{ "id": 3266429, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA LEE KLISNICK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Klisnick", "decision_date": "1979-05-29", "docket_number": "No. 78-31", "first_page": "148", "last_page": "160", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 148" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971259 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5257421 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/37/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 1022", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5640407 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3239845 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3400648 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464304 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 786", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782921 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 97", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174831 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3399698 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426458 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2700062 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/75/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 N.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1874, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5158461 ], "year": 1874, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/10/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790128 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871194 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 N.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2827115 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2964516 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 N.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2570251, 2572453 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/77/0151-01", "/ill-app-2d/77/0151-02" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 1320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2811970 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 N.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill.App. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2645560 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/93/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 N.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2797942 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455316 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5428466 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0296-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1230, "char_count": 31385, "ocr_confidence": 0.897, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.032866973374098e-07, "percentile": 0.5486941516667574 }, "sha256": "8e39ed053d23415d2867d9c0387a038bb8ce45a48718e72eaa9c971975be47a8", "simhash": "1:f454eed4cef497a7", "word_count": 5269 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:34.335432+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA LEE KLISNICK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Linda Lee Klisnick, was indicted for the offenses of aggravated battery, attempt murder and arson. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 12\u20144(a), 12\u20144(b)(1), 8\u20144, 9\u20141 and 20\u20141.) After a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found defendant guilty of arson, but not guilty of the other charges. The court entered judgment on the findings and sentenced defendant to a term of incarceration in the Department of Corrections of not less than one year nor more than one year and one day.\nDefendant appeals her conviction, contending that she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning the threatening contents of a note when it was not produced at trial.\nRon Lira, the complaining witness, testified that on March 16,1975, at about 6 p.m., he was at his brother\u2019s apartment in Chicago, Illinois. Several other people were also present, including his brother Roy Lira, Dave Tibor, Steven Rosenquist, the defendant, Dawn Soderburg and Cheryl.\nLira testified that defendant requested him to cash *20 worth of food stamps for her. He agreed, placed the stamps on the kitchen table and went into the bathroom. When he returned from the bathroom, the food stamps were gone. Defendant accused Lira of \u201cripping her off\u201d and an argument ensued.\nComplainant left with his brother-in-law Dave Tibor and went to his father-in-law\u2019s home. Lira further testified that he went out that evening with his in-laws and returned to their home around midnight. Upon their return, Lira received a note, found by his brother-in-law. Lira described the note as written on yellow paper, approximately four inches by five inches, with a jagged edge. He could not recall its contents verbatim, but testified that it was to the effect:\n\u201cRon, you burned me once. You are not going'to bum me again. * * * I am going to bum you and your property, personal property.