, a shotgun victim brought to the emergency room. Henderson had sustained multiple small gunshot wounds on the back of the head, back of the neck and right side of the face. Dr. Chato described the patient\u2019s wounds as caused by multiple shotgun pellets. He did not testify concerning the gauge of shotgun or pellet size.\nDr. Chato testified for the State in order to demonstrate the nature and extent of Henderson\u2019s wounds. This was necessary to support the charge of aggravated battery due to great bodily harm. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4(a).) The State produced evidence as to the gauge of the shell through Officer Bernard Cooney\u2019s testimony. He recovered two Montgomery Ward brand .20-gauge shotgun shells from beside a pool of blood at the scene of the crime. Moreover, the cartridge box found in defendant\u2019s car contained over a dozen rounds of .20-gauge Sears and Montgomery Ward shotgun shells. We also note that defendant does not maintain that his gun was not used, only that he did not shoot the victim.\nMoreover, opening statements cannot be considered as grounds for reversal unless it appears that they influence the jury in a manner resulting in substantial prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Vasquez (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 66, 254 N.E.2d 617.) Dr. Chato\u2019s failure to express an opinion as to the gauge of the shotgun pellets is a discrepancy of minor character. In light of evidence that Henderson\u2019s wounds were caused by .20-gauge shells, no error was committed.\nDefendant\u2019s third objection concerns the prosecutor\u2019s statement that Investigator Larenz would testify that the victim\u2019s grandmother told him:\n\u201c* * * I know Jack, he drives that kind of car [1965 or 1966, black over white Cadillac] and he works at some Shell Service station at Roosevelt and Independence.\u201d\nLarenz\u2019s testimony on this point was objected to on the grounds of hearsay and the trial court sustained the objection.\nNonetheless, the trial court allowed Larenz to testify that as a result of the conversation he went to the gas station at Roosevelt and Independence. Larenz spoke with the station manager and learned that Jack Bridges worked at that station. Additionally, bridges was known as \u201cJackie\u201d and drove a 1965 or 1966 black over white Cadillac.\nThe trial court\u2019s exclusion of hearsay testimony only affected the form of the presentation of Larenz\u2019s testimony. The substantive evidence that defendant worked at the Shell Station and drove a black-over-white Cadillac was still elicited. Since the substance of the evidence at trial was the same as predicted by the prosecutor in his opening statement, no error occurred. People v. Palmer (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 289, 291, 265 N.E.2d 627, 629, cert. denied (1971), 402 U.S. 931, 28 L. Ed. 2d 866, 91 S. Ct. 1532.\nMoreover, none of these remarks constitute reversible error due to the numerous cautionary directives by the trial court, the State and the defense that opening statements of counsel were not evidence. The court specifically instructed the jury that \u201cany statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be disregarded.\u201d See People v. Vasquez (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 66, 254 N.E.2d 617.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that the State\u2019s repeated reference to defendant\u2019s alias in order \u201cto insinuate to the jury that Bridges had been in trouble before, and had to conceal his identity\u201d deprived him of a fair trial.\nThe State argues that defendant has waived this issue upon appeal since the defense only objected on one occasion during trial and failed to include this contention in his motion for a new trial. As a general rule, the failure to object during trial and in post-trial motions waives an issue for purposes of appellate review. (People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856; People v. Trefonas (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 92, 136 N.E.2d 817.) Accordingly, this issue has been waived.\nIn any event, we find the State\u2019s references to defendant\u2019s alias were proper. The introduction of a defendant\u2019s alias is not proper unless: (1) the State has proof of such alias; (2) the alias is in fact proved; and (3) the alias is relevant and material to some issue in the case. (People v. Singer (1919), 288 Ill. 113, 123 N.E. 327; Peoplev. Carr (1969), 114 Ill. App. 2d 370, 252 N.E.2d 912.) The first two requisites are met by Officer Larenz\u2019s testimony that pursuant to his investigation he learned \u201cJackie\u2019s\u201d address, full name and alias. Moreover, on cross-examination defendant admitted that he was known by his alias, Jack Belton.\nProof of defendant\u2019s alias was also relevant and material to an issue in the case: the identity of the offender. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused is the person who committed the crime charged. (People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, 386-87, 288 N.E.2d 363.) The facts of this case show that the introduction of defendant\u2019s alias was a relevant part of his identification. Initial police interviews of Mr. and Mrs. Henderson and Bernice Smith established only that the assailant was known as \u201cJackie.