{
  "id": 3263760,
  "name": "JOANN WILKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wilkins v. Department of Public Aid",
  "decision_date": "1979-06-04",
  "docket_number": "No. 78-434",
  "first_page": "504",
  "last_page": "507",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 504"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "319 N.E.2d 34",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 284",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2953913
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/58/0284-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "362 N.E.2d 345",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1974,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 242",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5464462
      ],
      "year": 1974,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/66/0242-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "383 N.E.2d 275",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 221",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3320862
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/66/0221-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1075",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 1034",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3366599
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "1039"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/47/1034-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "196 N.E.2d 686",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 343",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2828022
      ],
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/30/0343-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 460,
    "char_count": 7685,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.898,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.572654163217837e-08,
      "percentile": 0.40246439078108415
    },
    "sha256": "9d06c2c86a072bca27633412b1cc31bdec8519ba719afd498ff48fee06c10e51",
    "simhash": "1:a7fccf267bfd0773",
    "word_count": 1252
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:34.335432+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JOANN WILKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal arises from an adjudication by the circuit court of a Department of Public Aid lien filed against the proceeds of an insurance policy payable for the damages sustained by plaintiff, Jo Ann Wilkins, who was injured in an automobile accident on August 29, 1977.\nThe policy was owned by plaintiffs mother, Ruby Wilkins, and covered members of her household for injuries caused by uninsured motorists. The policy limits were *10,000 for each person and *1,000 for medical payments, of which *653.50 had been already paid as reimbursement for certain medical expenses. The Department of Public Aid, hereinafter referred to as Department, filed a lien for *15,044.44 against the insurance proceeds for sums paid to and for plaintiffs benefit as a result of the accident, said lien being filed under the authority of section 11 \u2014 22 of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 23, par. 11\u201422).\nPlaintiff petitioned the trial court to adjudicate the rights, of the parties and to apportion the insurance proceeds. At the hearing on plaintiff\u2019s petition, Ruby Wilkins testified regarding her daughter\u2019s injuries and medical expenses. She related that she had personally incurred certain expenses as a result of her daughter\u2019s injuries and in the course of her daughter\u2019s continuing medical treatments, which expenses were not reimbursible by the Department. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered the available funds to be distributed in the following manner: *3,386.98 to plaintiff\u2019s attorney; *346.50 for payment of specified medical expenses; *2,250.00 to the Department; and the balance of *4,363.02, to plaintiff. By the terms of its order, the trial court also prohibited the Department from reducing plaintiff\u2019s future public aid payments or grants because of the monies allocated to her by the court.\nThe Department does not dispute the allocation of funds; therefore, the only issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering \u201cthat no future public aid payment or grant shall be reduced because of petitioner\u2019s receipt of monies adjudicated and apportioned to her herein.\u201d\nSection 11 \u2014 22 of the Illinois Public Aid Code provides that the department has a charge upon all claims, demands and causes of action for personal injuries occurring to a public aid recipient and charges the trial court with the responsibility of determining and allocating the Department\u2019s and recipient\u2019s interest in any personal recovery by the recipient (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 23, par. 11\u201422). The Department argues that the trial court exceeded its authority under the above section by its order preventing the Department from considering the apportioned funds as income to the plaintiff. We agree.\nWe initially note that in determining whether the Department\u2019s lien should be reduced at all, the court must weigh several policy considerations. Accommodations necessarily must be made between the dual purposes of the statutory scheme: namely, permitting the State to recover from a public aid recipient\u2019s personal injury award amounts furnished for medical assistance in order to lessen the burden on the taxpayer or to enable the State to help others in need of assistance (Beck v. Buena Park Hotel Corp. (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 343, 196 N.E.2d 686), and the prevention of double recovery by or an unjust enrichment of a recipient who acquires a fund for repayment (Schramer v. Wurtinger (2d Dist. 1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 362 N.E.2d 1075). Implicit within the court\u2019s power to reduce the Department\u2019s lien, however, is a policy of dealing fairly with a public aid recipient who may have been only partially recompensed when consideration is given to his pain and suffering and future medical bills (Moss v. Glynn (3d Dist. 1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 221, 383 N.E.2d 275).\nThe limits of the trial court\u2019s discretion in adjudicating the Department\u2019s lien under section 11 \u2014 22 and the standards by which the exercise of discretion are to be measured are, for apparent reasons, not precise. It is settled, however, that any reduction must be justified by sufficient evidence to support the exercise of discretion. See Johnson v. Lynch (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 242, 362 N.E.2d 345; Bender v. City of Chicago (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 284, 319 N.E.2d 34.\nOur focus in the instant cause is not on the amounts allocated to the respective parties, inasmuch as neither party challenges their distributed share; instead, we need only examine the statute and determine whether the trial court\u2019s restriction was proper. In this regard, we need not determine nor dwell upon the State\u2019s argument that funds recovered for personal injuries are to be considered as available income in determining eligibility for public aid.\nIt is apparent from the record that the trial court was attempting to ensure that the plaintiff would have the full benefit of the funds allocated to her. The court was also made aware of future expenses to be borne by the plaintiff and her mother which would not be reimbursed by the Department.\nPlaintiff contends that without the order of the trial court immunizing the allocated funds from future aid reductions, there can be no effective allocation of the personal injury recovery. She relies on that portion of the opinion in Wurtinger stating:\n\u201cImplicit also in the provision which allows the trial court to reduce the State\u2019s lien is the policy of dealing fairly with a public aid recipient who is recompensed only partially for that which an injury has taken from him. An accommodation of these policies is best reached in our view if the amount of the State\u2019s lien is adjudicated at an amount the debtor is realistically able to repay.\u201d (47 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1039.)\nPlaintiff argues that in order to accomplish this purpose and to guarantee that plaintiff would receive full benefit from the amount allocated, it was necessary for the court to make the funds immune from consideration by the Department in any attempt to decrease payments. While the restrictions contained in the court\u2019s order are, under the facts of this case, understandable, they are nevertheless erroneous and in excess of the court\u2019s authority under section 11 \u2014 22 of the Illinois Public Aid Code. Whether the Department would increase, decrease or leave unchanged the amount of plaintiff\u2019s aid, based upon the amount allocated to her by the trial court, is clearly a decision to be made by the Department free from any restrictions by the court which made the allocation. The court\u2019s order has, in effect, eliminated the Department\u2019s discretion to deal with the changing circumstances of the plaintiff\u2019s financial status.\nShould the Department subsequently reduce the amount of plaintiff\u2019s public aid or eliminate it entirely, she has a statutory right to appeal as provided in sections 11 \u2014 8 through 11 \u2014 8.7 of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 23, pars. 11\u20148 through 11\u20148.7); and she may then question the propriety of such reduction.\nAccordingly, we reverse the order of the Circuit Court of Alexander County directing that no future public aid payments to the plaintiff be reduced because of monies allocated to her in this cause.\nReversed.\nG. MORAN, P. J., and KUNCE, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Myra Turner, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.",
      "Clinton J. Thurston and Kerry D. Hunter, both of Thurston & Associates, of Cairo, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JOANN WILKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFifth District\nNo. 78-434\nOpinion filed June 4, 1979.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Chicago (Myra Turner, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.\nClinton J. Thurston and Kerry D. Hunter, both of Thurston & Associates, of Cairo, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0504-01",
  "first_page_order": 526,
  "last_page_order": 529
}