\u201d\nLira testified that the note also contained three signatures in the following order: Linda, Dawn, Cheryl. Lira went home and threw the note away.\nAt home, Lira\u2019s wife and children retired for the night. Lira went into the dining room, sat on the couch and listened to the stereo. As Lira was listening to the stereo, he heard an object come through the window. At this point he ran out the front door of his first-floor apartment, jumped over a railing and ran into a gangway. He then observed defendant and Dawn Soderburg about fifteen feet away from him, standing towards his dining room window. Lira testified that he observed a glass-type object with a flame at the end in defendant\u2019s hand. Her arm was in motion and the object left her hand and entered through Lira\u2019s dining room window.\nAfter throwing the object, the two girls ran towards a car and Lira gave chase. He observed defendant enter the driver\u2019s side and Dawn the passenger\u2019s side of a 1965-1967 blue Oldsmobile. He also observed the back of the head of a third person in the back seat of the vehicle.\nLira then noticed that his dining room was on fire and ran back into his home. He evacuated his wife and son and returned for his daughter. At that time, he heard a \u201cwhoosh\u201d sound and was knocked unconscious. Lira next remembered waking up in a hospital.\nLira also testified as to the extent of the injuries suffered by his daughter and himself. He identified various photographs of his apartment depicting extensive fire damage. Finally, Lira testified that he had previously been convicted of theft.\nOn cross-examination, Lira testified that on the day of the fire he made a statement to Officer McQuinn that he had been lying on the couch, half asleep, when he heard a crash and ran out to investigate. At that time he did not tell the officer about seeing any persons in the gangway. About 10 days later, Lira gave another statement to McQuinn where he mentioned having seen someone in the gangway.\nPrior to the fire a candle had been lit, but Lira testified his wife had put it out before going to bed. Lira did acknowledge that in his first statement to Officer McQuinn he said that he originally thought the cause of the fire was a candle, but realized that was impossible due to the extent of the fire.\nOn redirect examination, Lira explained that the first statements given to Officer McQuinn occurred while he was in pain and sedated in the hospital emergency room and intensive care areas. He was sedated for about nine days.\nGeorge Tibor testified that during the evening hours of March 16, 1975, he went to dinner and a show, accompanied by his wife, son David, daughter and son-in-law Ron Lira. They returned home at about 12 p.m. Shortly thereafter defendant, Dawn Soderburg and Cheryl came to the door. Defendant asked Tibor whether Ron Lira was inside and Tibor responded negatively. Defendant explained she was angry and wanted to see Lira because he had taken some money. She also mentioned seeing Lira\u2019s truck parked across the street, but Tibor explained it was inoperable.\nThe three girls returned to the car, a dark blue 1965 Oldsmobile, and drove about one-half block away. They stopped the car and backed up to Lira\u2019s truck. The witness next observed Dawn get out of the car and place a note under the windshield wiper of the truck. Tibor instructed his son to retrieve the note. According to Tibor, the note was a yellow piece of paper about four by six inches with a jagged top edge. Although he could not recall its exact contents, Tibor testified as to the substance of the note:\n\u201cRon, I want my *20 that you burned me for. You burned me once. More than once, and you are not getting away with it. If you don\u2019t give me the \u2014 pay me the *20 by Sunday, I am going to bum you and your possessions.\u201d\nThe note had three names on the bottom, in the following order: Linda, Dawn and Cheryl. After the fire in Lira\u2019s apartment, Tibor recovered the note from Lira\u2019s kitchen garbage can. He gave the note to Officers McQuinn and Schuler.\nSteven Rosenquist testified for the State that he was present in complainant\u2019s brother\u2019s apartment on March 16, 1975, between 5 and 7 p.m. He heard a discussion between complainant and defendant concerning food stamps, but admitted not paying too much attention at that time. Rosenquist testified that Lira left the apartment. At about 10:30 to 11 p.m., defendant, Linda, Dawn, Cheryl, Joe, Junior and Rosenquist left in defendant\u2019s car to find Lira. They went to the Tibor residence and noticed Lira\u2019s truck parked nearby. The three girls went to see if Lira was there, had a discussion with Mr. Tibor and returned to the car. Rosenquist testified that defendant was mad about something. As the car started to pull away, defendant said: \u201cThat stupid Lira ripped me off like that, burned me like that.\u201d Junior suggested that she write a note to Lira.