\u201d Continued investigation uncovered \u201cJackie\u2019s\u201d address and place of employment. Investigator Larenz first learned the assailant was Jack Bridges from \u201cJackie\u2019s\u201d employer. Several days later, the police received further information when Larry Henderson remembered \u201cJackie\u2019s\u201d address. Larenz checked this address and the name of Jack Bridges against: police records. He discovered Jack Bridges, also known as Jack Belton, lived at the address which Henderson provided. Furthermore, Henderson later positively identified a records division photograph indexed by the police identification number of Jack Bridges, also known as Jack Belton. At trial, defendant admitted that he was also known by this alias.\nThe State was forced to present evidence that defendant was the assailant in this manner because the witnesses could not identify him by his full name. Accordingly, the State\u2019s use of defendant\u2019s alias was necessary to explain the process by which he was captured and identified as Henderson\u2019s assailant. As the State points out in its brief, reference to defendant\u2019s alias did not predominate the course of the trial so as to insinuate defendant lived a life of crime. Among 27 references to defendant in the opening statement, only six times was he called \u201cJack Bridges, also known as Jack Belton.\u201d During the trial the prosecutor only mentioned the alias in cross-examination, when asking defendant if he was known by that alias. Larenz mentioned defendant\u2019s alias in explaining his investigation. In closing arguments, the State only mentioned the alias once, reminding the jury that defendant had admitted using the name \u201cJack Belton.\u201d\nCases cited by defendant do not negate the rule that an assumed name may be introduced if probative at trial but not solely to raise an inference that the alias was used to evade apprehension for prior criminal offenses. (People v. Berlin (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 612, 374 N.E.2d 948; People v. Pumphrey (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 94, 366 N.E.2d 433.) Defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 334, 146 N.E.2d 14, is misplaced as that case is distinguishable.\nIn Dukes, the State made repeated references to defendant\u2019s alias over objection. During closing argument, the prosecutor implied that placement of an alias on an indictment did not occur by chance, but indicated defendant was of dubious character. In the case at bar, the record supports no inference of an attempt to defame defendant\u2019s character by introduction of his alias.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that he was improperly sentenced on each count of aggravated battery where both counts arose from the same act. For the act of shooting Henderson with a shotgun, defendant was charged with, and found guilty of, two counts of aggravated battery: (1) battery with a deadly weapon, and (2) battery causing great bodily harm. People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273, is dispositive of defendant\u2019s contention. In King, the supreme court held that concurrent sentences cannot be imposed for separate offenses arising out of the same physical act.\nThe trial court, in imposing the sentence of not less than 2K years and not more than 7M years, stated:\n\u201cYou have been found guilty by a jury of two charges of aggravated battery. Since there are two ways of stating the offense legally and logically, any sentence that is imposed by the Court is concerned with both counts concurrently.\u201d\nIn so stating, it is clear that the trial court intended a single sentence for aggravated battery which concurrently addressed the two counts of aggravated battery. Concurrent sentences for each count were not contemplated.\nWe have been informed that the mittimus which we allowed to be filed as part of the record has been interpreted to mean that defendant (No. 74-2542) was sentenced to two counts of aggravated battery, receiving a sentence of 2M to 7M years on each to run concurrently.\nThe mittimus reads:\n\u201cTerm: Counts 1 and 2\nMinimum: Two years (2) and Six months,\nMaximum: Seven years (7) and Six months.\nBoth counts to run concurrent with, 76-1262.\u201d\nThe memorandum of orders in case No. 74-2542 in the record states:\n\u201cP.P. For Sentencing\n2 years 6 mos to 7 years 6 mos in the I.S.P. on ct 2 & ct 3 # # #\n#74-2542 to run concurrent with 76 C 1262.\n1 to 2 years #ct 1.\u201d\nWe conclude from the wording of the mittimus, from the trial court\u2019s statement at the sentencing and from the memorandum of orders that the trial court imposed but one sentence for both counts of aggravated battery in No. 74-2542 which was to run concurrently with a sentence on a separate and different offense (No. 76-1262).\nBecause the interpretation of the mittimus by the Department of Corrections that defendant received two concurrent sentences for aggravated battery may adversely affect defendant\u2019s prospects for parole (see People v. Schlenger (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 63, 147 N.E.2d 316), we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence of not less than 2/2 years and not more than 7M years for aggravated battery and remand the cause for the issuance of a corrected mittimus to show but one sentence for that offense.\nAffirmed and remanded with directions.\nGOLDBERG, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Susan McElroy, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, James Veldman, and Gerald E. Nora, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACK BRIDGES, a/k/a Jack Belton, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-298\nOpinion filed May 7, 1979.\nRalph Ruebner and Susan McElroy, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, James Veldman, and Gerald E. Nora, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0868-01", "first_page_order": 890, "last_page_order": 898 }