{ "id": 3268004, "name": "DENNIS P. LANNERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREYHOUND COMPUTER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Lannert v. Greyhound Computer Corp.", "decision_date": "1979-08-01", "docket_number": "No. 78-278", "first_page": "495", "last_page": "498", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 495" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ga. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 794478 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/147/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.W.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10132713 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/405/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 P.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Colo. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 91053 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "1093" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/131/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460412 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/398/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 N.Y.S.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.W. 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Mich. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1784336 ], "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/279/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607035 ], "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 2139482 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/267/0370-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 473, "char_count": 8162, "ocr_confidence": 0.92, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.36467879015340277 }, "sha256": "20894a85943b2c803cf736a06610aff412f4cb284aa49ab1b3809552a3fef826", "simhash": "1:a961d5ffe5ae1a99", "word_count": 1312 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:44.225302+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DENNIS P. LANNERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREYHOUND COMPUTER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE LINDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Dennis Lannert, brought an action to recover *11,250 allegedly due under an incentive compensation plan sponsored by defendant, Greyhound Computer Corporation. The trial court entered judgment for defendant and plaintiff brings this appeal.\nPlaintiff was employed by defendant from July 1, 1969, until he voluntarily resigned on July 2, 1976. Beginning January 1, 1976, plaintiff was entitled to participate in an incentive compensation plan in addition to his *30,000 annual salary. The plan provided that plaintiff would be paid an \u201cincentive base\u201d of *15,000 per year if company income equaled 100% of the approved operating plan. The plan also provided that plaintiff would be paid 2.5 times the \u201cincentive base\u201d as \u201cmaximum incentive compensation\u201d in the event company profits further exceeded certain projections. Altogether, plaintiff would be entitled to an incentive bonus of *18,750 for the six months he was employed in 1976.\nThe parties agree that company operations were such that both the \u201cincentive base\u201d and \u201cmaximum incentive compensation\u201d were due under the agreement. It is also agreed that upon termination plaintiff was paid the \u201cincentive base\u201d or *7,500. The dispute in this case is whether plaintiff is entitled to the \u201cmaximum incentive compensation\u201d of *11,250 since he resigned prior to the end of the year.\nThe controversy centers around interpretation of the following provision in the incentive compensation plan:\n\u201cIf an employee is terminated because of illness, disability, or death during the course of the year, incentive compensation is limited to the amount earned to the end of the quarter closest to the date when the termination took place. If an employee is terminated for any reason other than illness, disability or death during the course of the year, incentive compensation is limited to the amount earned to the end of the quarter closest to the date when the termination took place with a maximum of 100% of the pro rata portion of the Incentive Base for such quarter.\u201d\nIn short, an employee who is terminated for reasons of health is entitled to that portion of both the \u201cincentive base\u201d and \u201cmaximum incentive compensation\u201d earned to the end of the quarter closest to termination, whereas an employee terminated for any other reason is limited to an amount equal to the \u201cincentive base.\u201d Defendant refused to pay plaintiff the \u201cmaximum incentive compensation\u201d of *11,250, arguing that voluntary resignation was a termination for \u201creasons other than illness, disability or death.\u201d\nPlaintiff filed suit on September 21,1977, contending that the phrase \u201cemployee is terminated\u201d does not include voluntary resignations and that under the plan incentive compensation becomes earned and vested quarterly, thereby entitling him to the *11,250. Defendant apparently concedes that if the limitations of the \u201cTermination\u201d provision do not apply, plaintiff is entitled to the money. The trial court entered judgment for defendant, finding that the compensation plan was comprehensive in scope including both voluntary and forced terminations.