\nAt this time they backed the car up and defendant started writing on a yellow piece of paper. She then handed the note to Dawn, who signed something and handed it to Cheryl, who also wrote something on the note. Rosenquist did not see the contents of the note but described the paper as yellow, 8 by 11 inches and ripped on the side. At defendant\u2019s request, Dawn placed the note on Lira\u2019s truck and they returned to the apartment.\nThe three girls again left and returned at about 12:30 p.m. At this time Rosenquist, Junior, Harry and George were also in the apartment. Rosenquist testified that he heard a conversation concerning how to make a Molotov (cocktail) but couldn\u2019t recall who participated in the conversation.\nOn cross-examination, Rosenquist testified that he gave a statement to police officers and said Lira agreed to exchange money for food stamps with Cheryl. Additionally, in this statement he said Dawn wrote the note. On redirect-examination, he explained that all three girls wrote something on the note.\nInvestigator Nicholas Schuler testified that on March 17, 1975, he talked with George Tibor, Sr., pursuant to his investigation of the Lira fire. At this point Schuler received a handwritten note on yellow paper that was tom on two sides and approximately four by five inches. Schuler testified the note said substantially that: \u201cYou burned me once, and if I don\u2019t get my $20 back I will fuck you and your house.\u201d Three names followed: Linda, Dawn and Cheryl. Officer Schuler placed the note in a \u201cstreet file\u201d at headquarters. He remembered seeing it the day of the preliminary hearing and replacing it in the file. At the time of trial, Schuler did not know what had happened to the note. No copies were made of the note and no handwriting samples were taken from defendant.\nOfficer John Bickler of the Chicago Police Department Bomb and Arson Unit next testified. His duties consisted of determining the cause and origin of fires. Bickler testified that the fire in the Lira residence originated in the dining room. The electrical outlets and wires were in normal condition and, according to Bickler, electrical malfunction was not the cause of the fire.\nOfficer Bickler next identified various pictures of the damaged apartment. Bickler concluded that damage in the living room was strictly due to heat from the adjacent dining room where the fire originated. The fire was concentrated in the center of the room in front of a small service bar. At this location there was also evidence of a \u201chot spot\u201d (heaviest burning area) extending approximately six to seven feet with a width of about two feet.\nA State exhibit was identified as depicting shelves in the dining room. Bickler testified that there was deep burning into the wood. The majority of the heavy burning was on the end of the shelves and on the top. There was very little burning beneath the shelves. In Bickler\u2019s opinion, this indicated that an accelerant was used in the fire. Bickler theorized that an accelerant was either poured or thrown on that shelf and then landed on the floor. An alternative possibility was that two bottles were used, resulting in similar burning patterns on the shelf and floor. Bickler further testified that a candle, visible in the picture, could not have caused the type of burning and heat intensity that resulted in Lira\u2019s apartment.\nLaboratory analysis of samples of the wood, carpeting and padding failed to reveal the presence of hydrocarbons. Bickler explained the absence of hydrocarbons could be due to the amount of water used to extinguish the fire, the time lapse between the time of the fire and when samples were taken, and total burning and consumption of any accelerant because of the intense heat. Bickler discovered a substantial amount of broken glass and bottles in the dining area. He stated that since there was so much broken glass because of fallen bottles from Lira\u2019s bar, there was no way of determining if any of the broken glass once contained the accelerant.\nFinally, it was Bickler\u2019s opinion that the fire was caused by an accelerant and that it originated in the dining room on the shelves and in the middle of the dining room floor.\nOn cross-examination, Bickler admitted that if cleaning fluid or liquor had been spilled on the rug it could have burned. He also testified that if a lit bottle or container with a flammable hydrocarbon was thrown into the dining room, there would be an immediate burning or explosion upon impact. Bickler also testified as to a conversation with Lira about two days after the fire, while Lira was in the hospital. According to Bickler, Lira stated that at the time of the fire he was lying on the couch in the dining room. He had been watching television and had fallen asleep. Lira was awakened by a \u201cwhoosh\u201d noise and the breaking of glass. Upon awakening, he saw fire on the floor and shelves and ran out of the house. Lira also made some vague comments that he thought he saw some people in or around the building.\nOn redirect examination, Bickler explained that Lira was in pain during their conversation and his answers were very vague.