{
  "id": 3261599,
  "name": "TROPHYTIME, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LARRY GRAHAM, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Trophytime, Inc. v. Graham",
  "decision_date": "1979-06-26",
  "docket_number": "No. 15385",
  "first_page": "335",
  "last_page": "337",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 335"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "262 N.E.2d 823",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "128 Ill. App. 2d 181",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2655907
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/128/0181-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 257,
    "char_count": 3852,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.895,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.533010285252726e-07,
      "percentile": 0.9239714361725336
    },
    "sha256": "c28f2207ffc6515c6f2b7f562a89f203478ec4026d5d624e2e5399d45f96d1de",
    "simhash": "1:f33807afb75acf2c",
    "word_count": 648
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:34.335432+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "TROPHYTIME, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LARRY GRAHAM, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE MILLS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe do not reach the merits.\nWe cannot.\nNo jurisdiction.\nHere\u2019s why: A motion directed against an interlocutory order will not toll the running of the 30-day deadline for the filing of the notice of appeal.\nTrophy time sought \u2014 inter alia \u2014 to have a former employee enjoined from competing with plaintiff, based upon an alleged breach of contract. After hearings, the trial court, in a memorandum opinion and order dated August 30, 1978, denied plaintiff\u2019s request for an injunction. Then, a motion to vacate the August 30 order was filed by plaintiff on September 13, 1978. That motion sought a rehearing on defendant\u2019s motion for judgment or, in the alternative, leave to file an amendment to the complaint. This motion was denied on November 30, 1978, and on December 27, 1978, the plaintiff filed a notice of interlocutory appeal.\nThis court \u2014 observing that the notice of interlocutory appeal was filed almost four months after entry of the order being appealed \u2014 sua sponte entered a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 307. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 307.) We conclude that plaintiff\u2019s notice of interlocutory appeal was not timely filed and therefore this appeal must be dismissed.\nSupreme Court Rule 307 allows an interlocutory appeal to be perfected by the filing of a notice of appeal within 30 days from the entry of the interlocutory order denying an injunction. Having failed to meet this time restriction, plaintiff now argues that its motion requesting that the August 30 order be vacated extended the time within which it could file a timely notice of appeal. Under plaintiff\u2019s reasoning, the notice of appeal was timely filed since it was filed within 30 days of the date that its September 13 motion was denied.\nWe cannot agree.\nIn Seaman v. Lawn Savings & Loan Association (1970), 128 Ill. App. 2d 181, 262 N.E.2d 823, the plaintiff argued that his motion, filed subsequent to the entry of an interlocutory order, started over again the time for filing the notice of such an appeal under section 68.3 of the Civil Practice Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110, par. 68.3.) In rejecting this contention, the Seaman court pointed out that section 68.3 deals with motions to vacate or modify final decrees or final judgments in cases tried without a jury. It does not appear to have any relevance to interlocutory orders. Nor is the time within which to file a notice of interlocutory appeal extended by filing a post-trial motion pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 303(a)), which is directed to final judgments.\nPlaintiff argues that its motion \u2014 unlike the one filed in Seaman\u2014 directly attacked the interlocutory order and any issue relating to that order was not settled and disposed of until the motion was denied on November 30. We do not find this argument persuasive. The grant or denial of the extraordinary relief of an injunction ordinarily has a substantial impact upon one of the parties. Rule 307 is an exception to the final judgment rule and allows a party to take an appeal from such interlocutory orders. We are aware of no authority, however, which would allow a motion (filed subsequent to the entry of an interlocutory order) to postpone the time in which to file a timely notice of appeal.\nPlaintiff has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 307 and, thus, we are without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.\nAppeal dismissed.\nREARDON, P. J., and CRAVEN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE MILLS"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mort A. Segall, of Law Offices of Mort A. Segall, of Urbana, for appellant.",
      "Francis J. Davis, of Maloney & Davis, of Urbana, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "TROPHYTIME, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LARRY GRAHAM, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 15385\nOpinion filed June 26, 1979.\nMort A. Segall, of Law Offices of Mort A. Segall, of Urbana, for appellant.\nFrancis J. Davis, of Maloney & Davis, of Urbana, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0335-01",
  "first_page_order": 357,
  "last_page_order": 359
}