{
  "id": 3262148,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LESLIE AUDI, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Audi",
  "decision_date": "1979-06-22",
  "docket_number": "No. 78-248",
  "first_page": "568",
  "last_page": "571",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 568"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "389 N.E.2d 670",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 267",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5581330
      ],
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/71/0267-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "376 N.E.2d 449",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 207",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3352666
      ],
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/60/0207-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "369 N.E.2d 573",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 454",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3399698
      ],
      "year": 1977,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/54/0454-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "216 N.E.2d 147",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1966,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 475",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2878643
      ],
      "year": 1966,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/34/0475-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "389 N.E.2d 534",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 535",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2990737
      ],
      "year": 1979,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/75/0535-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "378 N.E.2d 225",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 483",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3346832
      ],
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/61/0483-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "172 N.E.2d 794",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1961,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 373",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2731929
      ],
      "year": 1961,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/21/0373-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 557,
    "char_count": 8299,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.888,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 9.261606478190819e-08,
      "percentile": 0.5114365741014244
    },
    "sha256": "bd8d9f0241e19f87ad4858a025c227d0e1e50dc76fdd04ce2e105ea95784288a",
    "simhash": "1:280d711ce3e6e8a7",
    "word_count": 1348
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:34.335432+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LESLIE AUDI, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE KARNS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant appeals from her conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, entered upon a jury verdict of guilty in the Circuit Court of Randolph County. Defendant was arrested without a warrant on December 2, 1977, while attempting to visit an inmate at Menard State Penitentiary. A routine pat-down of incoming visitors by prison personnel in the waiting room adjoining the visiting area revealed seven blue tablets in defendant\u2019s jacket pocket. The pills were identified as diazepam, commonly known as valium. After being informed of her Miranda rights by the penitentiary\u2019s internal investigator, defendant admitted to him that she had carried the pills into the waiting area. The investigator placed the tablets in an envelope and called the State Police.\nThe officer who arrived at the scene received the envelope, arrested defendant, and advised her of her rights. Defendant acknowledged to the officer that she had possessed the tablets. The trooper then transported defendant and the envelope of pills to the county jail for processing. When the officer left the booking area for a moment, defendant tore open the envelope and swallowed six of the seven tablets. Upon the officer\u2019s return, defendant told him what she had done, declaring that her purpose had been to destroy the evidence.\nOn the same day that she was arrested, defendant was released on bail. An information was filed against her on December 19,1977, and an arraignment was held that same day. At a preliminary hearing on December 27, 1977, the court found probable cause for defendant\u2019s prosecution.\nThe information, signed by an assistant state\u2019s attorney, \u201cinform[ed] the court that defendant knowingly and unlawfully had in her possession less than 30 grams of a substance containing Diazepam, a controlled substance.\u201d Underneath the assistant\u2019s signature was a jurat signed by a notary public, reading simply, \u201cSubscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of December, 1977.\u201d\nDefendant argues that the information was defective in that it was executed by an assistant State\u2019s attorney rather than the State\u2019s attorney himself. Her further argument concerns the sufficiency of the oath on the information. She maintains that a positive verification rather than a jurat attesting to the authenticity of the assistant\u2019s signature is required.\nPeople v. White, 21 Ill. 2d 373, 172 N.E.2d 794 (1961), is dispositive of the signature issue. In White the supreme court held that an assistant State\u2019s attorney is cloaked with sufficient authority to initiate prosecution by signing an information. In People v. Audi, 61 Ill. App. 3d 483, 378 N.E.2d 225 (1978), involving the same defendant, we likewise held that an assistant State\u2019s attorney is authorized to sign an information.\nAsserting that a positive oath is necessary to verify an information, defendant cites section 111 \u2014 3(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 111\u20143(b)) for the proposition that \u201c* * * an information shall be signed by the State\u2019s Attorney and sworn to by him or another.