\nRoy Lira, Jr. (nicknamed Junior), complainant\u2019s brother, next testified that on March 16,1975, defendant, Dawn and Cheryl were at his apartment. They had food stamps which they wanted Ron Lira to trade for money. Complainant left his brother\u2019s apartment and did not return. Junior testified corroborating the trip to complainant\u2019s father-in-law\u2019s house. He suggested the girls leave a note on the truck.\nAt this point, defendant ripped a piece of paper from her purse, signed her name and Dawn and Cheryl also signed it. Dawn put the note on the truck. Junior described the note as yellow paper about 8 by 8 inches. He did not read the note.\nAfter placing the note on Lira\u2019s truck, the girls dropped Junior off at his apartment, but returned later that night. Junior heard defendant tell \u201cHarry\u201d that \u201cRon was going to burn tonight.\u201d Junior and Harry suggested that they \u201cjust kick his ass.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Junior admitted giving a statement to the police on March 19,1975. At that time he stated that the food stamps were Cheryl\u2019s. He also admitted that in his statement he said Cheryl had threatened to bum complainant.\nHarry Czerwinski was the final witness for the State. He testified that on the night of the incident he was at Junior\u2019s apartment and engaged in a conversation with defendant. According to Czerwinski, defendant said she \u201chad been burned by Ron Lira and that she was going to bum him tonight.\u201d She asked whether lighter fluid or gasoline was better for a Molotov cocktail. The witness responded that \u201cshe was crazy and that she ought to give Ron a good ass kicking, that is what he deserves.\u201d\nDefendant testified that she saw complainant at Junior\u2019s apartment and asked him if he could cash food stamps for Cheryl. Cheryl gave complainant the food stamps and he went into the kitchen with them, but never returned. In searching for complainant, the three girls went to Lira\u2019s father-in-law\u2019s home. Cheryl told Lira\u2019s father-in-law that Ronnie burned her for $20 in food stamps and that she wanted the money.\nDefendant further testified that Dawn wrote the note, signed all three names and placed the note on Lira\u2019s truck. Defendant described the note\u2019s contents as: \u201cSomething about you burned me once and I don\u2019t like to get burned and I will get even.\u201d The girls returned to Junior\u2019s home and dropped him off. They returned a few minutes later and talked to Junior. Defendant denied seeing or conversing with Harry Czerwinski and stated he said nothing about a Molotov cocktail. Defendant denied being in the gangway to Lira\u2019s apartment and denied throwing a bottle through Lira\u2019s window. She further stated she did not start a fire at his apartment.\nOn cross-examination, defendant admitted giving a statement to the police on March 17,1975, saying that all three girls gave the food stamps to Lira. She further indicated in the statement that she was mad at Lira, but denied being mad when cross-examined.\nDefendant contends she was not proved guilty of arson beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, she argues that complainant\u2019s testimony was so thoroughly impeached and contradicted as to invalidate her conviction.\nThe State maintains that complainant\u2019s testimony was clear, convincing and consistent and substantially corroborated by witnesses who were present at various stages of events leading up to the arson.\nComplainant, Ron Lira, testified that he had a conversation with defendant at his brother\u2019s apartment. She requested Lira to cash *20 worth of food stamps and he agreed. Complainant claimed he placed the stamps on a table while he went to the bathroom. When he returned, the stamps were gone and defendant accused him of \u201cripping her off.\u201d\nAfter an argument with defendant, Lira left the apartment and went out that night with his in-laws. Upon returning to his father-in-law\u2019s home, Lira received a note written on a yellow, jagged piece of paper, about four by five inches in size. He could not recall the exact language used in the note, but said it was to the effect: \u201cRon, you burned me once. You are not going to bum me again * * *. I am going to bum you and your property, personal property.\u201d The note was signed: Linda, Dawn, Cheryl.\nLira further testified that when he returned to his home, he sat on a couch in the dining room and listened to the stereo. He subsequently heard an object come through the window and ran out the front door, jumped over a railing and entered the gangway. There he observed defendant and Dawn standing in the gangway. Lira stated that defendant held a glass object with a flame at the end. He saw her throw the object through his dining room window. Both girls then fled to defendant\u2019s car.\nAt this point Lira noticed his dining room was on fire, so he returned to evacuate his family. Once inside the apartment, Lira heard a \u201cwhoosh\u201d sound and was rendered unconscious.