\nPlaintiff argues on appeal that the phrase \u201cemployee is terminated\u201d excludes by definition voluntary resignation. The verb \u201cis terminated\u201d forms the passive as opposed to active voice making the subject of the verb (employee) the recipient of the action rather than the actor. Strictly speaking, \u201cemployee is terminated\u201d means terminated as a result of action by someone other than the employee.\nDefendant cites cases that hold that the phrase \u201ctermination of employment\u201d means a complete severance of the relationship of employer and employee by a positive act of either the employee, employer, or both. (Moss v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. (S. C. 1976), 228 S.E.2d 108, 111. Lineberger v. Security Life & Trust Co. (1956), 245 N.C. 166, 170, 95 S.E.2d 501, 503; Peters v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. (1937), 279 Mich. 663, 665, 273 N.W. 307, 308; Burns v. Stento (1939), 9 N.Y.S.2d 736, 742.) These cases, however, are not controlling as they do not seek to define the phrase \u201cemployee is terminated.\u201d\nIn sum, we find the language in question to be subject to a variety of plausible interpretations. As a result we feel it best to apply the widely accepted rule that \u201c[a]n instrument is to be construed most strongly against its author.\u201d (Cedar Park Cemetery Association, Inc. v. Village of Calumet Park (1947), 398 Ill. 324, 333, 75 N.E.2d 874.) The record indicates that the plan was drafted by defendant Greyhound Computer Corporation, and any ambiguity is to be resolved against Greyhound.\nIn Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Reich (1955), 131 Colo. 407, 411, 282 P.2d 1091, 1093, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted an extra compensation agreement remarkably similar to the plan at issue here. In that agreement extra compensation was to be paid based on the net profit of the store which the defendant managed. The agreement provided that \u201c[i]f, during the year, your employment is terminated for any reason, or if you become disabled, or are placed on a leave of absence, both your eligibility for Extra Compensation and the amount thereof, if any, shall be at the discretion of a Bonus Committee.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Defendant voluntarily resigned before the end of a fiscal year, and the bonus committee denied his claim for extra compensation. The court, however, found that the defendant was entitled to a proportionate share of the extra compensation:\n\u201cOf course, counsel for plaintiff contends that by his resignation defendant forfeited the right to the extra compensation. We find this to be an appropriate occasion to repeat the time-honored statement that forfeitures are not favored in the law, and to be effectual, must be clear and unequivocal; and further, this contract is to be liberally construed in favor of defendant, because it was drafted by plaintiff. An analytic reading of this contract will not permit any construction other than that extra compensation based on the net profit of the store for the fiscal year is an uncalculated addition to the salary fixed therein. s \u00b0 * In the absence of any failure on the part of defendant to faithfully serve plaintiff under this contract, justice requires that it be determined that he earned the proportionate part of the net profit of the store for the period which he served. A further provision in the contract, \u2018No extra compensation or any part thereof shall become due or payable before the end of the fiscal year\u2019 is not a condition concerning the payment of the extra compensation, but is only a fixing of the time at which it was to be paid. Logical reasoning for this is in the fact that the net profit for the fiscal year could not be determined until the close of that period.\nCases upon which counsel for plaintiff relies to support denial of this extra compensation to defendant are based upon contracts containing clear and unequivocal forfeiture in the event of voluntary termination of the employment by the employee.\u201d 131 Colo. 407, 411, 282 P.2d 1093; see also Haggar Co. v. Rutkiewicz (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), 405 S.W.2d 462; Anderson v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America (1978), 147 Ga. App. 236, 248 S.E.2d 507.\nHere, too, there is an absence of clear and unequivocal language that voluntary termination would result in a forfeiture. The fact that under the plan payment for the fourth quarter must await a year-end audit does not affect plaintiff\u2019s right to a proportionate share of his bonus based on service for two quarters. Accordingly we hold the plaintiff is entitled to *11,250 as his proportionate share of the \u201cmaximum incentive compensation.\u201d Thus we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of McHenry County and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.\nReversed and remanded.\nSEIDENFELD and RECHENMACHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE LINDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "James A. Campion, of Joslyn and Green, of Woodstock, for appellant.", "Thompson and Thompson, of Long Grove, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DENNIS P. LANNERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREYHOUND COMPUTER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 78-278\nOpinion filed August 1, 1979.\nJames A. Campion, of Joslyn and Green, of Woodstock, for appellant.\nThompson and Thompson, of Long Grove, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0495-01", "first_page_order": 517, "last_page_order": 520 }