* * *\u201d It is settled that the mandate for verification is statutory rather than constitutional in origin. People v. Audi, 75 Ill. 2d 535, 389 N.E.2d 534 (1979); People v. Harding, 34 Ill. 2d 475, 216 N.E.2d 147 (1966).\nThe purpose of the oath requirement, as explained by the supreme court in Audi, is to hold answerable on pain of perjury an individual who swears to an information. Section 5 of \u201cAn Act to revise the law in relation to oaths and affirmations\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 101, par. 5) provides:\n\u201cAll oaths, affirmations, affidavits and depositions, administered or taken as provided in this act, shall subject any person who shall so swear or affirm willfully and falsely, in matter material to any issue or point in question, to the like pains and penalties as are inflicted by law on persons convicted of willful and corrupt perjury.\u201d\nAs liability for falsehood may arise regardless of the wording of an oath, distinction among the types of oaths is not crucial.\nWe note that in defining an \u201cinformation,\u201d the legislature required verification but did not prescribe a specific form. Had the legislature intended to designate a particular type of oath, it could have done so. Indeed, the. legislature has indicated by its definition of \u201coath\u201d that an informal affirmation will suffice: \u201cThe word \u2018oath\u2019 shall be deemed to include an affirmation, and the word \u2018sworn\u2019 shall be construed to include the word \u2018affirmed.\u2019 \u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 131, par. 1.12.\nWe have discerned that the purpose of verification is the pursuit of truth, so that courts are not involved in groundless proceedings nor defendants subject to frivolous prosecutions. Concern with the precise nature of the oath diminishes in light of the preliminary hearing, a judicial inquiry into probable cause for prosecution. The preliminary hearing interposes an additional means of testing veracity. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 102\u201417, 109\u20143.) A preliminary hearing is constitutionally required whenever a prosecution is initiated by means of an information. Article I, section 7 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that \u201c[n]o person shall be held for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless either the initial charge has been brought by indictment of a grand jury or the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a77.\nDefendant alleges that the State\u2019s chemical analysis of the diazepam tablet destroyed the evidence against her and deprived her of an opportunity to present her case to the jury. We find no merit to this argument given the facts before us. This is not a case where the State tested a small sample of evidence and unnecessarily destroyed the balance. (See People v. Taylor, 54 Ill. App. 3d 454, 369 N.E.2d 573 (1977); People v. Dodsworth, 60 Ill. App. 3d 207, 376 N.E.2d 449 (1978).) A chemist in the State crime laboratory testified that destruction of the tablet was an inevitable result of chemical analysis; that the laboratory test required reducing the tablet to powder in order to isolate and measure the controlled substance therein by eliminating the residue. Once broken down for analysis, the tablet could not be reconstituted. Defendant herself is responsible for the situation that only one tablet remained to be tested. She cannot be heard to complain that her own destruction of the evidence deprived her of the right to produce it in court.\nFinally, defendant argues that her sentence of 2 to 6 years imposed on May 24, 1978, was improper and excessive. We have reviewed the sentence imposed under section 5 \u2014 5\u20144.1 of the Unified Code of Corrections, as amended (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005\u20145\u20144.1) applicable to our consideration of defendant\u2019s sentence, and our decision in People v. Choate, 71 Ill. App. 3d 267, 389 N.E.2d 670 (1979), and conclude that the presumption in favor of the propriety of the sentence has not been overcome. In light of defendant\u2019s criminal record and her presentence report, and considering that defendant had the drug in her possession inside a penal institution, we find nothing in the record to demonstrate that the sentence imposed was improper. Defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence are affirmed.\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Randolph County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nG. MORAN, P. J., concurs.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE KARNS"
      },
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE JONES,\nspecially concurring:\nI question the efficacy of People v. Choate and accordingly do not agree with the concluding paragraph of the majority opinion. However, since I believe the proper result has been reached under the applicable law, I nevertheless concur with the result.",
        "type": "concurrence",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE JONES,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hogan and Jochums, of Murphysboro, for appellant.",
      "William A. Schuwerk, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Chester (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Curtis L. Blood, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LESLIE AUDI, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 78-248\nOpinion filed June 22, 1979.\nRehearing denied July 24, 1979.\nJONES, J., specially concurring.\nHogan and Jochums, of Murphysboro, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Schuwerk, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Chester (Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., and Curtis L. Blood, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0568-01",
  "first_page_order": 590,
  "last_page_order": 593
}