\nOn cross-examination, Lira was questioned concerning answers he had given in police statements a day or two after the fire. In these statements Lira did not tell the police about seeing any persons in the gangway. About 10 days later, Lira gave a written statement to Officer McQuinn in which he mentioned having seen people in the gangway. However, he did not mention seeing a bottle with a flaming wick in defendant\u2019s hand. Officer Bickler testified that when he interviewed Lira about two days after the fire, Lira made some vague comment as to seeing people near the building.\nWhile Lira\u2019s earliest statements serve to impeach his trial testimony, we note that they were taken within two days of the fire. At this time Lira was either in the emergency room or the intensive care unit of the hospital. Moreover, he was in pain and under sedation. When Lira came out of sedation about nine or 10 days later, he mentioned seeing people near the building. His response to Bickler\u2019s questioning two days after the fire also evidenced some remembrance of people near the house.\nThese factors affect the weight to be given Lira\u2019s testimony by the trier of fact. However, the traumatic circumstances of Lira\u2019s hospital condition after the fire mitigate the impeachment value of these early police statements. It is the function of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. (People v. Akis (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 296, 347 N.E.2d 733.) Under the circumstances of this case, Lira was not so substantially impeached as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. Compare People v. Morgan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 200, 370 N.E.2d 1063.\nDefendant alleges further inconsistencies between Lira\u2019s testimony and early police statements. The record indicates that, considering his medical condition, these discrepancies are minor and do not detract from the reasonableness of complainant\u2019s story as a whole. See People v. Brown (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 182, 336 N.E.2d 523.\nDefendant finally contends that Lira\u2019s admission to a prior theft conviction and to agreeing to illegally exchange money for food stamps materially detracts from the reasonableness of his testimony. Again, these are merely factors bearing upon credibility. Moreover, the adequacy of proof to support a conviction depends on the individual facts of each case. (People v. Johnson (1968), 93 Ill.App. 2d 184, 236 N.E.2d 388.) Much of Lira\u2019s testimony was substantially corroborated by other witnesses who were present at various stages of events leading up to the arson.\nRosenquist corroborated the discussion between Lira and defendant concerning the food stamps. He further testified as to defendant\u2019s anger. Tibor, Rosenquist and Junior confirmed that the three girls were looking for Lira.\nWitnesses also corroborated Lira\u2019s testimony that a threatening note written by defendant existed. As the note was not produced at trial, no witness remembered its exact contents. Yet, Tibor and Schuler testified to the substance of a threat to do damage to Lira and his property. Rosenquist and Junior Lira testified that defendant wrote the note. Rosenquist also testified he overheard a conversation about how to make Molotov cocktails. Czerwinski testified as to threats against Lira by defendant and that she asked him about Molotov cocktails.\nIn short, Officer Bickler\u2019s testimony was sufficiently convincing to establish the fire was caused by an accelerant rather than accident. (See People v. Smith (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 237, 357 N.E.2d 1320.) Defendant\u2019s motive and opportunity for the commission of arson were established through circumstantial evidence. (Smith.) Moreover, there is sufficient evidence of defendant\u2019s criminal intent to commit arson by her prior threats to \u201cburn him.\u201d (People v. Alexander (1966), 77 Ill. App. 2d 151, 222 N.E.2d 172.) Such threats are highly relevant and in connection with other circumstances in this case lead to a logical inference of guilt. People v. Smith; People v. McAleer (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 821, 341 N.E.2d 72.\nLira\u2019s testimony constitutes the only direct evidence that defendant was actually present at his apartment during the firebombing. However, numerous circumstantial evidence indicates guilt. We have commented above about deference given to the trier of fact\u2019s resolution of attempted impeachment upon credibility. Here, the trial court was sitting as trier of fact, charged with determining the credibility of witnesses. Its findings are entitled to great weight and although not conclusive will not be disturbed unless the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Pellegrino (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 331, 196 N.E.2d 670.) We find no adequate reason to reverse its finding.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony as to the alleged threatening contents of the note when neither the note nor a reliable reconstruction of its text was offered at trial. Defendant argues that such testimony was impermissible hearsay and violative of the best evidence rule. Additionally, she asserts that her due process rights to discovery and to confront the evidence against her were violated. Specifically, she maintains that loss of the note by the State precluded her from demonstrating through handwriting analysis that she did not write the note.\nThe State\u2019s reply is twofold. First, waiver is argued since no written post-trial motion specifying these issues was filed by defendant. Second, the State maintains the trial court did not err in admitting testimony as to the contents of the note, since it was received for a limited purpose. The court chose to characterize the note in the same class as a verbal act.\nConcerning waiver, since this was a bench trial and these issues were presented to the court, the issues have been preserved. (People v. Guynn (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 736, 338 N.E.2d 239.) Moreover, defendant did make an oral post-trial motion.\nWe note initially that the \u201cbest evidence rule\u201d applies only when the proof of the contents of a document, as distinguished from its existence, is at issue. (Hunter, Trial Handbook for Illinois Lawyers \u00a756.1 (4th ed. 1972); Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a715.3 (2d ed. 1963).) The existence of the note at the time of the incident is uncontradicted, since defendant testified about the note. However, testimony concerning the note\u2019s contents was also introduced to indicate its threatening nature.\nThe original of a document is not required and other evidence of the contents is admissible if it is lost, so long as the proponent has not lost it in bad faith. (Burns v. Schmidt (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 47, 174 N.E.2d 188; Ragen v. Bennigsen (1956), 10 Ill. App. 2d 356, 135 N.E.2d 128.) Illinois recognizes degrees of secondary evidence, such as duplicates or copies, which must be accounted for before parol proof may be offered. Illinois Land & Loan Co. v. Bonner (1874), 75 Ill. 315; Civil Trial Evidence \u00a76.2 (Ill. Inst. Cont\u2019g Legal Educ. 1971).\nInvestigator Schuler\u2019s testimony that no copies were made of the note is uncontroverted. Additionally, the record does not contain any evidence of bad faith on the part of the police in the loss of the note. Accordingly, the \u201cbest evidence rule\u201d does not preclude oral proofs as to the contents of the note for the limited purpose intended.\nMoreover, absent bad faith or police misconduct, such as deliberate destruction of the note, we find defendant\u2019s due process challenge also is unpersuasive. Defendant\u2019s \u201cMotion for Pre-Trial Discovery\u201d requested the State to list any physical evidence that may be used at trial and produce any evidence which would be favorable to defendant. The State\u2019s \u201cAnswer to Discovery\u201d listed the note as physical evidence that may be used at trial. It was further noted that: \u201cAll physical evidence listed will be made available for inspection as required by the Supreme Court Rules, i.e., at a reasonable time and date upon request.\u201d The record does not indicate any attempt by defendant to inspect the note prior to trial. The State\u2019s response to defendant\u2019s inquiry as to exculpatory evidence was that no such evidence was known to the State.\nThe right of the defense to be informed on exculpatory evidence found by the prosecution is secured both under the Federal Constitution (Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194) and by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 412(c)). Case law interpreting this right generally focuses upon the concept of \u201csuppression\u201d by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused. In the instant case, the note was lost or misplaced by the police either at the preliminary hearing or sometime thereafter. Accordingly, cases cited by defendant concerning suppression or destruction of physical evidence are distinguishable. See, e.g., People v. Nichols (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 443, 349 N.E.2d 40; People v. Taylor (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 454, 369 N.E.2d 573.\nNotwithstanding the good faith of the State and the distinction between lost and suppressed evidence, the prosecution has an affirmative duty to volunteer exculpatory evidence to the defense. (United States v. Augurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392; Brady v. Maryland). The Supreme Court Rules regarding criminal discovery obligate the State to coordinate and assure evidence gathering, storage and retrieval. Supreme Court Rule 412(f) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 412(f)) provides:\n\u201cThe State should ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the various investigative personnel and its office sufficient to place within its possession or control all material and information relevant to the accused and the offense charged.\u201d\nAccordingly, if the missing note was exculpatory (i.e., favorable to the defendant, tended to negate the guilt of defendant as to the offense charged, tended to reduce his punishment, was susceptible to weakening or affecting any evidence that the State would use against defendant), the fact that the note was lost rather than suppressed would be immaterial. Brady v. Maryland. See Moore v. Illinois (1972), 408 U.S. 786, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706, 92 S. Ct. 2562; People v. Jones (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 152, 361 N.E.2d 1104; People v. Berry (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 647, 370 N.E.2d 26.\nDefendant asserts that the note may have proved exculpatory if a handwriting expert examined it and found that she was not the writer. We note that the State did not consider the note to be exculpatory. Moreover, the record fails to indicate any pre-trial attempt by defendant to inspect the note or have her expert examine it.\nIn the present case, where the evidence in question is unavailable, to require proof that the note would in fact have been exculpatory would constitute an absurd demand. However, to require that the defense demonstrate how that evidence could have been exculpatory under the overall evidence in the case is reasonable. People v. Ruffalo (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 532, 388 N.E.2d 114.\nWe find, however, that defendant has failed to meet such a requirement. Testimony concerning the note and its contents was admitted but limited as evidence of a verbal threat by defendant against Lira. We find there is independent testimony of prior verbal threats, other than the note itself, which standing alone is persuasive enough to support a finding of guilt. Defendant admitted being a party to the note, having knowledge of its contents and knowing that her name was ascribed to it. Even if she could prove by handwriting analysis that she did not draft the note, in light of evidence demonstrating numerous threats by defendant prior to the arson, absence of the note at trial does not violate due process.\nFinally, we turn to defendant\u2019s hearsay objections. Hearsay consists in the testimonial use of an unsworn, out-of-court statement as proof of the fact asserted by the out-of-court declarant. (Simon v. Plotkin (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 603, 365 N.E.2d 1022.) When an out-of-court statement is used, not as evidence of the fact asserted but as circumstantial evidence for another purpose, the hearsay rule is inapplicable. Gass v. Carducci (1962), 37 Ill. App. 2d 181, 185 N.E.2d 285.\nWe find that the trial court correctly applied these principles in admitting evidence concerning the note for a limited purpose. This limited purpose is reflected by the court\u2019s remarks in response to counsels\u2019 arguments concerning the admissibility of testimony as to the note\u2019s contents:\n\u201d \u00b0 Actually it [the note] is in the same class as a verbal act. It is not admissible for * 0 * it has no probative value for 000 the message on the note. # # #\nI want to make the record clear that I am admitting it * * * only for the limited purpose which I have indicated. # # e\n[TJhey testified that they can not recall the contents of the note verbatim. * \u2022 *\nIt goes to the weight and to the purpose for which it would be admitted. # e #\n[N]obody has admitted the note \u00b0 \u00b0 \u00b0 or the summary of its contents for the truth. # # #\nSimply for the fact that there was a note which said this and whether or not it\u2019s true is an entirely different question \u00b0 \u201d\nAccordingly, the trial court committed no error since testimony was not received for the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to indicate that such a note existed (as defendant admitted) and as circumstantial evidence of a threat to \u201cbum\u201d complainant and his property.\nMoreover, by accepting testimony only as evidence of a threat, the evidence was merely cumulative. Junior and Czerwinski both testified that defendant verbally threatened to \u201cburn\u201d complainant. Accordingly, even if testimony concerning the note constituted hearsay, it is not prejudicial; it was merely cumulative as to other evidence. People v. Daliege (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 706, 352 N.E.2d 247.\nFor all of the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcGLOON and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph Ruebner and Kenneth L. Jones, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Paul C. Gridelli, and Thomas Brucker, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA LEE KLISNICK, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 78-31\nOpinion filed May 29, 1979.\nRalph Ruebner and Kenneth L. Jones, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Lee T. Hettinger, Paul C. Gridelli, and Thomas Brucker, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0148-01", "first_page_order": 170, "last_page_order": 182 }